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Executive Summary  
 
The Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance has been commissioned by the Canadian Government to 
determine how best to generate sustainable finance, a significant challenge given the carbon intensity 
of Canada’s economy. The Expert Panel has defined sustainable finance as capital flows, risk 
management activities and financial processes that assimilate environmental and social factors as a 
means of promoting sustainable economic growth and the long-term stability of the financial system.  
While there are numerous strategies to be deployed to move Canada to a financially sustainable 
future, this report addresses two critically important issues: fiduciary obligation of corporate- and 
pension-fiduciaries, and national action on environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) financial 
disclosure, including climate-related financial risk disclosure. 
 
Our economy is facing significant challenges and disruptions in the transition to a lower carbon world.  
Our view is that absent clear and innovative steps to ensure our corporations and financial institutions 
act to address carbon emissions and other environmental, social and governance risks and 
opportunities, we will be seriously prejudiced in a world that is rapidly moving towards greener and 
more sustainable economic activity.  
 
Our report offers a comprehensive set of recommendations on these fiduciary obligation and 
disclosure. Our four top priorities are: 
 Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act 
to embed ESG factors, including climate-related risks and opportunities, in the fiduciary 
obligation of directors and officers. 
 Embed ESG matters in financial statements and enhance corporate disclosure on ESG, 
including climate-related financial risk, in reporting requirements of publicly-listed 
companies. 
 Require institutional investors and asset managers, including pension funds and mutual 
funds, to disclose how their portfolio management, voting and engagement activities are 
contributing to a lower carbon economy. 
 Endorse the TCFD disclosure framework and work with accounting standards setters and 
securities authorities to align climate-related financial disclosure. 
 
 
____________________ 
*Dr Janis Sarra, Presidential Distinguished Professor, University of British Columbia and Professor of Law, Peter 
A Allard School of Law, UBC and Professor Cynthia Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University.  
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It is time for the federal government to act to build further on the fiduciary obligation that already 
exists at Canadian common law and in corporate law with respect to directors and officers, as well as 
to codify the obligations that already exist in order to provide greater transparency to the public. We 
also make recommendations to align sustainability disclosure requirements with developments 
nationally and internationally.  It is the moment for Canada to show leadership on the issue of 
transparency regarding factors that pose material risks and opportunities so that Canada will truly 
transition to a greener economy. We want corporate boards to be identifying ESG material risks and 
opportunities, and to be disclosing their thinking and activities on those risks and opportunities to 
their stakeholders, without fear of liability when they are duly diligent in their consideration of these 
issues.   
 
There are currently 120 Canadian corporate and investment firm signatories to the UN Principles for 
Responsible Investment, representing assets under management of over $4 trillion.  These firms have 
committed to the integration of ESG issues into corporate and investment analysis and decision-
making processes. That level of support speaks to the growing recognition that effective corporate 
governance includes addressing ESG risks and opportunities.  
 
The Expert Panel has received opinions concerning many broad policy considerations and a great deal 
of  advice from participants in the financial sector. Our report is purposely very detailed as to the 
precise statutory amendments that the federal government should enact now to meaningfully move 
Canada forward on sustainable finance. Our 25 recommendations serve as a practical guide to 
changes in statutory language  that are required based on the type of legislation and area of fiduciary 
obligation and disclosure discussed.  The majority of the 72 questions posed by the Expert Panel will 
not likely require legislative change, but rather, will require innovative thinking, new finance, a 
principled commitment to a lower carbon economy backed by meaningful economic and 
technological strategies, and strong partnerships between governments, the private sector, the not-
for-profit and non-governmental organization sectors. Our recommendations are “legislatively 
focused” in this submission because they build on existing statutory duties. The improvements 
suggested are aimed at providing a baseline commitment, across the board, for all federally-regulated 
corporations, financial institutions, investment funds and pension funds, to embed sustainable 
thinking in the discharge of their fiduciary obligations. They are largely principles-based, setting 
threshold standards, which directors and officers can then implement as they believe appropriate for 
their organization.  Our recommendations are timely and practical, and give specifics on how changes 
can be accomplished at the federal level. 
 
A priority  is to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) to contain four new provisions 
regarding directors’ fiduciary obligations. First, amend the statute to require directors and officers to 
“consider” ESG factors with a view to the corporation’s best interest. In considering ESG factors, 
directors and officers may conclude that ESG factors are or are not factors posing a material risk or 
opportunity to the corporation.  Corporate stakeholders would be confident that such factors have 
been considered by directors and officers if there is a clear statutory obligation to do so. Second, 
amend the CBCA to require directors and officers to address material ESG factors, an obligation that 
arises only where ESG factors are material to the best interests of the corporation. One option for 
wording, taken from federal environmental legislation, is that directors and officers are to “take all 
reasonable care” to address material ESG issues, which would place a reasonableness standard on 
these obligations.  
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Third, we recommend codifying the common law in a new section 122(2) of the CBCA,  enacting 
specific wording based on Canadian judgments  that directors and officers may consider the interest 
of multiple stakeholders in making decisions.  The Supreme Court of Canada has held that directors 
and officers are to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, “having regard to all 
relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat affected stakeholders in a 
fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen”.  This 
amendment would create greater certainty and transparency for all stakeholders and would 
encourage directors’ oversight of the corporation with a view to long-term sustainability without fear 
of their decisions being attacked by “impatient investors”. Directors’ good faith decisions would be 
protected by the defence under the CBCA that already serves duly diligent directors well. Fourth, we 
recommend that the CBCA be amended to require discussion of management’s approach to material 
ESG risks and opportunities in the management proxy circular distributed before each annual meeting.  
Such information about management’s thinking about sustainability issues is directly relevant to the 
election or re-election of directors. 
  
Many of our recommendations are modelled on UK developments, where publicly-traded companies 
must now explain how they are managing issues such as environmental performance, diversity, 
human rights, and social and community involvement; and must report on certain statistics such as 
CO2 emissions. 
 
Imprecision in respect of information available on long-term climate-related financial risk or other ESG 
risks is not a bar to directors and officers acting now with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the defences of good faith and acting on a 
prudent and reasonable basis are very strong, even in the face of less than full information.  The 
amendments would enhance corporate governance and encourage corporate boards to engage in 
oversight and undertake strategic planning in the interests of the long-term sustainability of the 
corporation.  At the same time, we are cognizant of the regulatory burden on companies and make 
some recommendations that would ease current requirements that may be outdated and allow 
companies to shift some resources towards climate-related and ESG risk management. 
 
There are a host of other federally-regulated companies that would benefit from this enhanced 
language of fiduciary obligation and ESG consideration, and while this report examines all of them, 
the priority should be the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act.  Directors pursuant to these 
statutes have the same obligations as under the CBCA and have the good faith reliance defence under 
the relevant enabling statutes. Moreover, they are some of the most financially significant, with the 
most developed risk management and governance structures, and thus most able to assist in shifting 
the trajectory towards a greener economy. As has often been done in the past, once there is 
experience with the CBCA, other statutes should be amended to align. 
 
We also recommend amending of the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act to add the obligation to 
consider ESG factors when investing the assets of a pension fund in a manner that a reasonable and 
prudent person would. The pension administrator should provide information on ESG factors to 
members, former members, survivors or former spouses for their consideration. The Pension Benefits 
Standards Regulation should be amended to require that the Statement of Investment Policies and 
Procedures must contain information on how ESG factors are being incorporated. These amendments 
go one step further than developments in Ontario, but mirror developments in the United Kingdom 
and Europe. 
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With respect to the series of questions that the Expert Panel asked about the TCFD disclosure 
framework, we also have a suite of recommendations.  First, as a policy matter, we urge the Expert 
Panel to broaden its consideration to questions of expanded ESG disclosure generally, while 
recognizing the TCFD framework as an important framework for climate-related financial disclosure.  
Thus, we recommend that material ESG risks, costs and assets be included in the company’s financial 
statements and notes thereto.  Requirements for such integration should be accomplished by 
regulations under Canadian accounting standards, adopting internationally developing sustainability 
accounting standards. Integrating ESG matters in corporate financial statements will allow greater 
transparency and accountability. Where accounting methods are developing, the notes to the 
financial statements should make clear the basis on which metrics are being reported and changes  
year over year, allowing for reporting of currently known ESG risks and opportunities. 
 
We also recommend that the new Capital Markets Regulatory Authority pursuant to the Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System work to require expanded disclosure according to the TCFD 
framework.  Given the systemic, non-diversifiable nature of the financial risks inherent in climate 
change and the transition to a lower-carbon economy, our analysis is that the new Regulatory 
Authority has the authority to enact such requirements, but may also want to work first cooperatively 
with the provinces and territories. We have a number of recommendations for improving the quality 
of disclosure as new requirements are being developed, from clarifying the concept of materiality to 
acting to celebrate ESG and climate disclosure leaders. We suggest changes to reporting periods that 
would ease the regulatory burden of reporting material ESG risks, while protecting the continuous 
disclosure system and advancing financial sustainability. 
 
We recommend an ESG disclosure “safe harbour” to protect duly diligent directors and officers, 
recognizing  that as ESG disclosure and metrics develop, readers of the information should understand 
that it is evolving and that the disclosure may change as understandings of risks, opportunities and 
how to measure them improve.  Such a safe harbour will encourage longer-term sustainability 
planning and provide protection against short-termism pressure by “impatient capital”.  The safe 
harbour is a method under securities law to protect directors and officers in their duly diligent efforts 
to disclose material information to investors, regulators and the broader public. A protection for 
investors regarding  ESG reporting in financial statements is that directors and officers are required to 
explain changes in methodology or metrics year over year. 
 
On climate-related financial risk more specifically, we recommend that the federal government adopt 
requirements that institutional investors and asset managers, including mutual funds and pension 
funds, disclose annually the financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the investor’s  
measures to reduce them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in their 
portfolio construction and management, corporate engagement and voting policies.  
 
We offer a number of practical approaches regarding how to effect legislative change federally, as 
well as how the federal government should work cooperatively with provincial regulators. Finally, we 
conclude with a recommendation that the federal government create a Sustainable Finance Institute 
aimed at accelerating green finance and a sustainable Canadian economy, including working with the 
private sector, regulators, universities, non-governmental organizations, and green finance institutes 
internationally to further develop green finance policy, innovative strategies, data and metrics.  For 
ease of reference, all our recommendations are contained in Appendix 1 of the report at page 115. 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Our sincere thank you to the Ivey Foundation and the McConnell Foundation for their generous 
financial support of this research under the auspices of the Clean Economy Fund. Thank you to 
our law schools, Peter A Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia and Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University for their support of our research. Thanks also to MaryGrace 
Johnstone for her research support and to members of the Climate Law Initiative Canadian 
Advisory Committee, the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative (CCLI), and the portfolio and 
asset managers, directors, officers, and pension fund managers who gave very helpful comments 
on the draft of this report.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
                    
 
  
6 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Executive Summary         1  
 
Acknowledgments        5 
         
 
I. INTRODUCTION       10       
 
1. Context and methodology of our submission   14 
 
2. Understanding what is meant by environmental, social and  
governance risks and opportunities    15 
 
II. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION      16 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.4 (1)       16   
 
1. Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act to enhance good  
governance practice and to codify the common law   19 
Recommendation 1     24 
 
2. The existing defence under the CBCA is strong   26 
 
3. Amending the CBCA to incorporate ESG factors in the statutory  
fiduciary duty is unlikely to result in forum shopping to jurisdictions  
with lower standards      28 
 
4. Amend the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act to incorporate  
ESG factors       29 
Recommendation 2     29 
 
5. Canada can learn from the experience of the United Kingdom,  
which has incorporated ESG factors, as well as consideration  
of stakeholder interests, in its corporate law    30 
 
6. Amend the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act fiduciary  
duty         34 
Recommendation 3     35  
 
7. Amend the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act and the  
Canada Pension Benefits Standards Regulation   36 
Recommendation 4     39 
Recommendation 5     41 
i. Other jurisdictions have already incorporated ESG factors in  
their statements of pension fund investment policy   41 
 
7 
 
8. Require federal Crown corporations to consider ESG factors and  
address material ESG risks and opportunities                                          43 
Recommendation 6     44 
 
   Expert Panel Question 3.4(2)       44 
 
1. The significance of Canadian financial institutions to the  
Canadian economy      44 
 
2. Amend the fiduciary obligation provisions under the Bank Act   
to incorporate ESG factors     45 
Recommendation 7     46 
 
3. Include federally-regulated credit unions in the amended  
fiduciary obligation provisions under the Bank Act, and amend  
the fiduciary obligation provisions of the Canada Cooperatives Act  
and the Cooperative Credit Associations Act to align   48 
Recommendation 8     50 
Recommendation 9     50 
 
4. Amend the fiduciary obligation provisions under the Canada  
Trust and Loan Companies Act      52 
Recommendation 10     52 
 
5. Federally-regulated insurance companies and fiduciary duty  52 
Recommendation 11     54 
 
6. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions should  
assist in shifting governance practices     56 
Recommendation 12     57 
 
7. Amend the Bank of Canada Act to include ESG factors   57 
Recommendation 13     59 
 
      Expert Panel Question 3.4(4)       60     
  
1. Board education is critically important    60 
                         
III. FINANCIAL SERVICES ADVISORS AND ESG CONSULTATIONS  62 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.4 (3)       62  
 
1. Require financial services advice to include information on material  
ESG factors and work towards a “best interests of the client”  
standard of financial advice in the future    62 
 Recommendation 14     65 
 
8 
 
2. Investment agents and advisors should be responsive to client  
preferences regarding ESG     66 
   Recommendation 15     66 
    
IV. EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES THAT WILL ADVANCE THE  
PATH TO SUSTAINABILITY      67 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(3)      67 
   
1. Include material ESG risks, costs and assets in financial  
Statements       67 
i. Canada can look to international standards  70 
Recommendation 16     74 
    
2. Require disclosure of management’s approach to material ESG  
risks and opportunities in management’s proxy circular in  
conjunction with the annual meeting    74 
 Recommendation 17      76  
 
3. The Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Reference re  
Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation offers another avenue for  
dealing with systemic risk      76 
 
4. Can the federal government relieve some of the regulatory burden  
of requiring climate-related or ESG factors to be included in  
financial statements?     81 
Recommendation 18     81 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(1)       82 
 
1. The rationale for requiring disclosure pursuant to TCFD framework 82 
i. Overview of recommendations    82 
ii.  Implementing the TCFD’s disclosure framework  84 
  
2. Federal jurisdiction under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act:  
Climate change as systemic risk     86 
 
3. The federal government should also work with provincial securities  
regulators to encourage provincial securities law  to require TCFD  
disclosure       88 
 
4. Concerns and barriers to requiring TCFD disclosure   88 
Recommendation 19     90 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(2)      90 
 
1. The extensive process underpinning the TCFD framework  
9 
 
is one that the Government of Canada should recognize  90 
   Recommendation 20     92 
 
                    Expert Panel Question 3.3(4)       92 
 
1. Cultivate leadership by size of enterprise    92 
Recommendation 21      93 
 
       Expert Panel Question 3.3(5)      93 
 
1. Guidance on the materiality of environmental 
information       95 
i Purpose of Staff Notice 51-333    96 
ii Materiality of environmental information   96 
 
2. Improving the understanding of what is material  98 
Recommendation 22     99 
 
      Expert Panel Question 3.3(6)       99 
 
1. A safe harbour for ESG disclosure    99 
Recommendation 23                 101 
 
    Expert Panel Question 3.3(7)                    104 
 
1. Both the board and the audit committee are vitally important  
to effective oversight of ESG financial disclosures, including  
climate-related financial disclosures    104 
 
   Expert Panel Question 3.3(8)       106 
 
1. Canada can benefit from international reporting standards  
already developed       106 
 
V. AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR LENDERS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS  
IN THE TRANSITION TO A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY   107 
Recommendation 24     110 
 
VI. INITIATING THE REFORM PROCESS     111 
 
VII. A MECHANISM FOR ONGOING DIALOGUE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 112 
Recommendation 25     114 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION        114 
 
APPENDIX 1  Summary of Recommendations     115 
  
10 
 
 
Time to Act 
Response to questions posed by the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance on 
Fiduciary Obligation and Effective Climate-related Financial Disclosures 
 
Janis Sarra and Cynthia Williams* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change represents a significant risk in financial and other markets; it could substantially 
affect the valuation of many publicly-listed companies and place some investment portfolios at 
risk.1 The allocation of capital in business and investment have an impact on and are impacted by 
climate change.2  Globally, the OECD estimates that $6.9 trillion US each year is required up to 
the year 2030 to meet climate and sustainable development objectives.3 While that scale applies 
globally, there is no question that Canada has to deploy significant resources to ensure that 
climate objectives are met. There is also no doubt that sustainable finance presents new 
opportunities for Canada. For example, globally, investments in renewable electric technologies 
were $298 billion US in 2017, more than double the annual investment in fossil fuel generation.4 
According to the Global Commission on the Economy and the Climate, the clean economy is 
expected to grow to $26 trillion US and create 65 million jobs worldwide by 2030.5 
 
In this respect, Canada needs to develop timely and proactive strategies to address climate-
related challenges and to devise a going-forward strategy. However, it is necessary to look beyond 
climate-related financial risk and consider the environmental, social and governance factors that 
may present important risks and opportunities in the transition to a sustainable Canadian 
                                                 
* Dr Janis Sarra, Presidential Distinguished Professor, University of British Columbia and Professor of Law, Peter 
A Allard School of Law, UBC and Professor Cynthia Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University.  
1 Janis Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change” (April 2018) 
CCLI (Oxford and Canada), online (pdf): CCLI Oxford <https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Janis-Sarra_Fiduciary-Obligation-in-Business-and-Investment.pdf> [Sarra, “Fiduciary 
Obligations”]. See also World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2017 (11 November 2017), online: WEF 
<http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2017/> and Cynthia Williams, “Disclosure of Information Concerning 
Climate Change: Liability Risks and Opportunities” (April 2018) CCLI (Oxford and Canada), online (pdf): CCLI 
Oxford <https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Cynthia-Williams_Disclosure-of-Information-
Concerning-Climate-Change.pdf>.  
2 Sarra, ibid at 1, 47. 
3 OECD and World Bank, “Financing Climate Futures” (2018) at 15, DOI: 
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264308114-en>.  
4 Ibid at 22, citing International Energy Agency, “The Future of Cooling: Opportunities for energy-efficient air 
conditioning” (2018). 
5 Global Commission on the Economy and the Climate, quoted in Government of Canada, Prime Minister of 
Canada, Government of Canada fighting climate change with price on pollution (23 October 2018), online: 
Government of Canada <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/10/23/government-canada-fighting-climate-
change-price-pollution> [Prime Minister, Price on Pollution]. 
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economy. Transition needs to benefit everyone and not disproportionately impact economically 
vulnerable Canadians or strand communities highly dependent on carbon intensive economic 
activity.6  
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2018 Special Report on the impacts of 
global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emission pathways reported further scientific evidence that human-induced global warming has 
now reached 1°C above preindustrial levels, with some impacts predicted to be long-lasting or 
irreversible, such as the loss of ecosystems.7 The IPCC reports that without stepping up climate 
action, global average temperature increase could reach 2°C soon after 2060 and continue rising.8 
The IPCC reports that approximately 4% of the global land area is projected to undergo a 
transformation of ecosystems from one type to another now that we are at 1°C of global 
warming, and will increase to 13% at 2°C temperature change,9 significantly and directly affecting 
coastal areas and deltas and increasing risks associated with sea level rise for many human and 
ecological systems.10 
 
The recent United States (“US”) National Climate Assessment Report notes that adaptation 
“entails iterative risk management”, a continuing risk management process that does not have 
an end point.11  It highlights that individuals and organizations need to assess risks and 
vulnerabilities from climate and other drivers of change such as economic, environmental, and 
societal, take actions to reduce those risks, and understand that learning will take place over 
time.12 It notes that timescale differences relate to resilience, ranging from the ability to 
withstand and recover from current shocks and stressors while retaining basic functions to the 
ability to transform in desirable ways over time as the magnitude of change increases; to 
maximize benefits in the near term and identify the most important opportunities for longer-
term resilience.13 
 
The highly respected scientific journal, Nature, has published an empirical report that says 
globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80% of current coal reserves should 
remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2°C.14  The study finds that 
                                                 
6 Ibid at 28. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Global warming of 1.5°C – An IPCC Special Report on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty” (October 2018) at 7, online: IPCC <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/>. 
8 Ibid at 8. 
9 For example, 99% of coral reefs are projected to disappear globally at a temperature increase of 2ºC. 
Irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet could be triggered at around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. Ibid. 
10 Ibid at 10. 
11 National Climate Assessment, “Fourth National Climate Assessment, Chapter 28: Reducing Risks Through 
Adaptation Actions” (2017), online: NCA <https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/28/> [NCA, “Fourth 
National Climate Assessment”]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins, “The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global 
warming to 2°C” (7 January 2015) 517 Nature 187-190, online: Nature 
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trillions of dollars of known and extractable coal, oil and gas cannot be exploited if the global 
temperature rise is to be kept under the 2°C safety limit agreed by the world’s nations.15 
Considerable financial and reputational risks to corporations will arise from the physical, 
ecological, human health and human rights claims and impacts associated directly with the 
corporation’s role in contributing to GHG emissions and increased climate-change risk. These 
observations, among the thousands now generated, illustrate why it is time for the Canadian 
government to act to do its share to avert a global environmental and financial tragedy.  
 
The Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance16 has been commissioned by the Canadian Government 
to determine how best to generate sustainable finance, a significant challenge when Canada’s 
economy is very carbon intensive. While “sustainable finance” has a number of definitions, the 
Expert Panel has defined it as “capital flows (as reflected in lending and investment), risk 
management activities (such as insurance and risk assessment), and financial processes (including 
disclosures, valuation, and oversight) that assimilate environmental and social factors as a means 
of promoting sustainable economic growth and the long-term stability of the financial system.”17 
 
While there are numerous strategies to be deployed to move Canada to a financially sustainable 
future, this report address two critically important issues in the governance and oversight of this 
transition: first, fiduciary obligation of corporate- and pension-fiduciaries, and second, national 
action on climate-related financial disclosure and broader environmental social and governance 
(“ESG”) financial disclosure. 
 
Our economy is facing significant challenges and disruptions in the transition to a lower carbon world.  
Our view is that absent clear and innovative steps to ensure our corporations and financial institutions 
act to address carbon emissions and other environmental, social and governance risks and 
opportunities, we will be seriously prejudiced in a world that is rapidly moving towards greener and 
more sustainable economic activity.  
 
It is time for the federal government to act to codify and build further on the fiduciary obligation 
that already exists at common law and in corporate law in Canada with respect to directors and 
officers of federally-registered corporations. We also make recommendations to align statutory 
fiduciary obligation and disclosure requirements with developments nationally and 
internationally.  It is also the moment for Canada to show leadership on the issue of transparency 
and disclosure regarding factors that pose materials risks and opportunities as Canada transitions 
to a greener economy. 
 
                                                 
<https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14016>. The authors use “a single integrated assessment model that 
contains estimates of the quantities, locations and nature of the world’s oil, gas and coal reserves and 
resources, and which is shown to be consistent with a wide variety of modelling approaches with different 
assumptions, to explore the implications of this emissions limit for fossil fuel production in different regions.” 
15 Ibid, including most Canadian tar sands, all Arctic oil and gas and much potential shale gas. 
16 Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance, Interim Report of the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance (Ottawa: 
Department of Finance, 25 October 2018), online (pdf): Government of Canada 
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/eccc/En4-350-1-2018-eng.pdf> [Expert Panel]. 
17 Ibid at 3.  
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Underpinning the recommendations throughout this report is the fact that the transition to a 
sustainable economy carries with it tremendous opportunities in addition to risks. For example, 
five years ago, Alberta-based TransAlta Corporation spun off TransAlta Renewables in an initial 
public offering, and today its assets include 20 wind facilities, 13 hydroelectric facilities and one 
solar power facility.18 TransAlta Renewables has tripled in value and is now worth more than its 
parent corporation.19  The European Commission reports that “between 1990 and 2016, energy 
use was reduced by almost 2%, and greenhouse gas emissions by 22%, while GDP grew by 54%.”20 
The European Commission has estimated the upside economic benefits of energy efficiency 
digitalization, renovation and fuel switching, more efficient products and appliances, smart 
buildings management systems, and improved materials for insulation.21 In addition to financial 
benefits and reduction of carbon emissions, the European Commission has observed that 
achieving a net-zero GHG economy will reduce pre-mature deaths caused by fine particulate 
matter by more than 40% and health damage by around €200 billion per annum.22 Responsible 
investing considering ESG risks and opportunities, compared to traditional investment 
approaches, has been shown to potentially lead to positive investment outcomes over the long-
term.23 
 
Our 25 recommendations serve as a practical guide to changes in statutory language  that are required 
based on the type of legislation and area of fiduciary obligation and disclosure discussed.  The majority 
of the 72 questions posed by the Expert Panel will not likely require legislative change, but rather, will 
require innovative thinking, new finance, a principled commitment to a lower carbon economy backed 
by meaningful economic and technological strategies, and strong partnerships between governments, 
the private sector, the not-for-profit and non-governmental organization sectors. Our 
recommendations are “legislatively focused” in this submission because they build on existing 
statutory duties. The improvements suggested are aimed at providing a baseline commitment, across 
                                                 
18 TransAlta Renewables, “Reports on Voting Results From The 2018 Annual Meeting of Shareholders” (10 May 
2018), online: TransAlta <https://www.transaltarenewables.com/2018/05/10/transalta-renewables-inc-
reports-on-voting-results-from-the-2018-annual-meeting-of-shareholders/>. 
19 Expert Panel, supra note 16 at 26. 
20 European Commission, A Clean Planet for all – A European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, 
competitive and climate neutral economy (COM 773 final, 28 November 2018) at 4, online (pdf): 
 <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_en.pdf>.  
21 Ibid at 8. 
22 Ibid at 16. In 2018, more than half of Europe's electricity supply is free from GHG emissions, anticipated to 
move to more than 80% of electricity will be coming from renewable energy sources. It has allocated €70 
billion for the implementation of the Energy Union Strategy. EFSI 2.0 focuses even more on sustainable 
investments in all sectors to contribute to meeting the Paris Agreement’s objectives and to help to deliver on 
the transition to a resource efficient, circular and low-carbon economy, ibid at 17. See also the Juncker Plan – 
one pillar of which is the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI). The European Commission proposal to 
step up climate mainstreaming to at least 25% in the next Multiannual Financial Framework demonstrates the 
EU budget would continue to act as a catalyst to leverage sustainable private and public investment and 
channel EU support for the clean energy transition to where it is most needed. It is also a key part of the EU’s 
credibility in advocating for net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in 2050, ibid at 17-18. 
23 World Business Council on Sustainable Development, “Aligning Retirement Assets develops new resource to 
help companies meet the growing demand for responsible investing” (4 December 2018), online: WBCSD 
<https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decision-making/Aligning-Retirement-
Assets/News/new-resource-to-help-companies-meet-the-growing-demand-for-responsible-investing>.  
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the board, for all federally-regulated corporations, financial institutions, investment funds and 
pension funds, to embed sustainable thinking in the discharge of their fiduciary obligations. They are 
largely principles-based, setting threshold standards, which directors and officers can then implement 
as they believe appropriate for their organization.  Our recommendations are timely and practical, 
and give specifics on how changes can be accomplished at the federal level. 
 
 
This report is organized by direct responses to questions posed by the Expert Panel on Sustainable 
Finance in its interim report,24 specifically, the questions posed by the Expert Panel under two 
sections of the interim report: “3.4 Clear Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty” and “3.3 Effective 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures”.  For ease of reference, we have sub-labelled the questions 
3.4(1) to (4) and 3.3(1) to (8) in the discussion below. The recommended changes to corporate 
and financial services legislation should be made immediately as they are clearly within federal 
parliamentary authority. The changes in the securities law domain will likely take longer, given 
the importance of federal, provincial and territorial cooperation.  
 
 
1. Context and methodology of our submission 
 
This report builds on ongoing work of the authors as part of the Canada Climate Law Initiative.  
We are also the principal Canadian investigators in the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative 
(“CCLI”), an interdisciplinary research, education, and theory development project. The global 
CCLI initiative is organized by Ben Caldecott, Director of Sustainable Finance at the Smith School 
of Enterprise and the Environment at Oxford University, UK, in collaboration with the Prince’s 
Accounting for Sustainability, our law schools and a number of international partners.  As 
Canadian partner and full participants in the global CCLI, in 2017 and 2018, we conducted 
research and wrote reports; conducted expert meetings in Vancouver, Calgary, Ottawa, and 
Toronto with industry and legal specialists; organized two major conferences in Vancouver and 
Toronto on director and officer obligations and climate change financial risk management; and 
participated in both Canadian and international fora on how best to transition to a lower carbon 
economy, given current challenges in law and finance.   
 
With financial support for our research from the Ivey Foundation, the University of British 
Columbia and York University, we examined the legal basis for corporate directors in Canada to 
be required to take account of, disclose, and manage climate change risks under prevailing 
statutory and common laws.25 We assessed the materiality of these considerations, in terms of 
disclosure and the potential implications for company and investor decision-making in the real 
economy.26  We also examined the legal basis for pension trustees, pension investment managers 
and other pension fiduciaries in Canada to take account of, disclose, and manage climate change 
risks under prevailing statutory and common law.  
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 Janis Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change”, supra note 1. 
26 Cynthia Williams, “Disclosure of Information Concerning Climate Change: Liability Risks and Opportunities”, 
supra note 1; Cynthia Williams and Janis Sarra, “Directors’ Liability and Climate Risk: Canada – Country Paper: 
Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative” (April 2018).  
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In preparation for this report, in addition to extensive research on developments globally and 
careful analysis of Canadian corporate, securities, pensions and financial institutions legislation, 
we met with more than 30 institutional investors and asset managers, portfolio managers, 
lawyers, accountants, corporate executives, securities regulators, and several umbrella 
accounting and corporate governance associations.  We circulated a draft report on 5 December 
2018 on a confidential basis to 18 of these market participants; conducted a series of phone calls 
and in-person discussions with each of these individuals and organizations; and incorporated 
their helpful suggestions in this report.  As a result, we believe our recommendations are well 
grounded, timely and realistic. 
 
 
2. Understanding what is meant by environmental, social and governance risks and 
opportunities 
 
The European Commission has defined sustainable finance as the process of taking due account 
of environmental and social considerations in investment decision making, which will lead to 
increased investments in longer-term and sustainable activities.27  There are now many 
definitions for ESG considerations, most of which address the same factors. For purposes of our 
discussion in this submission, we use the definition recommended by the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”) for sustainability accounting purposes. It reports that:  
 
Sustainability accounting reflects the management of a corporation’s environmental and 
social impacts arising from production of goods and services, as well as its management 
of the environmental and social capital necessary to create long-term value. It also 
includes the impacts that sustainability challenges have on innovation, business models, 
and corporate governance and vice versa.28   
 
SASB proposes accounting metrics under five broad sustainability dimensions of ESG: 
 
Environment, including environmental impacts, either through the use of non-renewable, 
natural resources as inputs to the factors of production or through harmful releases into 
the environment that may result in impacts to the company’s financial condition or 
operating performance. It includes accounting for GHG emissions, air quality, energy 
management, water management, waste management and ecological impacts. 
 
Social Capital, which relates to the expectation that a business will contribute to society 
in return for a social license to operate. It addresses the management of relationships 
with key outside parties, such as customers, local communities, the public, and the 
government; includes issues related to human rights, protection of vulnerable groups, 
local economic development, access to and quality of products and services, affordability, 
                                                 
27 European Commission, The Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth (2018), online: EC <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097>. 
28 SASB, “Sustainability Framework” (2018), <https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/materiality-map/>. 
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responsible business practices in marketing, customer privacy, data security, and selling 
practices and product labelling. 
 
Human Capital, which addresses the management of a company’s human resources 
(employees and individual contractors) as key assets to delivering long-term value; and  
includes issues that affect the productivity of employees, diversity, management of 
labour relations and of the health and safety of employees, and the ability to create a 
safety culture. 
 
Business Model and Innovation, which addresses the integration of environmental, 
human, and social issues in a company’s value-creation process, including resource 
recovery, other innovations in the production process, business model resilience, 
managing the physical impacts of climate change, supply chain management, and 
product innovation, including efficiency and responsibility in the design, use phase, and 
disposal of products. 
 
Leadership and Governance, including the management of issues that are inherent to the 
business model or common practice in the industry and that are in potential conflict with 
the interest of broader stakeholder groups, and therefore create a potential liability or a 
limitation or removal of a license to operate. It includes systemic risk management, 
critical incident risk management, regulatory compliance, business ethics, safety 
management, supply-chain and materials sourcing, conflicts of interest, anticompetitive 
behaviour, and corruption and bribery.29 
 
 
II. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
 
The Canadian government has an important opportunity to provide leadership by enacting 
legislation across a range of federal statutes to clarify fiduciary obligation and modernize its scope 
to align with existing Canadian common law and with developments internationally.  The most 
logical place for a clarified duty on corporate directors and officers would be in the statutory 
fiduciary obligation provisions in corporations statutes.  This obligation should apply to all 
federally-incorporated companies, whether publicly-listed or privately held.  Our focus in 
responding to this question of the Expert Panel is on federal legislation, although one would hope 
that provincial and territorial governments would follow suit.  Essentially, we want corporate 
boards to be identifying ESG material risks and opportunities, and disclosing them to their 
stakeholders without fear of liability when they are duly diligent in their consideration of these 
issues. To this end, we require immediate and medium-term action to shift governance practice.   
 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.4 (1):  
Is there a need to more clearly define the scope of fiduciary duty with respect to the 
evaluation of climate-related or broader ESG factors in financial decision-making in 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
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Canada? What would be the best ways to effect change, and who are the key stakeholders 
in facilitating this change?  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) judgment in Peoples Department Stores30 clarified the 
fiduciary obligations of corporate directors and officers 15 years ago.  The scope of directors‘ and 
officers’ fiduciary obligations to act in the best interests of the corporation applies equally to 
privately-held and publicly-listed corporations. The Peoples Department Stores case involved the 
duties of directors and officers of a privately-held corporation that was wholly-owned by a 
closely-held publicly-listed company.31 The SCC judgment in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders in 
2008, made clear that these obligations apply to publicly-listed corporations as well.32 
 
In Peoples Department Store, the SCC held that section 122(1) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act establishes two distinct duties to be discharged by directors and officers in 
managing, or supervising the management of, the corporation.33  Section 122(1)(a) specifies that 
every director and officer of a corporation, in exercising their powers and discharging their duties, 
shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, what the 
Court referred to as the “duty of loyalty” and “statutory fiduciary duty”.  The SCC held that “The 
statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in good faith with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation.”34  “They must respect the trust and confidence 
that have been reposed in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the 
realization of the objects of the corporation.”35  The SCC further held that: “We accept as an 
                                                 
30 Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, [2004] 3 SCR 461, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples Department Stores]. 
31 Ibid. Wise Stores Inc. acquired Peoples Department Stores Inc from Marks and Spencer Canada Inc 
(“M & S”). The three Wise brothers were sole directors and majority shareholders and officers of Wise, 
controlling 75% of the firm’s equity. Because of covenants imposed by M & S, Peoples could not be merged 
with Wise until the purchase price had been paid. Wise was founded in 1930 as a small clothing store, 
expanded and listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange in 1986. Peoples was incorporated in 1991 by its parent 
M & S plc, ibid at paras 5, 7. Wise incorporated a company, 2798832 Canada Inc., for the purpose of acquiring 
all of the issued and outstanding shares of Peoples from M & S. The $27-million share acquisition proceeded as 
a fully leveraged buyout, at para 9. To protect its interests, M & S took the assets of Peoples as security 
(subject to a priority in favour of the TD Bank) and negotiated strict covenants concerning the financial 
management and operation of the company. Among other requirements, 2798832 Canada Inc. and Wise were 
obligated to maintain specific financial ratios, and Peoples was not permitted to provide financial assistance to 
Wise. In addition, the agreement provided that Peoples could not be amalgamated with Wise until the 
purchase price had been paid, ibid at para 11. In January 1993, 2798832 Canada Inc. was amalgamated with 
Peoples, the new entity retaining Peoples’ corporate name. Upon amalgamation the new Peoples became a 
subsidiary directly owned and controlled by Wise, the three Wise brothers were Peoples’ only directors, ibid at 
para 12. 
32 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 39, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE Inc v 1976 
Debentureholders]. 
33 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 30 at para 4.  Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC, 1985, c C-4, as 
amended, online (pdf): Government of Canada <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/pdf/C-44.pdf> [CBCA]. 
34 Peoples Department Stores, ibid at para 32. 
35 Ibid at para 35. The SCC cites 820099 Ontario Inc v Harold E Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 123 (Ont Ct (Gen 
Div), (aff’d (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 (Ont Div Ct)), in which Farley J “correctly observes that in resolving a conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders, it is safe for directors and officers to act to make the corporation 
a “better corporation””, at para 41. 
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accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for 
the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, 
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”36  
 
The SCC held that the second duty, the “duty of care”, “imposes a legal obligation upon directors 
and officers to be diligent in supervising and managing the corporation’s affairs”.37 The SCC held 
that the duty of care is to be assessed against an objective standard, taking into account the 
context in which a decision was made.38 The Court held that the contextual approach to 
assessment of the duty of care not only emphasizes the primary facts, but also permits prevailing 
socio-economic conditions to be taken into consideration. 39 
 
Several years later, the SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders held that: 
[66] Directors, acting in the best interests of the corporation, may be obliged to 
consider the impact of their decisions on corporate stakeholders, such as the 
debentureholders in these appeals. This is what we mean when we speak of a 
director being required to act in the best interests of the corporation viewed as 
a good corporate citizen. However, the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation, and only to the corporation. 
. . . 
 
[81] As discussed, conflicts may arise between the interests of corporate 
stakeholders inter se and between stakeholders and the corporation.  Where the 
conflict involves the interests of the corporation, it falls to the directors of the 
corporation to resolve them in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen. 
  
[82] The cases on oppression, taken as a whole, confirm that the duty of the 
directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to 
treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and 
fairly.  There are no absolute rules.  In each case, the question is whether, in all 
the circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the corporation, 
having regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the 
need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the 
corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen.40 
[emphasis added] 
 
It is important to draw attention once again to the precise wording of the statutory fiduciary 
obligation in Canada, because any need to “clarify” the duty in corporations statutes is really the 
                                                 
36 Ibid at para 42. The SCC held that “The directors’ fiduciary duty does not change when a corporation is in the 
nebulous “vicinity of insolvency”.” Ibid at para 46. 
37 Ibid at para 32. 
38 Peoples Department Stores Inc, supra note 30 at paras 62 and 63.  
39 Peoples Department Stores Inc, ibid at para 64.  
40 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, supra note 32. 
19 
 
idea of codifying what is already the law in Canada, in order to provide greater certainty. 
Codification will make the duties more transparent and accessible to all individuals performing 
duties within Canadian corporations or stakeholders interacting with corporations, including both 
the scope and limitations of these duties. It is also timely to enhance the scope of duties by 
adopting language creating an express duty to consider ESG factors, and to act reasonably where 
those factors are material, as discussed in the next part.  
 
Much of this report is focused on statutory reform. While very detailed, the goal is to set out a 
detailed blueprint of what is doable in the immediate to short term with respect to fiduciary 
obligation and corporate disclosure, in a manner that is consistent with the current statutory and 
regulatory frameworks that allow corporations and financial institutions to operate in Canadian 
capital and financial markets. 
 
 
1. Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act to enhance good governance practice and to 
codify the common law 
 
There are currently 310,000 corporations incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations 
Act (CBCA).41 Both the statutory language of Canadian corporate law and guidance from the 
Supreme Court of Canada make clear that the current fiduciary obligation of directors and officers 
of corporations is to manage or supervise management of the corporation in the best interests 
of the corporation. The CBCA should be amended to codify Canada’s common law, thus aligning 
the statutory wording to the obligations of directors and officers that have been clarified by the 
common law for many years. Equally, it is important to make absolutely clear the importance of 
considering and addressing material risks and opportunities. 
 
In terms of whether the statutory amendments should relate only to climate change risk or ESG 
factors more generally, ESG makes the most sense and most closely aligns with the common law.  
Our view is that directors and officers already have a fiduciary obligation to inquire whether ESG 
factors present a material risk or opportunity for the company in terms of its long-term 
sustainability. The corporate board has a responsibility to ensure that all material risk factors, 
including ESG factors, are managed, which includes oversight of officers charged with managing 
these risks and their impact on the business. 
 
However, some institutional investors have observed that there is an uneven level of 
understanding of these obligations throughout Canada. While Canadian courts have been very 
consistent in their findings on the scope of obligations in acting in the best interests of the 
corporation, there has not, to our knowledge, yet been a judgment on the specific issue of 
                                                 
41 Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC, 1985, c C-4, as amended, online (pdf): Government of Canada 
<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/pdf/C-44.pdf> [CBCA]. Number of CBCA corporations is from Marketplace 
Framework Policy Branch Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada (27 November 2017): 
Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 42nd 
Parl, 1st Sess (30 November 2017), online: Senate of Canada 
<https://www.sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/Committee/421/BANC/53684-e>. 
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directors’ and officers’ obligations to consider material ESG risks. It may take another decade for 
a court decision specifically on an ESG issue such as climate-related financial risk fiduciary 
obligation to reach the Supreme Court of Canada. Corporate and pension fiduciaries should 
benefit now from clear language under Canadian statutes. It also makes sense to codify ESG 
factors in the statutory fiduciary obligation to align with developments internationally.  
 
A survey of corporate directors undertaken by the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance 
(“CCGG”) found that no company is too early in its development or too small not to be thinking 
about how environmental and social factors are or may become important to business strategy 
and what risk management practices need to be implemented.42 Directors need to ensure timely 
and accurate information if they are to fulfill their risk management and capital decision 
obligations. The CCGG observes that environmental and social issues can impact a corporation’s 
assets and liabilities, both tangible and intangible, and that even smaller companies need to focus 
on longer-term issues if they want to be successful in the long term, noting that practices and 
measures can evolve with company maturity and scale.43 
 
ESG considerations are already high on the Canadian corporate agenda. As of December 2018, 
there are 120 Canadian signatories to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), 
representing assets under management of over 4 trillion CAD.44 By signing the UN PRI, Canadian 
corporations and investors commit to the integration of ESG issues into investment analysis and 
corporate and investment decision-making processes. That level of support speaks to the growing 
support for effective governance, including addressing ESG risks and opportunities.  
 
As the SCC has ruled, “Considerable power over the deployment and management of financial, 
human, and material resources is vested in the directors and officers of corporations.”45 “In 
deciding to invest in, lend to or otherwise deal with a corporation, shareholders and creditors 
transfer control over their assets to the corporation, and hence to the directors and officers, in 
the expectation that the directors and officers will use the corporation’s resources to make 
reasonable business decisions that are to the corporation’s advantage.”46 
 
While fewer than 1% of the 310,000 federally-registered companies are publicly-listed 
companies, they are some of Canada’s most significant corporations.  While we could not get 
precise numbers of publicly-listed federally-registered companies, the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(“TSX”) was very helpful in supplying information regarding the market value of corporations 
                                                 
42 Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG), “The Directors’ E&S Guidebook, Practical insights and 
recommendations for effective board oversight and company disclosure of environmental and social (“E&S”) 
matters” (May 2018) at 6, online (pdf): CCGG 
<https://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/the_directors__e_s_guidebook.pdf> [CCGG Guidebook]. 
43 Ibid at 7. 
44 Nalini Feuilloley, UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), “Signatories by country, Canada” (27 
November 2018), online: UN PRI 
<https://www.unpri.org/searchresults?qkeyword=canada&PageSize=10&parametrics=WVSECTION%7CSignato
ries&cmd=ReplaceKeyword&val=canada>. Reported as 3 trillion USD, converted using Bank of Canada currency 
converter 6 January 2019. 
45 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 30 at para 34. 
46 Ibid. 
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listed on the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange (“TSXV”) by jurisdiction of registration.47  As the graph 
below illustrates, at October 2018, federally-registered corporations account for 86.9% of market 
value of all corporations listed on the TSX and TSXV.  That represents a market value of 719.4 
billion CAD.48   
 
 
 
Source of data: TSX November 201849 
 
It means that if the federal government acts to clarify the corporations statutes by codifying the 
common law and acts to enhance disclosure of systemic risks, it is covering the vast majority 
portion of publicly-listed companies in Canada by market value.  
  
Our recommendation for amendment to the CBCA is four-fold. First, amend the statute to require 
directors and officers to “consider” ESG factors with a view to the corporation’s best interest. In 
considering ESG factors, directors and officers may conclude that ESG factors are or are not 
factors posing a material risk or opportunity to the corporation.  Corporate stakeholders would 
be confident, however, that such factors have been considered by directors and officers. Second, 
amend the CBCA to require directors and officers to “address” ESG factors where they are 
material. This second obligation arises only where ESG factors are material to the best interests 
                                                 
47 Our thanks to Cheryl Mascarenhas, Specialist, Market Intelligence, TMX Group and other staff at the TSX and 
TSXV for their assistance in providing data [TSX].  
48 Data on file with authors: TSX, ibid. Actual figure at 31 October 2018: $719,383,487,832.20.  
Total QMV of Financial Services trading on TSX/TSXV: Incorporated in Canada $719.4 billion; Incorporated in 
Ontario $99.9 billion; Incorporated in All Other Provinces $8.3 billion, Total:  $827,565,325,983.14. 
49 Ibid. Data on file with authors.  
22 
 
of the corporation.  One option for wording to qualify what they are to address, drawn from 
federal environmental legislation, is that directors and officers are to “take all reasonable care” 
to address material ESG issues.50 The importation of this language would place a reasonableness 
standard on the requirement to address material ESG risks and opportunities. 
 
Third, for greater certainty, codify in the CBCA the wording in the Supreme Court of Canada 
judgments that directors and officers may consider the interests of multiple stakeholders in 
making those decisions by adding a new section 122(2) to the CBCA. New section 122(2) would 
specify that directors and officers “may consider” multiple interests.  As with the common law, 
the board is to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, “having regard to all 
relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat affected stakeholders 
in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate 
citizen”.51  In the list of stakeholders to consider, our recommendation is to include retirees in the 
list given by the SCC, as recent cases have illustrated that their interests are relevant to the best 
interests analysis.  A fourth recommended amendment to the CBCA on disclosure is discussed in 
Part IV below. 
 
There is a substantial body of empirical study now that links management of ESG factors with 
positive corporate financial performance. In a meta-study of 2,200 empirical studies on ESG and 
financial performance, Friede, Busch and Bassen found that the large majority report positive 
corporate financial performance when the companies integrate ESG considerations, and for 90% 
of the total, there was at least a non-negative relationship between ESG and corporate financial 
performance.52 The study reported that the positive ESG impact on corporate financial 
performance appears stable over time; and the results show that the business case for ESG 
investing is empirically very well-founded.53  Friede Busch, and Bassen conclude that the 
orientation toward long-term responsible investing, including integrating ESG factors, should be 
important for all kinds of rational investors in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties, and may better 
align investors’ interests with the broader objectives of society.54  Investors globally are engaging 
with corporate boards on ESG issues, one study reporting that asset managers with €2 trillion 
                                                 
50 For example, section 280.1 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33, as amended, 
specifies that: “Duties of directors and officers 280.1 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation shall take all 
reasonable care to ensure that the corporation complies with (a) this Act and the regulations, other than 
Division 3 of Part 7 and regulations made under that Division; and (b) orders and directions of, and prohibitions 
and requirements imposed by, the Minister, enforcement officers and review officers, other than those issued 
or imposed in connection with obligations or prohibitions under that Division or regulations made under that 
Division.”  Similar language is used provincially, for example, the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, RSO 
1990, c E 19, as amended, specifies: “Duty of director or officer194 (1) Every director or officer of a corporation 
has a duty to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation from, (a) discharging or causing or permitting 
the discharge of a contaminant, in contravention of, (i) this Act or the regulations . . .”  
51 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, supra note 32. 
52 Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch and Alexander Bassen, “ESG and financial performance: aggregated evidence from 
more than 2000 empirical studies” (2015) 5:4 Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 210-233,  DOI: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2015.1118917>. 
53 Ibid at 212. 
54 Ibid at 227, observing that it requires a detailed and profound understanding of how to integrate ESG criteria 
into investment processes in order to harvest the full potential of value-enhancing ESG factors. 
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under management are now engaging with corporate boards.55 Another example is BlackRock, 
which as of December 2018 has $5.98 trillion US in assets under management and has a team of 
40 professionals engaged specifically in ESG and sustainable stewardship. 
 
A number of other empirical studies offer broad evidence from capital markets that supports the 
notion that corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) and ESG factors matter to a company’s financial 
performance and to its cost of capital.56 Integrating ESG factors can result in better access to 
finance;57 lower the cost of capital,58 including both debt and equity capital;59 and may reduce 
the likelihood that companies face major capital constraints.60 Another empirical study showed 
that the level of engagement with ESG matters reduces firm risk and increases firm value; 
including evidence that an improvement in CSR ratings are likely to decrease the risk of 
government litigation and reduce the likelihood of an environmental or social crisis that could 
negatively affect firm’s cash flows.61 Another empirical study found that firms with strong ESG 
and CSR significantly outperform firms with weak CSR in the mid- and long-term in certain areas 
of activity and regions.62   
                                                 
55 Frank AJ Wagemans, CSA van Koppen and Arthur PJ Mol, “Engagement on ESG issues by Dutch pension 
funds: is it reaching its full potential?” (2018) 8:4 Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 301-322, DOI: 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2018.1485379>. 
56 Dan Dhaliwal, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Albert Tsang, and Yong George Yang, “Nonfinancial Disclosure and 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy: International Evidence on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure” (May 2012) 
87:3 The Accounting Review 723-759, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10218>; Marc Orlitzky, Frank 
Schmidt, and Sara Rynes “Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis (2003) 24:3 
Organization Studies 403-441, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840603024003910>; Christophe Revelli and 
Jean-Laurent Viviani, “Financial performance of socially responsible investing (SRI): what have we learned? A 
meta-analysis” (2015) 24:2 Business Ethics: A European Review, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12076>; 
Rob Bauer and Daniel Hann, “Corporate Environmental Management and Credit Risk” (2010) [unpublished], 
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1660470>.  
57 B Cheng, I Ioannou and G Serafeim, “Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance” (2014) 35:1 
Strategic Management Journal 1-23 [Cheng, Ioannou, Serafeim]; Marwa Samet, Khaireddine Mouakhar and Anis 
Jarboui, “Exploring the relationship between CSR performance and financial constraints: empirical evidence from 
European firms” (2018) 76:4 Review of Social Economy, 480-508 at 502 (using a panel dataset consisting of 397 
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Other studies indicate that industry-specific classifications of materiality identify ESG information 
that is value relevant and predictive of companies’ future financial performance.63 One survey 
found that 82% of respondents suggest that they use ESG information because it is financially 
material to investment performance.64 The 2018 RBC Global Asset Management Responsible 
Investing Survey, reporting on 540 investment firm, portfolio manager and asset manager 
responses, found that over 90% believe ESG-integrated portfolios are likely to perform as well or 
better than non-ESG-integrated portfolios and 67% view ESG as a risk mitigator.65 
 
Recommendation 1: 
 
The current fiduciary obligation under the CBCA should be amended to incorporate ESG factors 
as follows (in red italics): 
 
Duty of care of directors and officers  
122 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
122(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees, 
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions. 
 
For greater certainty, the new section 122(2) makes transparent the fact that directors and 
officers already have the option of considering multiple stakeholder interests, as the CBCA has 
                                                 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2017.1403272>, using a novel classification of activities into nine areas, 
each belonging to one of the standard environment, social, and governance (ESG) dimensions. 
63 Amir Amel-Zadeh and George Serafeim, “Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence from a Global 
Survey” (2018) 74:3 Financial Analysts Journal 87-103 at 87, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v74.n3.2> [Amel-
Zadeh and Serafeim], surveying investment firms with the collaboration of Bank of New York Mellon, with 
respondents, on a value-weighted basis, with $31 trillion US in assets under management (AUM), comprised 43% 
of global institutional AUM. See also M Khan, G Serafeim, and A Yoon, “Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence 
on Materiality” (2016) 91(6) Accounting Review 1697–724. 
64 Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim, ibid at 88. 
65 2018 RBC Global Asset Management Responsible Investing Survey, “Charting a Sustainable Advantage” 
(2018) at 5-6, online (pdf): RBC <http://www.rbcgam.com/corporate-governance-and-responsible-
investment/pdf/esg-executive-summary.PDF>. 
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been interpreted by the SCC. However, it would give directors and officers more confidence that 
such consideration would not be attacked by shareholders that have only a short-term interest.  
It would assist with corporations making decisions in the longer term best interests of the 
corporation as it would counter-balance pressure for short-term returns to the potential harm to 
the sustainability of the corporation. 
 
Incorporating ESG considerations in section 122 of the CBCA would mean that directors’ good 
faith decisions would be protected by the defence under the CBCA that already serves duly 
diligent directors well: 
 
Defence — good faith 
123(5) A director has complied with his or her duties under subsection 122(1) if 
the director relied in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the corporation represented to the director by an 
officer of the corporation or in a written report of the auditor of the corporation 
fairly to reflect the financial condition of the corporation; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by the professional person.66 
 
Consideration of ESG factors aligns completely with direction given by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in respect of how directors and officers are to approach their obligations to act in the 
best interests of the corporation, whether privately held or publicly-listed, looking to its long-
term interests. In BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, the SCC reiterated its conclusions in Peoples 
Department Stores that “In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors 
may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, 
governments and the environment to inform their decisions.67 The SCC further held that:  
 
The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual 
concept. It is not confined to short-term profit or share value. Where the 
corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the 
corporation. The content of this duty varies with the situation at hand. At a 
minimum, it requires the directors to ensure that the corporation meets its 
statutory obligations. But, depending on the context, there may also be other 
requirements. In any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is mandatory; 
directors must look to what is in the best interests of the corporation.68  
[emphasis added] 
   
In considering the specific substance of the fiduciary duty based on the relationship of directors 
to corporations, the SCC held that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation” should be 
read not simply as the “best interests of the shareholders”; that from an economic perspective, 
the “best interests of the corporation” means the maximization of the value of the corporation, 
                                                 
66 CBCA, supra note 41. 
67 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, supra note 32 at para 39. 
68 Ibid at para 38. 
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but that various other factors may be relevant in determining what directors should consider in 
soundly managing with a view to the best interests of the corporation.69 The fiduciary obligation 
of directors and officers is clear in the caselaw. The proposed amendments to the CBCA would 
make these duties even clearer. 
 
If these amendments are enacted, board approval processes and practices should improve, and 
boards will ensure that they have allocated appropriate time and examined relevant information 
to assess whether material ESG risks are being considered and addressed along with other 
material risks, including in capital allocation decisions. By codifying the requirement to consider 
ESG factors with a view to the best interests of the corporation, oversight of risk and opportunities 
will be enhanced.  Coupled with increased disclosure to investors, as discussed at length in Part 
IV below, the amendments will provide greater transparency and enhance governance. It will 
encourage boards to undertake strategic planning in the interests of the long-term sustainability 
of the corporation.  Boards should also consider aligning the compensation of senior officers and 
other staff with achievement of sustainability goals. 
 
 
2. The existing defence under the CBCA is strong 
 
The defence under the CBCA specifies that a director has complied with his or her fiduciary duty 
and duty of care if he or she relied on a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to 
a statement made by the professional. In other words, directors that make inquiries of 
professionals in regard to ESG factors that affect the best interests of the company and in good 
faith make decisions based on that advice, are not liable for decisions taken.  This defence has 
protected duly diligent directors for years. 
 
Imprecision in respect of information available on long-term climate-related financial risk or other 
ESG risks is not a bar to directors and officers acting now with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation. The defences of good faith and acting on a prudent and reasonable basis are very 
strong, even in the face of less than full information. The SCC has held that:  
 
the contextual approach dictated by s 122(1)(b)  of the CBCA not only emphasizes 
the primary facts but also permits prevailing socio-economic conditions to be 
taken into consideration. The emergence of stricter standards puts pressure on 
corporations to improve the quality of board decisions. The establishment of 
good corporate governance rules should be a shield that protects directors from 
allegations that they have breached their duty of care. . . . Many decisions made 
in the course of business, although ultimately unsuccessful, are reasonable and 
defensible at the time they are made.  Business decisions must sometimes be 
made, with high stakes and under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in 
which detailed information is not available.  It might be tempting for some to see 
unsuccessful business decisions as unreasonable or imprudent in light of 
information that becomes available ex post facto.  Because of this risk of 
                                                 
69 Ibid at para 42. 
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hindsight bias, Canadian courts have developed a rule of deference to business 
decisions.70  
[emphasis added] 
 
This deference in the face of uncertainty is apparent in many other Canadian corporate law 
judgments. For example the Ontario Court of Appeal has held: 
 
The court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a 
perfect decision. Provided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, 
the court ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board even though 
subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s determination.  As long 
as the directors have selected one of several reasonable alternatives, deference 
is accorded to the board’s decision.71 
 
The SCC is very clear about the defences available and the deference that will be given to 
fiduciaries’ decisions: 
 
Directors and officers will not be held to be in breach of the duty of care under s 
122(1)(b) of the CBCA if they act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis. 
The decisions they make must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the 
circumstances about which the directors or officers knew or ought to have 
known.  In determining whether directors have acted in a manner that breached 
the duty of care, it is worth repeating that perfection is not demanded.  Courts 
are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the application of business 
expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making, but 
they are capable, on the facts of any case, of determining whether an appropriate 
degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear in reaching what is claimed 
to be a reasonable business decision at the time it was made.72 
[emphasis added] 
 
As the Supreme Court has held, directors’ decisions are not going to be assessed based on 
hindsight bias.73  Even more so in respect of climate-related risks or ESG that are evolving as new 
                                                 
70 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 30 at para 64. 
71 Maple Leaf Foods Inc v Schneider Corp (1998), 42 OR (3d) 177 at p 192, cited with approval in Peoples, ibid at 
para 65.  
72 Peoples Department Stores, ibid at para 64. 
73 The Supreme Court of Canada has said: “Many decisions made in the course of business, although 
ultimately unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the time they are made. Business decisions must 
sometimes be made, with high stakes and under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in which 
detailed information is not available. It might be tempting for some to see unsuccessful business decisions as 
unreasonable or imprudent in light of information that becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk 
of hindsight bias, Canadian courts have developed a rule of deference to business decisions called the 
“business judgment rule”, adopting the American name for the rule.” Peoples Department Stores, ibid at para 
64. 
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information and insights on financial risk develop. Similar recommendations are below made in 
respect of Canadian financial institutions.74 
 
Another option would be to amend the CBCA regulations to embed ESG considerations in the 
manner we have recommended amending the statute.  In our view, while this strategy may be 
accomplished more quickly, it lacks the transparency of statutory language, in terms of assisting 
companies to be aware of their obligations and manage their oversight accordingly and in terms 
of clarity and certainty for stakeholders.  
 
 
3. Amending the CBCA to incorporate ESG factors in the statutory fiduciary duty is unlikely to 
result in forum shopping to jurisdictions with lower standards 
 
Given that the proposed amendments are essentially codification and clarification of existing 
common law, the argument that corporations will “forum shop” to another jurisdictions with 
lower standards is without merit. The SCC’s clarification 15 years ago did not result in a mass 
move to incorporate in the US or other jurisdictions.  Registration (both incorporation and 
continuation) under the CBCA allows corporations to operate nationally, an important feature of 
CBCA registration.  Moreover, many Canadian institutional investors have made clear that they 
expect directors and officers to consider ESG factors and their level of engagement with boards 
means that companies are unlikely to risk loss of significant investors. 
 
It is possible they could incorporate under provincial corporate statutes, but it is also unlikely as 
the fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation exists across the country.  
An example that statutory amendment will likely not lead to forum shopping was the amendment 
to the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) after the SCC’s judgment in Peoples Department 
Stores.75 The SCC held  that the duty of care can be owed to creditors in addition to shareholders, 
given that the statutory language does not specify that the duty of care is owed solely to the 
corporation.76 This ruling that the duty of care could open directors up to actions by creditors77 
led the Ontario government to change the OBCA in 2007 to provide that directors owe their 
statutory duty of care exclusively to the corporation.78 There was a great deal of speculation at 
                                                 
74 See the discussion under Expert Panel Question 3.4(2). 
75 Ontario Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B16, as amended [OBCA]. 
76 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 30 at para 57. 
77 The SCC held: “Indeed, unlike the statement of the fiduciary duty in s. 122(1) (a) of the CBCA , which specifies 
that directors and officers must act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, the statement of the 
duty of care in s. 122(1) (b) of the CBCA  does not specifically refer to an identifiable party as the beneficiary of 
the duty.  Instead, it provides that “[e]very director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall . . . exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances.”  Thus, the identity of the beneficiary of the duty of care is much more 
open-ended, and it appears obvious that it must include creditors.” Peoples Department Stores, ibid at para 57.   
78 OBCA, supra note 75, s 134 (1)  Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising his or her powers and 
discharging his or her duties to the corporation shall, (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances [emphasis added].  
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the time that many companies would shift place of registration to Ontario to limit the scope of 
their duty of care obligations. That was not the case.  
 
 
4. Amend the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act to incorporate ESG factors 
 
There are a growing number of not-for-profit corporations in Canada. The federal government 
has recognized their importance in its recent allocation of $755 million to help not-for-profit 
corporations, charitable and other social purpose organizations access new financing that will 
drive positive social change.79 The federal government expects that its new Social Finance Fund 
could generate up to $2 billion in economic activity, and help create and maintain as many as 
100,000 jobs over the next decade.80  
 
Thus it makes sense to amend the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act81 to align with the 
clarified fiduciary obligation in the CBCA. The rationale is the same as for directors and officers 
under the CBCA. Directors pursuant to the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act have the same 
obligations as under the CBCA and have the good faith reliance defence under the statute.  
 
One question is whether this enhanced duty should apply to all not-for-profit corporations or only 
those corporations that are a particular size. The federal government should commence with 
larger not-for-profit corporations (by amount of capitalization) and then move to smaller 
corporations.  However, there is not really a cogent argument to exclude smaller not-for-profit 
corporations, as their governance and financial decisions are likely to be less complex and ESG 
factors less material, and thus, the time and resource costs of directors and officers putting their 
minds to ESG risks and opportunities should be manageable.  As discussed below under question 
3.3(7), the federal government should play an important role in ensuring clear and accessible 
tools are made available to smaller corporations to identify and address material ESG factors. 
 
Recommendation 2: 
 
Amend section 148 of the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act to read (in red italics): 
 
Duties of directors and officers  
                                                 
The amendments to the OBCA also added a new statutory defence of due diligence and good faith reliance that 
aligns Ontario legislation with the CBCA. The expanded defences are aimed at providing more flexibility to 
directors in allowing them to rely on due diligence or reports of corporate officers or employees outside of 
financial statements in their decision-making. 
79 Announcement of Social Finance Fund appeared in Government of Canada, “Fall Economic Statement (21 
November 2018), online: Government of Canada <https://www.budget.gc.ca/fes-eea/2018/docs/nrc/2018-11-
21-en.html>. Additionally, the Government proposes to invest $50 million over two years in an Investment and 
Readiness stream, for social purpose organizations to improve their ability to successfully participate in the 
social finance market.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act, SC 2009, c 23, as amended [NFP Corporations Act]. 
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148 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
148(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, members, shareholders, employees, 
retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions. 
 
Director — good faith  
149 (2) A director has complied with his or her duties under subsection 148(1) if 
the director relied in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the corporation represented to the director by an 
officer of the corporation or in a written report of the public accountant of the 
corporation fairly to reflect the financial condition of the corporation; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by that person.  
 
The existing section 149(2) defence under the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act would be 
available to directors that acted in good faith and relied on professional advice in respect to 
consideration of ESG factors. Such an amendment would result in a consistent and transparent 
set of fiduciary duties. 
 
 
5. Canada can learn from the experience of the United Kingdom, which has incorporated ESG 
factors, as well as consideration of stakeholder interests, in its corporate law  
 
The United Kingdom (“UK”) has fully embraced the importance of ESG in corporate governance. 
The UK government has incorporated ESG in several statutes on the premise that “companies 
that address ESG concerns can achieve higher growth rates and increased profitability, better 
stakeholder reputation and improved brand strength” and based on the conclusion that “ESG 
risks can seriously undermine investor confidence and the long-term prospects for businesses.”82   
                                                 
82 Michael Hutchinson and Kate Ball-Dodd, “Environment, Social and Governance (“ESG”): New UK Mandatory 
Reporting Rules” (September 2013), online (pdf): Mayer Brown 
<https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/123b4ac7-a050-46f2-9449-
0b6740327749/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/57d4f570-4b22-4a0b-8376-
1e639889272e/UK_Mandatory_Reporting_Sep13.pdf> [Hutchinson and Ball-Dodd]. 
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The UK Companies Act now requires directors, in specified circumstances, to consider ESG factors 
and to report on them.  There is strong language in government reports and guides, the Corporate 
Code of Conduct and in publications of the London Stock Exchange that good governance means 
considering and addressing ESG factors. There is confidence that having to report on the issues 
requires directors to focus on them. For example, the Companies Act 2006 requires companies 
to disclose climate change risks where they are financially material.83  The UK House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee has reported that: “Environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
refers to the three central factors in measuring the sustainability and ethical impact of an 
investment in a company or business.”84 
 
The duty of directors and officers under section 172 of the UK Companies Act has been modified 
to create a duty on directors to act to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, by considering the interests of multiple stakeholders, including: the likely 
consequences of any decision in the long term, the interests of the company's employees, 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others, the impact of the company's operations on 
the community and the environment.85   
 
The UK Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 require 
that quoted companies must provide, in their strategic report, “to the extent necessary for an 
understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s business, 
information about human rights issues alongside social and community issues; a gender 
breakdown at the end of the financial year of the directors of the company, the senior managers 
and employees of the company.”86 The Strategic Report Regulations also introduced a new 
requirement on quoted companies to state the annual quantity of emissions expressed in terms 
of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent arising from the activities for which that company and its 
                                                 
83 UK House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, Greening Finance: embedding sustainability in 
financial decision making (HC 2017-19, 1063-VII, 4 June 2018) [UK House of Commons]. 
84 Ibid at 6. 
85 Companies Act 2006, c 46 (UK): s 172 Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to—(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company’s 
employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) 
the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as 
between members of the company.  
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other than the 
benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members were to achieve those purposes.  
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in 
certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company. 
86 The Companies Act 2006 (UK), Amendment of Part 25, The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report) Regulations 2013 (entered into force 1 October 2013) [The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and 
Directors’ Report)]. 
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consolidated undertakings are responsible (for example, from direct emissions to the 
atmosphere) and arising from the purchase of energy for heating or cooling.87 
 
The company’s strategic report must contain (a) a fair review of the company’s business, and (b) 
a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company.88 The review must, to 
the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
company’s business, include (a) analysis using financial key performance indicators, and (b) where 
appropriate, analysis using other key performance indicators, including information relating to 
environmental matters and employee matters.89 In the case of a quoted company, the strategic 
report must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or 
position of the company’s business, include: 
 
414C (7)(a) the main trends and factors likely to affect the future development, 
performance and position of the company’s business, and  
(b) information about— 
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s business on the 
environment), 
(ii) the company’s employees, and 
(iii) social, community and human rights issues, including information about any 
policies of the company in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of 
those policies. 
If the report does not contain information of each kind mentioned in paragraphs 
(b)(i), (ii) and (iii), it must state which of those kinds of information it does not 
contain.90 
[emphasis added] 
 
The strategic report must be approved by the board of directors and signed on behalf of the 
board by a director or the secretary of the company.91  
  
                                                 
87 Ibid. See also Hutchinson and Ball-Dodd, supra note 82. 
88 The Companies Act 2006 (UK) (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report), supra note 86, s 414C. 
89 Ibid, s 414C(4). The regulation specifies that: “(5) In subsection (4), “key performance indicators” means factors 
by reference to which the development, performance or position of the company’s business can be measured 
effectively. (6) Where a company qualifies as medium-sized in relation to a financial year (see sections 465 to 
467), the review for the year need not comply with the requirements of subsection (4) so far as they relate to 
non-financial information.” 
90 Ibid, s 414C (11). This provision also contains gender diversity disclosure requirements. The strategic report 
may also contain matters otherwise required by regulations made under section 416(4) to be disclosed in the 
directors’ report as the directors consider are of strategic importance to the company. 
91 Ibid, s 414D (1). 
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The UK Companies Act uses a comply or explain approach.92 Revisions effective in 2018 to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code apply to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2019.93 
The Code is applicable to all companies with a premium listing, whether incorporated in the UK 
or elsewhere.94  The principles state that: “A successful company is led by an effective and 
entrepreneurial board, whose role is to promote the long-term sustainable success of the 
company, generating value for shareholders and contributing to wider society.”95  The board 
should understand the views of the company’s other key stakeholders and describe in the annual 
report how their interests have been considered in board discussions and decision-making.96  
 
UK-incorporated quoted companies, ie, those with equity shares listed on London Stock Exchange 
Main Market, EEA regulated, NYSE or NASDAQ, are expected to explain how they are managing 
issues such as environmental performance, human rights, social and community involvement and 
diversity.97 They are also expected to report on certain statistics, for example Scope 1 and 2 CO2 
emissions and gender diversity at board, senior management and whole-company levels.98 
Requirements differ for companies of different sizes and listed status; all companies are expected 
to disclose principal business risks, and medium-sized companies are not expected to include an 
analysis of non-financial key performance indicators.99 Furthermore, only listed companies are 
required to contain an overview of the business strategy and model as well as environment, 
employee, social, community, human rights and diversity information in the strategic report.100 
 
                                                 
92 Financial Reporting Council, “The UK Corporate Governance Code” (April 2016) at 1, 4, online (pdf): FRC 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca7e94c4-b9a9-49e2-a824-ad76a322873c/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-April-2016.pdf>. 
93 Financial Reporting Council, “UK Corporate Governance Code” (July 2018), online: FRC 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governance-code>. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. The principles further state: B. The board should establish the company’s purpose, values and strategy, 
and satisfy itself that these and its culture are aligned. All directors must act with integrity, lead by example 
and promote the desired culture. C. The board should ensure that the necessary resources are in place for the 
company to meet its objectives and measure performance against them. The board should also establish a 
framework of prudent and effective controls, which enable risk to be assessed and managed. D. In order for 
the company to meet its responsibilities to shareholders and stakeholders, the board should ensure effective 
engagement with, and encourage participation from, these parties. E. The board should ensure that workforce 
policies and practices are consistent with the company’s values and support its long-term sustainable success. 
The workforce should be able to raise any matters of concern. Ibid at 4. 
96 Ibid at 5, citing also that: “The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 require directors to 
explain how they have had regard to various matters in performing their duty to promote the success of the 
company in section 172 of the Companies Act 2006.” 
97 London Stock Exchange Group, “Revealing the Full Picture, Your guide to ESG reporting: Guidance for issuers 
on the integration of ESG into investor reporting and communication” (2018) at 19, online (pdf): LSEG 
<https://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/images/Green_Finance/ESG/2018/February/LSEG_ESG_rep
ort_January_2018.pdf> [London Stock Exchange]. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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The UK amendments broaden the definition of governance and emphasize the importance of 
positive relationships between companies, shareholders and stakeholders.101 Companies are to 
demonstrate how the governance of the company contributes to its long-term sustainable 
success and achieves wider objectives.102  The London Stock Exchange has also issued guidance 
on ESG reporting in the UK.103 It observes that the UK governance and reporting framework 
encourages reporting of ESG through the Guidance on the Strategic Report and Corporate 
Governance Code requirements for disclosure of principal risks and uncertainties and a viability 
statement.104  
 
 
6. Amend the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act fiduciary duty 
 
Other federally-regulated incorporation or registration statutes should be amended to align 
fiduciary obligations with the proposed changes to the CBCA. The federal government should 
amend the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act105 to align the fiduciary duty provisions 
with the proposed amendments to the CBCA.  The Act establishes the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board (“CPPIB”).  Its objects are: (a)  to assist the Canada Pension Plan in meeting its 
obligations to contributors and beneficiaries under the Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”); (b) to 
manage any amounts transferred to it under sections 108.1 and 108.3 of the CPP, and its right, 
title or interest in any designated securities, in the best interests of the contributors and 
beneficiaries; and (c) to invest its assets with a view to achieving a maximum rate of return, 
without undue risk of loss, having regard to the factors that may affect the funding of the CPP 
and the ability of the CPP to meet its financial obligations on any given business day.106  The CPPIB 
board of directors is required to manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs 
of the Board.107   
 
The CPPIB is a large institutional investor that manages and invests the funds of the Canada 
Pension Plan on behalf of its 20 million Canadian contributors and beneficiaries.108  CPPIB states 
that it has a profound responsibility: to invest the assets belonging to millions of Canadians to 
help ensure the sustainability of the Canada Pension Plan.109 As of December 2018, CPPIB has 
                                                 
101 Financial Reporting Council, “Revised UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 highlights” (2018) at 1, online 
(pdf): FRC <https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/524d4f4b-62df-4c76-926a-66e223ca0893/2018-UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-highlights.pdf>. 
102 Ibid at 2. 
103 London Stock Exchange, supra note 97 at 19.  
104 Ibid at 19. 
105 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, SC 1997, c 40, as amended [CPPIBA]. 
106 Ibid, ss 3, 5. 
107 Ibid, s 8(1). See also ibid, s 8 Specific duties (2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the board of 
directors shall (a) establish written investment policies, standards and procedures in accordance with section 
35; (b) establish procedures for the identification of potential conflicts of interest and procedures to resolve 
those conflicts; (c) establish a code of conduct for officers and employees of the Board; and (d) designate a 
committee of the board of directors to monitor application of the conflict of interest procedures and the code 
of conduct. 
108 CPPIB, “Who we are” (January 2019), online: CPPIB <http://www.cppib.com/en/who-we-are/>. 
109 Ibid. 
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$368.3 billion in assets under management.110 Its net income in Q2 of fiscal 2019 after all CPPIB 
costs was $8.9 billion.111  Thus, the CPPIB has enormous potential to help shift governance 
practice to meet the issues discussed in this report.  
 
Recommendation 3: 
 
The fiduciary obligation of the directors and officers pursuant to the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board Act112 is virtually the same as many other federal statutes and section 14 of the 
Act should be amended to incorporate ESG as follows (in red italics) 
 
Duty of care  
14 (1) Every director and officer of the Board in exercising any of the powers of 
a director or an officer and in discharging any of the duties of a director or an 
officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Board;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of 
the corporation; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
Special knowledge or skill 
14(2) A director or officer of the Board who in fact possesses, or by reason of 
profession or business ought to possess, a particular level of knowledge or skill 
relevant to the director’s or officer’s powers or duties shall employ that 
particular level of knowledge or skill in the exercise of those powers or the 
discharge of those duties. 
 
14(3) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees, 
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions. 
 
Reliance on statements  
14(3) A director or an officer of the Board is deemed to comply with subsections 
(1) and (2) if they rely in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the Board represented by an officer of the Board, or 
represented in a written report of the Board’s auditor, to be a fair reflection of 
the financial condition of the Board; or 
                                                 
110 CPPIB, “Our Performance” (January 2019), online: CPPIB <http://www.cppib.com/en/our-performance/>. 
111 Ibid. 
112 CPPIBA, supra note 105, s 14. 
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(b) a report of an accountant, lawyer, notary or other professional person whose 
profession lends credibility to a statement made by the person. 
 
CPPIB is already committed to ESG in its public statements: “We believe that organizations that 
manage Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors effectively are more likely to create 
sustainable value over the long-term than those that do not. As we work to fulfill our mandate, 
we consider and integrate ESG risks and opportunities into our investment decisions.”113 As a 
long-term investor, CPPIB reports that it is investing for multiple generations of beneficiaries, 
today and well into the future.  It is positioning its portfolio to perform well through the transition 
to a low-carbon economy. CPPIB states that “as a significant long-term investor we believe we 
can have a powerful influence on the companies in which we invest. We seek to create change 
from the inside by engaging with numerous Canadian and global companies that are high emitters 
of greenhouse gas emissions.”114 Codifying the duty would make that fiduciary obligation 
transparent to all Canadian stakeholders.  
 
 
7. Amend the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act and the Canada Pension Benefits 
Standards Regulation 
 
Pension funds safeguard the financial security of our aging population.115 The fiduciary obligation 
of pension administrators, trustees and other pension fiduciaries is evident in both statutory and 
common law, requiring positive actions on the part of fiduciaries.116 In determining asset 
allocation between short-term and long-term investments, the fiduciary obligation precludes 
short-term investments that prejudice long-term investments, as the fund must be sustained over 
the long-term, and thus, trustees must take account of systemic risks.117 The duty of impartiality 
requires trustees and fund managers to balance intergenerational interests in their investment 
decisions, recognizing that the time horizon for older workers is much different than for workers 
just entering the workforce.118  
 
The federal government has the opportunity to amend its federal pension legislation, the Canada 
Pension Benefits Standards Act,119 to clarify the fiduciary obligations of pension fiduciaries. The 
Act currently addresses the duties of administrators, corporate and individual trustees as follows: 
 
Administrator 
                                                 
113 CPPIB, “Sustainable Investing” (January 2019), online: CPPIB <http://www.cppib.com/en/how-we-
invest/sustainable-investing/>.  
114 Ibid. See also the discussion in Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, supra note 1 at 47-49. 
115 For a discussion, see Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, ibid at 45-57. 
116 Hodgkinson v Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377 at 419 [Hodgkinson v Simms]; Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v United 
Steelworkers, [2013] 1 SCR 2; Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, ibid at 47. 
117 James Hawley, Keith Johnson and Ed Waitzer, “Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance” (2011) 4 Rotman 
International Journal of Pension Management 2 at 13. 
118 Ronald B Davis, Democratizing Pension Funds, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2008) at 54 [Davis]; Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, supra note 1. 
119 Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, RSC, 1985, c 32 (2nd Supp) [Canada Pension Benefits 
Standards Act]. 
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7 (1) The administrator of a pension plan shall be  
(a) in the case of a multi-employer pension plan established under one or more 
collective agreements, a board of trustees or other similar body constituted in 
accordance with the terms of the plan or the collective agreement or agreements 
to manage the affairs of the plan; 
(b) in the case of a multi-employer pension plan not described in paragraph (a), 
a pension committee constituted in accordance with the terms of the plan, 
subject to section 7.1, to manage the affairs of the plan; or 
(c) in the case of a pension plan other than a multiemployer pension plan, 
(i) the employer, or  
(ii) if the plan is established under one or more collective agreements 
and the terms of the plan or the collective agreement or agreements to 
manage the affairs of the plan provide for the constitution of a board of 
trustees or other similar body, that body. 
      . . . 
 
Administration of pension plan and fund 
8(3) The administrator shall administer the pension plan and pension fund as a 
trustee for the employer, the members of the pension plan, former members, 
and any other persons entitled to pension benefits under the plan. 
 
Standard of care  
8(4) In the administration of the pension plan and pension fund, the 
administrator shall exercise the degree of care that a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person. 
 
Manner of investing assets  
8(4.1) The administrator shall invest the assets of a pension fund in accordance 
with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person 
would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments of a pension fund. 
. . . 
 
Administrator’s duty  
8(4.3) If a pension plan permits a member, former member, survivor or former 
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make 
investment choices, the administrator must offer investment options of varying 
degrees of risk and expected return that would allow a reasonable and prudent 
person to create a portfolio of investments that is well adapted to their 
retirement needs. 
 
Deemed compliance with subsection (4.1)  
8(4.4) With respect to the account for which an investment choice is made by a 
member, former member, survivor or former spouse or former common law 
partner of a member or former member, if an administrator offers investment 
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options in accordance with subsection (4.3) and the regulations, that 
administrator is deemed to comply with subsection (4.1). 
 
Investment choices  
8(4.2) A pension plan may permit a member, former member, survivor or former 
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make 
investment choices with respect to their account maintained in respect of a 
defined contribution provision or with respect to their account maintained for 
additional voluntary contributions. 
 
Special knowledge or skill  
8(5) Without limiting the generality of subsection (4), an administrator who in 
fact possesses, or by reason of profession or business ought to possess, a 
particular level of knowledge or skill relevant to the administration of a pension 
plan or pension fund shall employ that particular level of knowledge or skill in the 
administration of the pension plan or pension fund. 
 
Administrator not liable  
8(5.1) An administrator is not liable for contravening subsection (4), (4.1) or (5) 
if the contravention occurred because the administrator relied in good faith on  
(a) financial statements of the pension plan prepared by an accountant, or a 
written report of the auditor or auditors of the plan, that have been represented 
to the administrator as fairly reflecting the financial condition of the plan; or 
(b) a report of an accountant, an actuary, a lawyer, a notary or another 
professional person whose profession lends credibility to the report. 
 
The standard of fiduciary obligation of pension administrators and trustees is a standard that has 
been set by the common law, now accompanied by amendments to pension law. Fiduciary duties 
are imposed on a person who exercises discretionary power on behalf of another person who has 
reposed their trust and confidence in that person.120  A pension fiduciary’s duties are a duty to 
act prudently and a duty of loyalty.121  Pension fiduciaries must act with a view to the best 
interests of the pension plan, aimed at providing a retirement income for employees when they 
retire.122  As the statutory language above indicates, pension fiduciaries, in the administration of 
the pension plan and pension fund, must exercise the degree of care that a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.123 Canadian pension 
fund trustees have a fiduciary obligation to pension beneficiaries to act prudently in their best 
interests in making investment decisions regarding fund portfolios.124  
 
                                                 
120 Hodgkinson v Simms, supra note 116 at 419. See generally, Davis, supra note 118. 
121 Hodgkinson v Simms, ibid. See also Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development), [1995] 4 SCR 344. 
122 A Kaplan and M Frazer, Pension Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006). 
123 Section 8(4), Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act, supra note 119. 
124 See Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, supra note 1 at 47. Arguably, there are also foundations with an asset 
pool for which the same arguments can be made with respect to fiduciary obligation. 
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When the courts assess whether pension fiduciaries have met their obligations, the duties are 
assessed based on the express language in the pension plan, and the relevant pension and trust 
legislation.125 For example, for a defined benefit pension plan, the objective is to build a life 
income for the future retiree. Pension plans have an obligation to make investment decisions that 
create sustainable pension funds, addressing intergenerational pressures such as the need to 
fund pensions in the short to medium term, and the need to look ahead to future generations of 
beneficiaries.126 
 
Waitzer and Sarro have observed that systemic factors are critically important for long term 
pension investments:127  
It is now broadly accepted that most investment returns come from general 
exposure to the market (beta) rather than from seeking market benchmark 
outperformance strategies (alpha). As a result, systemic market factors have 
become critical to fiduciary responsibility. Investments are increasingly expected 
to look past current market benchmarks and consider questions of future 
value—to “assess the impact of their investment decisions on others including 
generations to come.” Risk management means considering such factors as 
market integrity, systemic risks, governance risks, advisor risks, and the like. 
There is also a growing recognition that asset classes of longer duration often 
yield the highest private (as well as societal) returns.128 
 
Arguably, therefore, the current standard of fiduciary obligation requires pension fiduciaries to 
consider ESG risks and opportunities. However, as with corporations law, codification of the duty 
would provide greater certainty and transparency for pension fiduciaries, pension beneficiaries, 
investors and other stakeholders.  
 
Recommendation 4: 
 
Amend sections 8(4.1) and 8(4.2) of the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act by adding the 
follow language (in red italics): 
 
Manner of investing assets  
8(4.1) The administrator shall invest the assets of a pension fund in accordance 
with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person 
would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments of a pension fund, and in 
exercising this authority, will consider environmental, social and governance 
factors.  
 
Investment choices  
                                                 
125 Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co, [2010] 2 SCR 273 at para 41; Nolan v Kerry (Canada) Inc, [2009] 2 SCR 678 at para 
187. 
126 Davis, supra note 118. 
127 D Sarro and E Waitzer, “Fiduciary society unleashed: The road ahead for the financial sector” (2014) 69 
Business Lawyer 1081.  
128 Ibid at 1093. 
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8(4.2) A pension plan may permit a member, former member, survivor or former 
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make 
investment choices with respect to their account maintained in respect of a 
defined contribution provision or with respect to their account maintained for 
additional voluntary contributions, and to inform that choice, the pension 
administrator should provide information on environmental, social and 
governance factors to the member, former member, survivor or former spouse or 
former common law partner of a member or former member for their 
consideration on each fund offered. 
 
The existing section 8(5.1) protection from liability, set out on page 37, would apply to these 
requirements regarding ESG factors. 
 
The Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 and the Pension Benefits Standards Regulations129 
(“PBSR”) currently require that the administrator of a federally-regulated pension plan establish 
a written Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures (“SIP&P”).130 This SIP&P must be 
based on the "prudent person portfolio approach" that a reasonable and prudent person would 
apply to the investment portfolio of a pension fund.131 A well-developed SIP&P helps 
administrators optimize the members' benefits under defined contribution pension plan 
provisions and meet the promised benefits under defined benefit pension plan provisions.132 
 
As prescribed in the PBSR, the SIP&P must specifically address the following elements:  
(a) categories of investments and loans, including derivatives, options and 
futures, 
(b) diversification of the investment portfolio, 
(c) asset mix and rate of return expectations, 
(d) liquidity of investments, 
(e) the lending of cash or securities, 
(f) the retention or delegation of voting rights acquired through plan 
investments, 
(g) the method of, and basis for, the valuation of investments that are not 
regularly traded at a marketplace; and categories of investments and loans, 
including derivatives, options and futures; and  
(h) related party transactions 
having regard to all factors that may affect the funding and solvency of the plan 
and the ability of the plan to meet its financial obligations.133 
 
                                                 
129 Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985, SOR/87-19, as amended (current to 8 November 2018), 
online: Government of Canada <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-87-19.pdf> [PBSR].  
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 OSFI, Guideline for the Development of Investment Policies and Procedures for Federally Regulated Pension 
Plans (Ottawa: OSFI, April 2000), online: OSFI <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/pp-rr/ppa-rra/inv-
plc/pages/penivst.aspx> [OSFI, Pension Plans]. 
133 PBSR, supra note 129, s 7.1 (1). 
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In addressing these elements, the plan administrator is currently required to determine the 
degree of risk and risk tolerance the plan is able to sustain.134  The plan administrator must 
review the SIP&P at least annually.135  These requirements would be enhanced by expressly 
amending the PBSR to incorporate ESG factors as one of the elements that the SIP&P must 
address. 
 
Recommendation 5: 
 
The Pension Benefits Standards Regulations should be amended to specify that ESG factors 
must be considered and incorporated in the SIP&P. The federal government should amend 
section 7.1 of the Pension Benefit Standards Regulation to require: 
The Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures required under section 7.1 
shall contain information as to how environmental, social and governance 
factors have been considered and have been incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures. 
 
This amendment would align with developments in Ontario and internationally. 
 
i. Other jurisdictions have already incorporated ESG factors in their statements of 
pension fund investment policy 
 
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act136 has been amended to require pension funds to disclose 
information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into 
the plan’s investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated.137 
It is a “disclose and explain” approach.138 Pursuant to Regulation 909 under the Pension Benefits 
Act, the administrator of a pension plan is required to establish a statement of investment 
policies and procedures (“SIPP”).139 Effective January 2016, plan administrators are required to 
file their SIPP and any amendments with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario 
(“FSCO”).140 FSCO observes that reporting that ESG factors are incorporated into the plan's 
broader investment policies and procedures requires action by the administrator beyond a 
broad delegation. Some examples of the actions that administrators should take include: 
                                                 
134 OSFI, Pension Plans, supra note 132. In addressing these elements in an investment policy, the administrator 
should establish limits on the plan’s exposure to credit risk (a single entity or group of associated entities), and 
to market risks (interest rate, currency and price). In setting these limits, the plan administrator should consider 
the plan’s exposure under a variety of potential scenarios.  
135 PBSR, supra note 129, s 7.2. 
136 Ontario Pension Benefits Act, RSO 1990, c P 8, as amended [Pension Benefits Act]. 
137 O Reg 235/14, made under the Pension Benefits Act, amending Reg 909 of RRO 1990 (General), s 8 [O Reg 
235/14]. 
138 Section 78(1) of General, RRO 1990, Reg 909 [Pension Benefits Act, Reg 909] under the Pension Benefits Act, 
supra note 136. The Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures (SIPP) must meet the requirements of 
the federal investment regulations (FIR), as modified in sections 47.8 and 79 of the Regulation: see Financial 
Services Commission for Ontario (FSCO), “FAQs – Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures (SIPP)”, 
online: FSCO <http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/legislative/Pages/sipp.aspx#ESG> [SIPP]. 
139 Pension Benefits Act, Reg 909, ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
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summarizing policies where the managers incorporate ESG factors into their investment 
policies; describing how the administrator incorporates ESG factors as part of the manager 
search, selection and review process; and describing how the administrator incorporates ESG 
in the choice of investment fund options.141  
 
FSCO has observed that administrators have a fiduciary duty to supervise their investment 
managers, including ensuring that the managers are complying with the Pension Benefits Act 
and with the SIPP. This supervision requirement extends to the incorporation of ESG factors, 
where the SIPP contains them.142 There are also specific requirements as to what must be 
disclosed to beneficiaries and others that should provide guidance to how the federal 
government can amend the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Regulation.143  
 
One report suggests that the Ontario Pension Benefits Act amendments have been important 
in stimulating boards of trustees to explicitly discuss ESG issues and to seek advice on how 
responsible investment is consistent with their fiduciary obligation.144 Investors have observed 
that the Ontario amendments have had an important catalytic effect on pension funds, in that 
they now consciously assess both risks and opportunities associated with ESG factors as they 
want to be in a position to give informed disclosure to beneficiaries.   
 
                                                 
141 SIPP, supra note 138. 
142 Ibid. 
143 O Reg 235/14, supra note 137, s 8: 
40 (1) A statement required under subsection 27 (1) of the Act shall contain, as recorded in the records of the 
administrator, at least, 
(v) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies 
and procedures for the plan that contains, 
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated; 
40.1 (1) A statement to a former member required under subsection 27 (2) of the Act shall contain, as 
recorded in the records of the administrator, at least, 
(s) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies 
and procedures for the plan that contains, 
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated; 
40.2 (1) A statement to a retired member required under subsection 27 (2) of the Act shall contain, as 
recorded in the records of the administrator, at least, 
(r) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies 
and procedures for the plan that contains, 
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated; 
78 (3) The statement of investment policies and procedures shall include information as to whether 
environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s investment policies and 
procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated. 
144 UN PRI, “Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century” (8 September 2018) at 15, online: UN PRI 
<https://www.unpri.org/fiduciary-duty/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-century/244.article>. See also the Ontario 
Government, “The End of Coal” (published 15 December 2017), online: Government of Ontario 
<https://www.ontario.ca/page/end-coal> [archived], which reports that Ontario is saving approximately $4.4 
billion annually in health, environmental and financial costs since it eliminated coal-fired energy generation. 
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The UK has enacted similar legislation. Effective 1 January 2019, new regulations clarify 
trustees’ fiduciary duties, including consideration of ESG factors.145 The new regulations clarify 
that it is the duty of pension trustees to consider financially material risks and opportunities, 
including ESG topics like climate change, in addition to traditional financial metrics. All pension 
schemes that are required to produce a Statement of Investment Principles need to update the 
statement to set out financially material considerations over the appropriate time horizon of 
the investments, including how those considerations are taken into account in the selection, 
retention and realization of investments.146 The UK Government has specified that “financially 
material considerations” include, but are not limited to, ESG considerations, including, but not 
limited to, climate change, which the trustees of the trust scheme consider financially 
material.147  The appropriate time horizon for considering ESG factors is the length of time that 
trustees consider is needed for the funding of future benefits by the investments of the 
scheme.148 
 
The UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association has observed: 
Fiduciary duty means acting in the best interests of beneficiaries, who will have, given 
the nature of pensions, long-term investment horizons. The integration of financially 
material environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into investment decisions 
and robust stewardship policies can help reduce investment risk and enhance returns.149 
 
One improvement from the current Ontario requirements would be to require federally-
regulated pension plans across Canada to incorporate ESG factors, including climate change risk, 
into the plan’s statement of investment policies and procedures, as opposed to a disclose or 
explain approach. Failure to do so would then give rise to liability for breach of fiduciary and 
prudential obligations. It would align with UK and EU developments and would enhance 
investment policies under the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act and provide important 
signalling for provincial and territorial governments regarding pension legislation across the 
country.  At the absolute minimum, the federal government should require a disclose or explain 
approach, as is required under Ontario law. 
 
 
8. Require federal Crown corporations to consider ESG factors and address material ESG risks 
and opportunities 
 
                                                 
145 UK Government, Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), “Pension trustees: clarifying and strengthening 
investment duties” (18 June 2018, last updated 11 September 2018), online: UK Government 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/pension-trustees-clarifying-and-strengthening-investment-
duties>. See Impact Assessment. 
146 Ibid. 
147 By 1 October 2019 some schemes will have been required to update and publish their Statement of 
Investment Principles. Effective 1 October 2020 some schemes are required to produce and publish their 
implementation statement. Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 UK House of Commons, supra note 83 at 7, citing UKSIF (GFI0002). 
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Federal Crown corporations operate in many sectors of the Canadian economy, each with a 
specified public policy interest.150 There are currently 46 federal Crown corporations in Canada, 
varying in size, capitalization and reliance on government appropriations.151  There is a broad 
range of governance structures, although the majority are reporting corporations pursuant to 
International Financial Reporting Standards.152 The Expert Panel should recommend to the 
federal government that Crown corporations must consider ESG factors in their governance and 
oversight and that they address material risks and opportunities. It would demonstrate leadership 
in sustainability in terms of the activities funded in large part by Canadian taxpayers. 
 
Recommendation 6: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend to the federal government to require federal Crown 
corporations to consider whether there are material ESG risks and opportunities, and 
where they exist, to take all reasonable care to address the material ESG factors. 
 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.4(2):   
What is the best way to incorporate ESG into rules or regulations that govern Canadian 
financial institutions?  
 
 
1. The significance of Canadian financial institutions to the Canadian economy 
 
Canadian financial institutions are a significant part of the Canadian economy. Federally-
regulated financial institutions that are publicly-traded had $597.6 billion in qualifying market 
value as at November 2018, and that figure does not include more than 200 financial institutions 
operating in Canada that are not listed on the TSX.153  Canadian financial institutions earned a 
record total net income of $44.7 billion CAD in 2017.154 Insurance companies’ business activities 
                                                 
150 Government of Canada, “Crown Corporations Financial Data” (27 December 2018), online: Government of 
Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/reporting-government-
spending/inventory-government-organizations/crown-corporations-financial-data.html>; Government of 
Canada, “Appendix A: List of Crown corporations and other reporting entities (9 October 2018), online: 
Government of Canada <https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/recgen/manuels-manuals/chap18/07-eng.html>.  
151 Government of Canada, “Consolidated Financial Information for Crown Corporations (Annual Report 2017-
2018; in thousands of dollars)” (27 December 2018), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/reporting-government-spending/inventory-
government-organizations/consolidated-financial-information-crown-corporations-annual-report-2017-
2018.html>. 
152 Ibid. 
153 They are listed on international exchanges or privately held. TSX, supra note 47; Bloomberg and OSFI, “Who 
We Regulate” (15 January 2019), online: OSFI <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/wt-ow/Pages/wwr-er.aspx> 
[OSFI, “Who We Regulate”]. 
154 Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Annual Report 2018” (2018) at 15, online (pdf): CDIC 
<http://www.cdic.ca/en/newsroom/financial-reports/Documents/annual-report/2018-annual-report.pdf>. 
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represent almost 2% of Canada’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) generated annually155 and net 
income of insurance companies in Canada was $9.8 billion in 2016, with 75% of the industry’s net 
income attributable to three large conglomerate insurers.156 There have been considerable 
amendments to financial institution legislation in recent years to enhance capital adequacy, 
liquidity and governance oversight.  
 
Fairness suggests that amendments to incorporate ESG factors as part of fiduciary obligation 
should be made across the entirety of federally-regulated business entities, including federally-
regulated banks, insurance companies and financial institutions. Given the size and market 
capitalization of many of these entities, it would result in a considerable shift in corporate activity 
towards sustainable governance. 
 
Canada’s financial institutions are regulated under a number of statutes. Given that directors are 
one of the key stakeholder groups to effect a shift to consideration of ESG factors, it makes sense 
to amend these statutes to mirror the provisions of the CBCA. The policy suggestions below 
specifically focus on fiduciary obligations under the Bank Act,157 the Insurance Companies Act,158 
the federal Trust and Loan Companies Act,159 statutes relating to federally-registered credit 
unions, and the Bank of Canada Act.160   
 
 
2. Amend the fiduciary obligation provisions under the Bank Act to incorporate ESG factors 
 
The Bank Act161 applies to banks listed in Schedule I or II and to bank holding companies, which 
are  body corporates incorporated or formed under Part XV of the Bank Act.162  The statute also 
applies to authorized foreign banks permitted to carry on business in Canada.163 As of 31 
December 2017, there were 32 banks,164 21 bank holding companies,165 and 32 foreign banks 
authorized to carry on business in Canada pursuant to the Bank Act.166 The six largest banks 
account for about 90% of total assets held by federally-regulated deposit-taking institutions.167  
                                                 
155 Canada, Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0434-05 Gross domestic product at basic prices, by industry, monthly, 
industry detail, growth rates (x1,000,000) (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2018), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610043405>. 
156 Ibid. 2016 are the statistics most recently available. 
157 Canada Bank Act, SC 1991, c 46, as amended [Bank Act]. 
158 Canada Insurance Companies Act, SC 1991, c 47, as amended (ICA). 
159 Trust and Loan Companies Act, SC 1991, c 45, as amended. 
160 Bank of Canada Act, RSC, 1985, c B-2, as amended [Bank of Canada Act]. 
161 Bank Act, supra note 157. 
162 Bank Act, ibid, s 2. 
163 Bank Act, ibid, s 14.1 (1) There shall be set out in Schedule III (a) the name of every authorized foreign bank 
and, where applicable, any other name under which it is permitted to carry on business in Canada; (b) the 
province in which the principal office of the authorized foreign bank is situated; and (c) whether the authorized 
foreign bank is subject to the restrictions and requirements referred to in subsection 524(2).  
164 Schedule I, Bank Act, ibid. 
165 Schedule II, Bank Act, ibid. 
166 Schedule III, Bank Act, ibid. 
167 OSFI, Annual Report 2017-2018 (2018), online (pdf): OSFI <http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/ar1718.pdf>. OSFI regulates: 35 domestic banks; 21 foreign banks; 28 full service foreign 
46 
 
The Bank Act also sets out the same fiduciary obligations for directors and officers of bank holding 
companies, as for Schedule I and II banks. 
 
Recommendation 7:  
 
For greater certainty, the Bank Act sections 158 and 748 on fiduciary obligations of banks and 
bank holding companies should be amended to read (in red italics): 
 
158 (1) Every director and officer of a bank in exercising any of the powers of a 
director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer 
shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank; 
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
158(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment to inform their decisions. 
… 
 
Duty of care  
748 (1) Every director and officer of a bank holding company in exercising any of 
the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a 
director or an officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank 
holding company;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
748(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
                                                 
bank branches; 4 lending foreign bank branches; 44 trust companies; and 18 loan companies. OSFI, “Who We 
Regulate”, supra note 153.  
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funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment to inform their decisions. 
 
The addition of sections 158(2) and section 748(2), which largely track the suggested CBCA 
amendments codifying Canadian common law, adds depositors and deposit insurance protection 
funds as stakeholders whose interests directors and officers may consider in acting with a view 
to the best interests of the bank.  Depositors are significant stakeholders whose savings are 
protected under banking legislation.  As the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
(“OSFI”) has observed: “Relative to non-financial businesses, the failure of a financial institution 
can have a greater impact on members of the public who may have placed a substantial portion 
of their life savings with the institution and who may be relying on that institution for day-to-day 
financial needs.”168 The deposit insurance protection fund169 is essentially a significant contingent 
creditor that could have the largest claim on a deposit-taking bank’s assets if it were to fail. It is 
therefore another stakeholder that directors and officers may consider in acting in the best 
interests of the bank. 
 
Strong defences are already available under sections 211 and 798 of the Bank Act, which would 
then apply to consideration of ESG factors and decisions to address material issues by banks and 
bank holding companies: 
 
Defence – due diligence 
211 (1) A director, officer or employee of a bank is not liable under section 207 
or 210 or subsection 506(1) and has fulfilled their duty under subsection 158(2) 
if they exercised the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good 
faith on  
(a) financial statements of the bank that were represented to them by an officer 
of the bank or in a written report of the auditor or auditors of the bank fairly to 
reflect the financial condition of the bank; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by them. 
 
Defence — good faith  
211 (2) A director or officer of a bank has fulfilled their duty under subsection 
158(1) if they relied in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the bank that were represented to them by an officer 
of the bank or in a written report of the auditor or auditors of the bank fairly to 
reflect the financial condition of the bank; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by them. 
                                                 
168 OSFI, Corporate Governance Guideline (September 2018), online: OSFI <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-
if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/CG_Guideline.aspx> [OSFI, Corporate Governance Guideline].   
169 Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, “About deposit insurance” (2018), online: CDIC 
<http://www.cdic.ca/en/about-di/Pages/default.aspx>.  
48 
 
       . . . 
 
Defence — due diligence   
798 (1) A director, officer or employee of a bank holding company is not liable 
under section 794 or 797 and has fulfilled their duty under subsection 748(2) if 
they exercised the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good 
faith on 
(a) financial statements of the bank holding company that were represented to 
them by an officer of the bank holding company or in a written report of the 
auditor of the bank holding company fairly to reflect the financial condition of 
the bank holding company; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by them. 
 
Defence — good faith  
798 (2) A director or officer of a bank holding company has fulfilled their duty 
under subsection 748(1) if they relied in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the bank holding company that were represented to 
them by an officer of the bank holding company or in a written report of the 
auditor of the bank holding company fairly to reflect the financial condition of 
the bank holding company; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by them. 
 
Thus, there is a strong defence that if directors and officers exercise the care, diligence and skill 
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable circumstances, including 
reliance in good faith on the assistance of professionals, they have nothing to be concerned about 
in terms of personal or corporate liability. Here again, an obligation to address material ESG 
factors would be counter-balanced by a strong defence for duly diligent directors and officers. 
 
 
3.  Include federally-regulated credit unions in the amended fiduciary obligation provisions 
under the Bank Act, and amend the fiduciary obligation provisions of the Canada Cooperatives 
Act and the Cooperative Credit Associations Act to align 
 
The amendments to consider and address material ESG factors should also apply to federally-
regulated credit unions.170 There are currently three federal statutes that regulate credit unions, 
the Bank Act,171 the Canada Cooperatives Act172 and the Cooperative Credit Associations Act.173 
 
                                                 
170 Bank Act, supra note 157, s 183.01 Directors of federal credit union and s 216.01 Conversion into federal 
credit union. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Canada Cooperatives Act, SC 1998, c 1, as amended [Canada Cooperatives Act].  
173 Cooperative Credit Associations Act, SC 1991, c 48, as amended [Cooperative Credit Associations Act]. 
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The Bank Act defines a federal credit union as ”a bank that, within the meaning of section 12.1, 
is organized and carries on business on a cooperative basis.”174  As with the issuing of letters 
patent to incorporate a bank, the Minister is to take into account all matters that the Minister 
considers relevant to the application, specifically, the nature and sufficiency of the financial 
resources, soundness, feasibility, integrity, competence and the best interests of the financial 
system in Canada, including the best interests of the cooperative financial system in Canada.175  
A credit union can be structured by common shares or membership shares pursuant to the Bank 
Act.176 At least two-thirds of the directors of a federal credit union, or any greater proportion that 
is provided for by the by-laws, must be members of the federal credit union or representatives 
of members of the federal credit union.177 
 
A federal credit union may also apply, with the approval in writing of the Minister, under the 
Canada Cooperatives Act178 for a certificate of continuance, or a certificate of continuance and a 
certificate of amalgamation, as a cooperative under that Act; or apply under the Cooperative 
Credit Associations Act179 for letters patent continuing the federal credit union as an association 
under that Act or amalgamating and continuing the federal credit union as an association under 
that Act.180 
 
It therefore makes sense to amend the fiduciary duties under the Canada Cooperatives Act and 
the Cooperative Credit Associations Act to align with proposed changes to the Bank Act. 
 
 
                                                 
174 Section 2, Bank Act, supra note 157. Section 12.1 specifies: 12.1 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a federal 
credit union is organized and carries on business on a cooperative basis if (a) a majority of its members are 
natural persons; (b) it provides financial services primarily to its members; (c) membership in the federal credit 
union is wholly or primarily open, in a non-discriminatory manner, to persons who can use the services of the 
federal credit union and who are willing and able to accept the responsibilities of membership; (d) each 
member has only one vote; (e) a delegate has only one vote even though the delegate is a member or 
represents more than one member; (f) dividends on any membership share are limited to the maximum 
percentage fixed in the federal credit union’s letters patent or by-laws; and (g) surplus funds arising from the 
federal credit union’s operations are used (i) to provide for the financial stability of the federal credit union, (ii) 
to develop its business, (iii) to provide or improve common services to members, (iv) to provide for reserves or 
dividends on membership shares and shares, (v) for community welfare or the propagation of cooperative 
enterprises, or (vi) as a distribution to its members as a patronage allocation. Section 22(2) specifies that (2) On 
the application of five or more persons, a majority of whom are natural persons, made in accordance with this 
Act, the Minister may, subject to this Part, issue letters patent incorporating a federal credit union. 
175 Section 27, ibid. 
176 Section 38(2), ibid. 
177 Section 159.1, ibid. 
178 Canada Cooperatives Act, supra note 172, s 11.1 specifies that: If a federal credit union, within the meaning 
of section 2 of the Bank Act, is continued as a cooperative under this Act, (a) its membership shares are 
deemed to be membership shares to which are attached the rights, privileges and restrictions set out in this 
Act and the articles; (b) the members of the federal credit union are deemed to be the members of the 
cooperative; and (c) any agreement made before continuance under which the members of the federal credit 
union have agreed to vote in a manner provided in the agreement is of no effect. 
179 Cooperative Credit Associations Act, supra note 173. 
180 Section 39.2 (1), Bank Act, supra note 157. 
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Recommendation 8: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers under the Canada Cooperatives Act as 
follows (in red italics): 
Duties  
80 (1) Every director and officer must, in exercising the powers and performing 
the duties of office, 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
cooperative;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
80(2)  In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment to inform their decisions. 
 
Directors would have the existing due diligence defence under section 111 of the Canada 
Cooperatives Act: 
 
Defence Due diligence   
111  A director is not liable under this Part if the director exercised the care, diligence 
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable 
circumstances, including reliance in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the cooperative represented to the director by an officer of 
the cooperative or in a written report of the auditor of the cooperative fairly to reflect 
the financial condition of the cooperative; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by the 
professional person. 
 
The Cooperative Credit Associations Act specifies similar duties of directors and officers and its 
provisions should be amended to align with the recommendations above. 
 
Recommendation 9: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligation of directors and officers under section 168(1) of the Cooperative 
Credit Associations Act as follows (in red italics):  
 
Duty of care  
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168 (1) Every director and officer of an association in exercising any of the powers of a 
director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the association;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to environmental, 
social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of the corporation; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise 
in comparable circumstances. 
 
168(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may 
consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection funds, 
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment to inform their decisions. 
 
 
Directors and officers under the Cooperative Credit Associations Act would have the due diligence 
and good faith defences that already exist under the statute: 
 
Defence — due diligence  
215 (1) A director, officer or employee of an association is not liable under section 211 
or 214 or subsection 430(1) and has fulfilled their duty under subsection 168(2) if they 
exercised the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have 
exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the association that were represented to them by an officer 
of the association or in a written report of the auditor of the association fairly to reflect 
the financial condition of the association; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by 
them.181 
 
Defence — good faith  
215 (2) A director or officer of an association has fulfilled their duty under subsection 
168(1) if they relied in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the association that were represented to them by an officer 
of the association or in a written report of the auditor of the association fairly to reflect 
the financial condition of the association; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by them. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
181 Section 211 refers to a list of specified transactions for which a director may be liable in terms of consenting 
or voting; section 214 refers to liability for employee wages in specified circumstances; and section 430(1) 
refers to voidable contracts. Cooperative Credit Associations Act, supra note 173. 
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4. Amend the fiduciary obligation provisions under the Canada Trust and Loan Companies Act 
 
In order to create fairness and consistency, the federal government should amend the federal 
Trust and Loan Companies Act,182 which currently has the same fiduciary obligation provisions as 
the Bank Act. The rationale for the change is the same. 
 
Recommendation 10: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligations under the federal Trust and Loan Companies Act as follows (in 
red italics):  
 
Duty of care  
162 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers 
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an 
officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
company;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
162(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments 
and the environment to inform their decisions. 
 
The defences under sections 216(1) and (2) of the Trust and Loan Companies Act183 are the same 
as the liability protection pursuant to the Bank Act, discussed above.  
 
 
5. Federally-regulated insurance companies and fiduciary duty 
 
Several major Canadian insurance companies are signatories to the UN “Principles for Sustainable 
Insurance”, which provides a framework for the global insurance industry to address ESG risks 
                                                 
182 Trust and Loan Companies Act, SC 1991, c 45, as amended. 
183 Ibid, s 216: Defence — good faith (2) A director or officer of a company has fulfilled their duty under 
subsection 162 (1) if they relied in good faith on (a) financial statements of the company that were represented 
to them by an officer of the company or in a written report of the auditor of the company fairly to reflect the 
financial condition of the company; or (b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a 
statement made by them. 
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and opportunities.184  The four principles are a commitment to: embedding ESG issues relevant 
to the insurance business in decision-making; work with clients and business partners to raise 
awareness of ESG issues, manage risk and develop solutions; work with governments, regulators 
and other key stakeholders to promote widespread action on ESG issues; and demonstrate 
accountability and transparency in regularly disclosing publicly progress in implementing the 
Principles.185 
 
There are a number of insurance companies that are federally regulated and thus amendment of 
the fiduciary obligation should significantly assist in embedding sustainable governance 
strategies. OSFI reports that it currently supervises 67 federally-regulated life insurance 
companies, 13 federally-regulated fraternal benefit societies and 152 federally-regulated 
property & casualty insurance companies.186 Many of these insurance companies are already at 
the forefront of advocating or adopting climate-related or ESG factors in their decision-making. 
 
The Insurance Companies Act187 specifies that directors of a company shall manage or supervise 
the management of the business and affairs of the company.188 There are a series of specified 
duties, as well as exceptions to those duties in some circumstances.189 The fiduciary obligation in 
                                                 
184 United Nations Environment Finance Initiative, “Principles for Sustainable Insurance” (2018), online: UNEP 
<www.unepfi.org/psi>.  
185 Ibid. 
186 OSFI, “Who We Regulate”, supra note 153.  
187 Canada Insurance Companies Act, SC 1991, c 47, as amended [ICA]. 
188 Ibid, s 165 (1) Duty to manage. 
189 Ibid, s 165 (1) Duty to manage; and s 165 Specific duties (2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), 
the directors of a company shall 
(a) establish an audit committee to perform the duties referred to in subsections 203(3) and (4); 
(b) establish a conduct review committee to perform the duties referred to in subsection 204(3); 
(c) establish procedures to resolve conflicts of interest, including techniques for the identification of potential 
conflict situations and for restricting the use of confidential information; 
(d) designate a committee of the board of directors to monitor the procedures referred to in paragraph (c); 
(e) in the case of a company that issues participating policies, establish, before issuing any participating policies 
or, in the case of a former-Act company, within six months after the coming into force of this Part, a policy for 
determining the dividends and bonuses to be paid to the participating policyholders; 
(e.1) establish a policy respecting the management of each of the participating accounts maintained under 
section 456, 
(i) if the company has participating policyholders on the day on which this paragraph comes into force, within 
six months after that day, and 
(ii) in any other case, before issuing a participating policy; 
(e.2) establish criteria for changes made by the company to the premium or charge for insurance, amount of 
insurance or surrender value in respect of its adjustable policies, 
(i) if the company has adjustable policyholders on the day on which this paragraph comes into force, within six 
months after that day, and 
(ii) in any other case, before issuing an adjustable policy; 
(f) establish procedures to provide disclosure of information to customers of the company that is required to 
be disclosed by this Act and for dealing with complaints as required by section 486; 
(g) designate a committee of the board of directors to monitor the procedures referred to in paragraph (f) and 
satisfy itself that they are being adhered to by the company; 
(h) establish investment and lending policies, standards and procedures in accordance with section 492; and 
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section 166(1) of the Insurance Companies Act mirrors the CBCA provisions.  Therefore, it makes 
sense to amend the fiduciary obligation in the Insurance Companies Act to align with the 
proposed changes to the CBCA.  In terms of stakeholder groups to consider, insurance 
policyholders and the insurance protection funds should be included.190 As with deposit 
insurance, the policyholder insurance protection funds are the largest contingent creditors and 
their interests should be included in the enumerated list.  The same duties are mirrored for 
insurance holding companies in the Insurance Companies Act, and that language would also need 
amending. 
 
Recommendation 11: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers of insurance companies and insurance 
holding companies in the Insurance Companies Act as follows (in red italics): 
 
166 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers 
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an 
officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
company;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
166(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds, 
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment to inform their decisions. 
 
      . . . 
 
Duty of care  
795 (1) Every director and officer of an insurance holding company in exercising 
any of the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of 
a director or an officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
insurance holding company;  
                                                 
(i) in the case of a former-Act company, appoint the actuary of the company forthwith after the coming into 
force of this Part. 
190 Assuris, “Home Page” (2018), online: Assuris <www.assuris.ca/>, and the Property and Casualty Insurance 
Compensation Corporation, “Home Page” (2018), online: PACICC <http://www.pacicc.ca/>. 
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(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
795(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds, 
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment to inform their decisions. 
 
The existing good faith defences would then be available to the directors and officers: 
 
Defence — good faith  
220(2) A director or officer of a company has fulfilled their duty under subsection 
166(1) if they relied in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the company that were represented to them by an 
officer of the company or in a written report of the auditor of the company fairly 
to reflect the financial condition of the company; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by them. 
 
 
Defence — good faith  
845 (2) A director or officer of an insurance holding company has fulfilled their 
duty under subsection 795(1) if they relied in good faith on 
(a) financial statements of the insurance holding company that were represented 
to them by an officer of the insurance holding company or in a written report of 
the auditor of the insurance holding company fairly to reflect the financial 
condition of the insurance holding company; or 
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made 
by them. 
    . . .  
 
Reliance on information  
960 An insurance holding company and any person who is a director or an officer, 
employee or agent of the insurance holding company may rely on any 
information contained in a declaration required by the directors pursuant to 
section 959 or on any information otherwise acquired in respect of any matter 
that might be the subject of such a declaration, and no action lies against the 
insurance holding company or any such person for anything done or omitted to 
be done in good faith in reliance on any such information. 
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6. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions should assist in shifting governance 
practices 
 
OSFI should assist boards that come under OSFI’s supervisory authority to shift their governance 
practices to take account of ESG factors.  OSFI has said that the quality of corporate governance 
practices of federally-regulated financial institutions is an important factor in maintaining the 
confidence of depositors and policyholders, as well as overall market confidence.191  In September 
2018, it issued a corporate governance guideline that “draws attention to specific areas of 
corporate governance that are especially important for financial institutions (eg, risk governance), 
owing to the unique nature and circumstances of financial institutions and risks assumed relative 
to other corporations.”192 While its guideline has a number of important recommendations 
regarding board diversity, independence, and risk management, it makes no mention of ESG 
factors, other than to specify that: “On an on-going basis, the FRFI (federally-regulated financial 
institutions) should be satisfied that the Risk Appetite Framework remains appropriate relative to 
the risk profile of the FRFI, its long-term strategic plan and its operating environment.”193 
 
Importantly, the new corporate governance guideline requires federally-regulated financial 
institutions to develop a “Risk Appetite Framework”, OSFI noting that “Risk governance is a 
distinct and crucial element of the FRFI’s corporate governance”.194  The Risk Appetite Framework 
should set the basic goals, benchmarks, parameters and limits as to the amount of risk the 
federally-regulated financial institution is willing to accept, taking into account various financial, 
operational and macroeconomic factors. It should consider the material risks to the federally-
regulated financial institution, as well as the institution’s reputation vis-à-vis policyholders, 
depositors, investors and customers.195  Thus it does recognize the need to take account of risks 
to diverse stakeholders, although makes no mention beyond direct financial claimants. Arguably, 
the scope of the Risk Appetite Framework includes consideration of material ESG risks; however, 
for greater certainty, OSFI should make clear the need to consider these risks. 
 
OSFI’s role is to supervise federally-regulated financial institutions to assess their financial 
condition and monitor compliance with the applicable federal legislation, which it carries out 
within a risk-focused framework”.196 OSFI has developed a comprehensive set of assessment 
criteria, key among which is the quality of oversight and control provided by the board and senior 
officers, monitoring their activities to assess safety and soundness, the quality of control and 
governance.197 Its general approach is “trust but verify” in terms of governance, capital adequacy 
                                                 
191 OSFI, Corporate Governance Guideline, supra note 168. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid at 11. 
194 Ibid at 7. 
195 Ibid at 8. 
196 OSFI, Supervisory Framework (revised December 2010), online: OSFI <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-
if/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/sff.aspx>. 
197 Ibid. 
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and risk management.198  Within these activities, OSFI should contribute meaningfully to 
enhanced governance through consideration of ESG factors by embedding them in its corporate 
governance guideline and in its oversight practice. As the World Bank and the OECD have 
observed, it is important to support financial supervisory authorities to better assess and oversee 
climate-related risks that could threaten the financial stability of the financial system in the short 
and long term.199 
 
The Bank of England is integrating the financial risks from climate change into its supervisory 
activities, including through its Prudential Regulatory Authority, to embed climate change risk in 
its assessment and intervention practices in support of the safety and soundness of its financial 
institutions and also in actively supporting an orderly transition to a low-carbon economy.200 
 
The Expert Panel’s Interim Report noted that this year OSFI will include questions on climate risk 
oversight in its supervisory process.201 No information is yet available on this development, but it 
is an important factor to consider. OSFI advises that it will publish a short statement on climate-
risk and the insurance industry in the coming weeks.202  OSFI should be encouraged to expand 
that supervisory oversight to include material ESG factors that pose a risk to capital adequacy and 
liquidity of the financial institutions over which it exercises supervisory oversight. 
 
 Recommendation 12: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions include in its supervisory oversight of federally-regulated financial institutions 
material ESG factors that pose a risk to capital adequacy and liquidity of these institutions. 
This requirement would provide greater certainty and transparency of management of ESG 
risks and opportunities. 
 
 
7.   Amend the Bank of Canada Act to include ESG factors 
 
Canada’s central bank is created pursuant to the Bank of Canada Act.203 The purpose of the bank 
is to: regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, control 
and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and mitigate by its influence 
fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as may be 
                                                 
198 Janis Sarra, “Flotsam, Financing and Flotation: Is Canada ‘Resolution Ready’ for Insurance Company 
Insolvency?” / «Épaves, financement et flottement : Le Canada est-il prêt pour la résolution des sociétés 
d’assurance insolvables? » in Janis Sarra, Barbara Romaine, Blair Nixon and Jill Corraini, eds, Annual Review of 
Insolvency Law 2018 (Toronto: Carswell, 2019) 793 at 1006. 
199 OECD, “Financing Climate Futures: Rethinking Infrastructure” (28 November 2018) at 30, 84, online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/climate-futures/> [OECD, “Financing Climate Futures”]. 
200 Bank of England, “The Bank of England’s response to climate change” (2017), online: Bank of England 
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-bulletin/2017/the-banks-response-to-climate-
change.pdf?la=en&hash=7DF676C781E5FAEE994C2A210A6B9EEE44879387>.  
201 Expert Panel, supra note 16 at 17. 
202 OFSI, telephone conversation, 25 January 2019. 
203 Bank of Canada Act, supra note 160. 
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possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally promote the economic and financial 
welfare of Canada.204  The business and powers of the bank include: buying and selling gold, silver, 
or any other coin and gold and silver bullion; buying and selling foreign currencies and 
maintaining deposit accounts with banks or foreign banks, either in or outside Canada; making 
short-term loans or advances to members of the Canadian Payments Association; and a host of 
other duties in buying and selling securities issued by or guaranteed by governments for the 
purposes of conducting monetary policy or promoting the stability of the Canadian financial 
system.205 
 
While the Bank of Canada has a somewhat unique status as the nation’s central bank, it is 
nonetheless worth considering legislative change to encourage the bank, in carrying out its 
statutory purposes, to consider ESG factors where they are material.  The Bank of Canada is a 
body corporate with a board of 12 directors in addition to the Governor and a Deputy Governor 
of the bank.206 There is no express statutory duty of care or loyalty set out in the statute, although 
there is authority for the Minister, with the approval of the Governor in Council, to “appoint 
directors to hold office, during good behaviour, subject to removal by the Governor in Council at 
any time for cause.”207  There are express restrictions on serving in respect of conflicts of interest, 
such as being a shareholder of a clearing house designated under the Payment Clearing and 
Settlement Act208 or an investment dealer that acts as a distributor of new federal government 
securities.209 There is a provision providing protection for directors specifying that no action lies 
against the directors and other listed persons “for anything done or omitted to be done in good 
faith in the administration or discharge of any powers or duties that under this Act are intended 
or authorized to be executed or performed.”210 
 
Creating an express statutory fiduciary obligation that includes taking account of ESG factors in 
the Bank of Canada Act would codify director and officer responsibilities, creating greater 
transparency.  It will enhance activities the Bank is already engaged in. Bank of Canada Deputy 
Governor Timothy Lane recently observed that the Bank of Canada needs to consider the effects 
of climate change as it delivers on its mandate to promote the economic and financial well-being 
of Canadians.211  He notes that the Bank has a broad “set of responsibilities to support financial 
stability, including identifying, analyzing and assessing both imminent and emerging systemic 
risks.”212 He notes that climate change ultimately has implications for monetary policy and that 
                                                 
204 Ibid, preamble. 
205 Ibid, s 18. 
206 Ibid, ss 3(2), 5(1). 
207 Ibid, s 9(1). Section 10 (1) specifies that “The directors shall be selected from various occupations.” 
208 Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, SC 1996, c 6. 
209 Bank of Canada Act, supra note 160, s 10(1). 
210 Ibid, s 30.1. 
211 Bank of Canada Deputy Governor Timothy Lane, “Thermometer Rising—Climate Change and Canada’s 
Economic Future” (Remarks delivered at the Finance and Sustainability Initiative, 2 March 2017), online: Bank 
of Canada <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2017/03/thermometer-rising-climate-change-canada-economic-
future/> [Lane, “Thermometer Rising”]. He observed that “In Canada alone, it has been estimated that, in the 
absence of action to address global warming, we would face annual costs of between $21 billion and $43 
billion by the 2050s.” 
212 Ibid. 
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the Bank will continue to pursue low, stable and predictable inflation amid the structural shift to 
a lower-carbon economy; monitor the transitory effect of carbon pricing on inflation, and take 
account of structural changes that are likely to have important consequences for both aggregate 
supply and demand. Lane observes that these changes may be difficult to incorporate directly 
into our economic models, but the Bank has a role, particularly in bringing green finance ideas to 
the table and envisaging a lower-carbon future.213 
 
Thus it merits consideration of enacting an express duty of care in the Bank of Canada Act, the 
federal government aligning requirements it asks of federally-regulated corporations and 
financial institutions with the duty of directors and officers of its central bank. The language would 
be different than the other statutes because the duties of directors of the Bank of Canada differ, 
but it should specify statutory language such as the following: 
 
 
Recommendation 13: 
 
Amend the Bank of Canada Act to add the following language (in red italics): 
 
1. The directors and officers, in carrying out their duties under this Act, shall in 
good faith consider any material environmental, social and governance 
factors that may affect the Bank fulfilling its statutory mandate. 
 
2. In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may 
consider the interests of, inter alia, members of the public, shareholders, 
employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment 
to inform their decisions. 
 
The provision limiting liability should be amended to account for ESG factors in the following way 
(in red italics): 
 
No liability if in good faith 
 30.1 No action lies against Her Majesty, the Minister, any officer, employee or 
director of the Bank or any person acting under the direction of the Governor for 
anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or 
discharge of any powers or duties that under this Act are intended or authorized 
to be executed or performed, including their consideration of environmental, 
social and governance factors in carrying out their duties under this Act. 
 
The proposed amendments would bring transparency to the obligations of directors and officers 
and would encourage directors and officers of the Bank of Canada to take account of ESG factors 
in their governance decisions. 
 
 
                                                 
213 Ibid. 
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Expert Panel Question 3.4(4):  
What is the most effective method for delivering board education on climate risk and 
ESG/sustainability issues? Does education need to include guidance on effective 
governance and committee modeling for ESG oversight?  
 
 
1. Board education is critically important 
 
There needs to be a multi-faceted approach to education of boards of directors on ESG and 
sustainability issues.  In this respect, there are a number of organizations well equipped to 
conduct board education.  Chartered Professional Accountants Canada (“CPA Canada”) is working 
with the federal Ministry of Natural Resources to develop and conduct board education on 
climate-related financial risk, a project the co-authors are involved in. The Institute for Corporate 
Directors, while it has not yet taken on this issue, could be very effective, given its national reach.  
However, there also needs to be access for small- and medium-sized enterprises to gain 
information and expertise. 
 
The CCGG has observed that Board orientation and continuing education should include building 
awareness and understanding of complex and emerging environmental and social issues, where 
relevant.214 In this respect, boards should consider the use of independent advisors and/or 
external speakers to provide exposure to different viewpoints, and that education should be 
disclosed in committee updates.215  The CCGG, whose members are Canadian institutional 
investors that together manage approximately $4 trillion in assets, has issued a guidebook on 
effective board oversight of environmental and social matters.216 The guidebook has 29 
governance recommendations under eight key governance topics that are relevant for boards.217 
It notes that the materiality of other environmental and social factors will largely depend on the 
specific circumstances of a company, including sector, geography, or corporate structure, for 
example, relations with Indigenous communities for extractive sector companies or 
contamination of water in agribusiness.218  The CCGG also suggests that an effective enterprise 
risk management framework can provide a process for identifying and managing material risks 
that includes environmental and social factors, and provide appropriate information to the board 
so that it can discuss the company’s management approach and priorities to environmental and 
social factors in its corporate reporting through its Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(“MD&A”), annual report, and/or proxy circular.219 
 
                                                 
214 CCGG Guidebook, supra note 42 at 16. 
215 Ibid at 16. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid at 2. 
219 Ibid at 10. The OECD and World Bank have urged using blockchain to support board education, help 
overcome knowledge gaps in measuring and reporting on risks, and share knowledge on developing low-
emissions and sustainable strategies; OECD, “Financing Climate Futures”, supra note 199 at 91. 
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In 2014, the TSX and CPA Canada issued a “Primer for Environmental and Social Disclosure” aimed 
at educating senior management, particularly chief financial officers, in-house counsel and 
members of audit committees of TSX issuers and TSX Venture Exchange issuers.220  It discusses 
what principles boards need to consider for their business operations and financial reporting.221 
This kind of primer should be expanded based on new knowledge and become part of education 
available to corporate boards of TSX-listed and TSX-V-listed companies. 
 
The recent US National Climate Assessment Report highlights the need for board education in 
terms of directors and officers understanding the breadth of climate-related risks.222 It observes 
that many terms are used, but not fully explained. For example, the “social cost of carbon” 
includes the economic costs of climate change that will be felt in market sectors such as 
agriculture, energy services, and coastal resources, as well as nonmarket impacts on human 
health and ecosystems.223  
 
A taxonomy of terms could be incorporated into board education. Canada can benefit from 
efforts internationally to develop consistent terms and metrics.  Many impacts of climate change 
are expected to have negative effects on economic productivity, such as increased prices of goods 
and services,224  and board education needs to draw fiduciaries’ attention to the type and scope 
of such risks. Equally, board education can alert boards to consider opportunities to move to 
more sustainable practices. 
 
Thus, some initiatives for board education have made important contributions to date, but such 
education on ESG factors, including climate-related financial risk, needs to be widely expanded 
to reach boards of all sizes so that they fully understand their fiduciary obligations. Our 
recommendation regarding a Sustainable Finance Institute (recommendation 25 in Part VII) 
should serve an important role in dissemination of educational materials to boards as that 
information becomes available. 
  
                                                 
220 TSX and CPA Canada issued “A Primer for Environmental and Social Disclosure” (March 2014), online (pdf): 
TSX <https://www.tsx.com/resource/en/73>. 
221 Ibid. 
222 NCA, “Fourth National Climate Assessment”, supra note 11, Appendix 5 at 40. The Global Change Research 
Act of 1990 mandates that the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) deliver a report to Congress 
and the President no less than every four years. 
223 Ibid. It contains extensive discussion, including, that high temperatures and storm intensity, which are both 
linked to more deaths and illness, are projected to increase due to climate change, which would in turn 
increase health care costs for medical treatment. At the same time, these health effects directly impact labour 
markets. Workers in industries with the greatest exposure to weather extremes may decrease the amount of 
time they spend at work, while workers across a wide range of sectors may find their productivity impaired 
while on the job, which translate into lower earnings for workers and firms; ibid, Chapter 14 at 28-29. 
224 Ibid. 
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III. FINANCIAL SERVICES ADVISORS AND ESG CONSULTATIONS 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.4 (3):  
What are the responsibilities of investment agents and advisers for identifying and acting 
in accordance with the preferences of clients regarding sustainability issues? What is the 
most effective manner for these preferences to be identified and communicated?  
 
 
1. Require financial services advice to include information on material ESG factors and work 
towards a “best interests of the client” standard of financial advice in the future 
 
Canadian investment firms and their financial services representatives serve millions of retail 
investors.225 There are a growing number of reports on the inadequacy of financial advice in 
Canada, and it is well beyond the scope of this submission to discuss the myriad issues.226   
However, in the context of the Expert Panel’s work on sustainable finance, two issues have been 
directly relevant. One is to consider requiring a “best interest standard” for financial advice to 
consumer or retail investors and the second is to embed ESG considerations in giving advice on 
financial services and products.   
 
The Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) have recently consulted on incorporating an 
explicit best interest of the client standard into financial services advice, and unfortunately, its 
new recommendations in September 2018 on embedded commissions as an investor protection 
measure do not propose reforms regarding the client best interest standard, which appears to 
mean that there is not yet sufficient support across Canadian securities regulators.227  The Expert 
                                                 
225 A significant majority of investors use an intermediary to complete their trades in securities. Such 
intermediaries have various titles, and can fulfill a number of roles. Sometimes the intermediary functions largely 
as an order-taker and simply executes orders. In many cases the intermediary provides advice and/or 
recommendations. In some cases the intermediary manages the portfolio and has discretion as to what specific 
investments the client will hold and is not required to obtain client consent to purchase or sell a specific 
investment. Often the relationship between the investor and the intermediary is long-term. The investor comes 
to rely on the intermediary’s advice in deciding how to invest his or her money. For ease of reference, we refer 
here to individuals who act as intermediaries in any of these capacities as “financial service representatives” or 
“representatives” for short. These individuals include all those individuals, known as “registrants” who are 
overseen by the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (“MFDA”), the Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada (“IIROC”) and those directly regulated by the various securities commissions.” Canadian 
Centre for Elder Law and the Canadian Foundation for the Advancement of Investor Rights, “Report On 
Vulnerable Investors: Elder Abuse, Financial Exploitation, Undue Influence And Diminished Mental Capacity” 
(2018), online (pdf):  British Columbia Law Institute <https://www.bcli.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/171115-Vulnerable-Investor-Paper-FINAL.pdf> at 14 [Report on Vulnerable 
Investors]. 
226 See for example, Report on Vulnerable Investors, ibid. 
227 Ontario Securities Commission, “Canadian securities regulators propose rules to prohibit certain embedded 
commissions” (13 September 2018), online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/NewsEvents_nr_20180913_csa-propose-rules-to-prohibit-certain-embedded-
commissions.htm>. Barbara Shecter, “OSC drops push for ‘best interest’ standard as regulators propose 
narrower reforms” Financial Post (21 June 2018), online: <https://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-
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Panel should recommend that financial services advice should include offering advice on options 
for investment that incorporate material ESG factors; which we submit would be a step towards 
advising in the best interest of the client, although not denominated as such. In the longer term, 
the best interest of the client standard, as adopted in the UK, US and other countries, is a standard 
that is more responsive to the modern challenges of retail investing and should be considered 
further.  
  
In the interim, it is timely for the federal government to act to align with other OECD countries 
and at least implicitly embed “best interests of the client” in the standard for giving financial 
advice in Canada, by expressly requiring financial advisors to proactively ask investors if they wish 
to invest in socially responsible investments or funds that explicitly incorporate ESG factors.  As 
Canada shifts from defined benefit pension plans and defined contribution pension plans to 
individually directed pension savings,228 the professionals advising individuals should be acting in 
their best interests and should be providing them with investment options that incorporate ESG 
factors and options that reflect socially responsible investment. At a minimum, they should be 
providing information on whether ESG factors are being included in the governance of financial 
services and products being recommended, in a form that allows consumers to assess their 
options. 
 
One report has observed that: “In addition to low financial literacy, the increasing degree of 
product complexity and product proliferation makes it difficult for the average Canadian to be 
adequately informed about the different investment product options that are available. Canada 
has not been immune to the proliferation of complex products including complex exchange 
traded funds and structured products.”229   
 
Provincial securities commissions, under the auspices of the Canadian Securities Administrators, 
the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (“IIROC”), and the Mutual Fund 
Dealers Association of Canada (“MFDA”) are responsible for regulating investment firms and their 
representatives in Canada. They impose “suitability obligations” on representatives, which 
require representatives to ensure investment decisions are suitable for their clients based on 
their clients’ personal characteristics, investment objectives, time horizon, and risk tolerance.230 
                                                 
street/osc-drops-push-for-best-interest-standard-as-regulators-propose-narrower-reforms>, discussing CSA 
consultations on the best interest of the client standard and its replacement with specific reforms to reduce 
conflicts of interest.  
228 Between 1977 and 2011, the proportion of the overall employed population covered by registered pension 
plans declined from 52% to 37% for men, mainly due to a drop in defined benefit coverage. Report on 
Vulnerable Investors, supra note 225 at 20-21. 
229 Ibid at 21. 
230 CSA Staff Notice 31-336, Guidance for Portfolio Managers, Exempt Market Dealers and Other Registrants on 
the Know-Your-Client, Know-Your-Product and Suitability Obligations (2014) and NI 31-103, Registration 
Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations (12 June 2018), s 13.3; IIROC, “Notice 12-0109 
Know your client and suitability – Guidance” (26 March 2012), online (pdf): IIROC 
<http://www.iiroc.ca/Documents/2012/d21b2822-bcc3-4b2f-8c7f-422c3b3c1de1_en.pdf> and IIROC, “Rule 
1300 Supervision of Accounts” (31 October 2018), online (pdf): IIROC 
<http://www.iiroc.ca/RuleBook/MemberRules/RulesCollated_en.pdf>; MFDA, “Bulletin 0713 Suitability – 
Research Paper on Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority Decisions” (24 January 2017), online: MFDA 
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The key components of the suitability obligation are: “know your client (“KYC”) and “know your 
product”, which means the “representative should be able to explain to the client the 
investment’s risks, key features, and initial and ongoing costs and fees”, and disclose all material 
negative factors about an investment product, ensuring the client comprehends the 
information.231 The representative should be able to clearly explain the reasons that a specific 
investment product is or is not suitable for the client based on the client’s KYC profile.”232   
 
The Canadian Foundation for the Advancement of Investor Rights (“FAIR Canada”)233 has 
observed that consumers are confused by different titles and functions of financial advisors.234   
It observes that  a key reform needed to help protect financial consumers and lead to improved 
outcomes for retail investors is the implementation of a meaningful statutory best interest 
standard. It observes: 
While many consumers suffer harm as a result of non-compliance with existing rules 
(such as suitability), they also suffer significant and profound harms when they are 
dealing with registrants and licensees who are complying with the existing rules. These 
harms are costing Canadian financial consumers millions of dollars and impacting their 
ability to save adequately for their retirement, help put their children through university 
or for their other financial (and life) goals. Harms from product sales that are focused 
more on compensation to the advisor rather than the consumer’s best interest are much 
more widespread than harms from deficient financial plans.235 
 
Implementation of a “best practices” standard to provide information on alternatives 
incorporating material ESG factors would align well with global efforts to develop good ESG 
information to be able to offer advice on retirement investments.  One study found that 
employees, particularly younger employees, tend to save more for retirement when offered 
investment options that reflect their values.236 The World Business Council on Sustainable 
                                                 
<http://mfda.ca/bulletin/0713-p/>, MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1 ‘Know-Your-Client’” (4 January 2018), online: MFDA 
<http://mfda.ca/policy-and-regulation/rules/mfda-rules/#r2_2_1> [MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1”], and MFDA, “Notice 
0069 Suitability” (22 February 2013), online: MFDA <http://mfda.ca/notice/msn-0069/>. 
231 Report on Vulnerable Investors, supra note 225 at 24. 
232 Ibid. 
233 FAIR Canada, “Home Page” (2019), online: FAIR <www.faircanada.ca>. 
234 FAIR Canada, “Comment on the Regulation of Financial Planners” (17 April 2018) at para 1.4, online: FAIR 
<https://faircanada.ca/submissions/fair-canada-comments-on-regulation-of-financial-planners/>. FAIR Canada 
therefore recommends that the use of business titles be restricted to the following categories: “financial 
planner” for those who have the necessary proficiency and who provide services on a fee-for-service basis and 
who do not receive any compensation for product sales or referrals; “investment or financial advisor or 
planner” with appropriate financial planning credential to be subject to a fiduciary duty and a statutory best 
interest standard; “portfolio manager” for those licensed to exercise discretionary authority while operating 
within business models that allow them to comply with the fiduciary duty already required of such registrants; 
and “salesperson” for the remaining financial services representatives who do not meet the above restricted 
categories. 
235 Ibid at 2.3. 
236 As You Sow, “Aligning Defined Contribution Plans with Sustainability Goals” (2017), online: As You Sow 
<https://www.asyousow.org/reports/aligning-defined-contribution-plans-with-corporate-sustainability-goals>. 
Meaghan Kilroy, “Millennials embrace ESG option in Bloomberg’s 401(k) plan” Pensions & Investments (7 
February 2018), online: <https://www.pionline.com/article/20180207/ONLINE/180209884/millennials-
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Development (“WBCSD”) is a CEO-led organization of over 200 leading businesses working 
together to accelerate the transition to a sustainable world,  targeting the realization of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (“SDG”) through six work programs to achieve systems 
transformation.237 One of its major projects is aimed at enabling companies to better align 
retirement assets, including defined benefit and defined contribution plans, with their overall 
sustainability goals by integrating ESG considerations, creating more demand for sustainable 
investments.238 WBCSD’s initial data indicate it may be possible to create total portfolio solutions 
that enhance risk-adjusted returns in the long run without compromising short-term return goals, 
matching well with the long duration of retirement investments. It suggests that companies that 
have high ESG characteristics are likely to be more resilient through a downturn. Top asset 
management and investment consulting firms, including BlackRock and Mercer, are developing 
best practices and innovative thinking on how to incorporate ESG sustainable strategies into 
advice regarding corporate retirement plans.239 As an aspirational goal, the WBCSD project 
envisions that 1% ($10 billion US) of WBCSD member companies’ total retirement assets 
(estimated at $1 trillion US) will be invested in ESG-themed funds by 2020.240  
 
In December 2018, WBCSD published a toolkit, to help companies understand how retirement 
plans are governed and operated, as well as how ESG responsibility may be considered in 
different plan structures and contexts.241 It specifies that, traditionally, investment “advisors have 
provided plan sponsors with advice on their portfolio asset allocation (defined benefit plans), 
lineup construction (defined contribution plans) and manager selection/monitoring (both) and 
plan sponsors have maintained the responsibility for implementation of investment portfolios 
and managing other third-party relationships such as recordkeepers.  The nature and extent of 
this advice can vary substantially, up to and including a fully outsourced model.”242 
 
Recommendation 14: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend that financial advisers be required to include 
information on material ESG factors in giving financial  advice to consumer or retail 
investors. 
                                                 
embrace-esg-option-in-bloombergs-401k-plan>, cited in World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), “Aligning Retirement Assets Toolkit #1: The Responsible Retirement Plan Opportunity” (4 December 
2018), online: WBCSD <https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decision-
making/Aligning-Retirement-Assets/Resources/The-responsible-retirement-plan-opportunity> [WBCSD, 
“Aligning Retirement Investment Assets"]. WBCSD, “Aligning Retirement Assets develops new resource to help 
companies meet the growing demand for responsible investing” (4 December 2018), online: WBCSD 
<https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decision-making/Aligning-Retirement-
Assets/News/new-resource-to-help-companies-meet-the-growing-demand-for-responsible-investing>. 
237 WBCSD, “How we drive sustainable development” (2019), online: WBCSD <https://www.wbcsd.org/>.  
238 WBCSD, “Aligning Retirement Assets” (2018), online: WBCSD 
<https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decision-making/Aligning-Retirement-Assets>. 
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to develop a sustainable retirement plan? 
240 Ibid. 
241 WBCSD, “Aligning Retirement Investment Assets”, supra note 236. 
242 Ibid at 14. 
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2. Investment agents and advisors should be responsive to client preferences regarding ESG  
 
Investment advisors, brokers, dealers, and mutual fund dealers are regulated by the IIROC or the 
MFDA, both of which are self-regulatory organizations. Both have standards of conduct for their 
licensed members that generally require fairness, honesty, actions in good faith and observing 
high standards of ethics when dealing with clients’ business.243  As noted above, investment 
advisors also have obligations to know their clients, including their clients’ investment goals, risk 
tolerance, and investment horizon.244  
 
Implicitly, these standards of conduct suggest that investment advisors and agents would be 
expected to suggest investments, or invest clients’ money, where given discretionary authority, 
consistent with clients’ statements of investment principles or sustainability concerns, and 
consistent with any contractual obligations defining the relationship between an investor and an 
asset manager.  
 
The European Union is requiring a more proactive approach among financial advisors.  Part of the 
European Commission’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth is to incorporate 
sustainability when providing financial advice.245  The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(“MiFID II”) and the Insurance Distribution Directive (“IDD”) require investment firms and 
insurance distributors to offer 'suitable' products to meet their clients' needs, when offering 
advice, requiring advisors to ask about their clients' preferences such as ESG factors and take 
them into account when assessing the range of financial instruments and insurance products to 
be recommended, ie, in the product selection process and suitability assessment.246  We 
recommend that the government encourage that approach in Canada. 
 
Recommendation 15: 
 
The federal government should work with IIROC, MFDA and investment firms to develop 
new requirements that investment advisers and distributors ask about their clients' 
preferences regarding ESG factors and take them into account when assessing the range 
of financial instruments and insurance products being recommended. 
 
                                                 
243 IIROC, “Rule 1402 Standards of Conduct”, online (pdf): IIROC 
<http://www.iiroc.ca/industry/rulebook/Documents/rule-1400.pdf>; MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1”, supra note 230. 
244 IIROC, “Rule 2500 Minimum Standards for Retail Customer Account Supervision”, online (pdf): IIROC 
<http://www.iiroc.ca/Rulebook/MemberRules/Rule02500_en.pdf>; MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1”, ibid. 
245 European Commission, “Commission Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth” (March 2018), online: 
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sustainability preferences in its guidelines on the suitability assessment to be updated by Q4 2018. 
246 Ibid at 2.4. 
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IV. EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES THAT WILL ADVANCE THE PATH TO 
SUSTAINABILITY 
 
The Expert Panel has posed a series of questions on climate-related disclosure, and more 
specifically, questions relating to the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) Taskforce on Climate-
Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) disclosure framework.  We have reordered the questions 
slightly in our response in the belief that an important public policy decision is whether to 
broaden the sustainability disclosure to ESG factors, given that trend internationally. In our view, 
incorporating ESG into financial reporting is an important step in the transition to sustainable 
finance. It also aligns with our recommendations above in respect of codifying and enhancing the 
common law of director and officer fiduciary obligation. 
 
Thus, we commence with the third question, 3.3(3), on including climate-related disclosures in 
financial statements, broadening the response to discuss why material ESG factors should be 
included in financial statements.  We then address the remaining seven questions posed by the 
Expert Panel, directly responsive to the specific climate-related and TCFD-related questions.   
 
Our discussion includes two possible routes to enhancing disclosure on the path to sustainability.  
One is through amendments to corporate law, as has been done in the UK.  The second is through 
federal capital markets stability law.  In answering the Expert Panel’s questions in this part, we 
clearly delineate the two possible avenues, both of which can be accomplished effectively within 
the Canadian law and policy framework. In addition, the Expert Panel should encourage the 
provincial and territorial governments to enhance disclosure under securities law in respect of 
ESG risks and opportunities, including climate-related risks and opportunities. 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(3):   
Is there a need for climate-related disclosures to be included in mainstream financial 
statements, or is that not necessary so long as other conditions are met (i.e. robust 
oversight and governance of the reporting process and quality)? 
 
 
1. Include material ESG risks, costs and assets in financial statements 
 
Realistically, the only way that corporations will fully take account of climate-related financial 
costs and benefits is to include them in the financial statements.  Financial statements are a 
fundamental component of continuous disclosure. Financial statements provide both equity and 
debt investors with the information to make informed choices whether to buy, sell or hold their 
investment.247 Financial statements are, by their nature, mainly historical, in that they are the 
                                                 
247 NI 51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations (12 June 2018), s 4.1 [NI 51-102]: Generally, annual and 
quarterly reporting includes a statement of comprehensive income, a statement of changes in equity, a 
statement of cash flows, a statement of financial position at the end of the most recently completed financial 
year and the financial year immediately preceding the most recently completed financial year. NI 51-102 
specifies that the audited annual financial statements must be filed, for a reporting issuer other than a venture 
issuer, within 90 days after the end of its most recently completed financial year; and the date of filing, in a 
foreign jurisdiction, annual financial statements for its most recently completed financial year. Venture issuers 
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record of past transactions and their impact on the issuer’s financial position.248 Critically 
important is that the information is comparable from one year to the next.  One issue that has 
been identified as problematic with separate “non-financial corporate social responsibility” 
(“CSR”) reports is that companies can change the metrics form one year to the next if they do not 
like the results and there is nothing that requires them to explain the changes, thus there is no 
comparability or consistency in reporting year over year. The CCGG notes that siloed, non-
integrated, CSR and environmental reporting can be viewed as “greenwashing”.249  A second issue 
is that when CSR reports are not part of financial statements, they tend to be ignored by 
corporate boards, as they are not viewed as issues core to the corporation. They are often not up 
to date as a result, and there is not a corporate-wide commitment to accuracy or strategic 
planning in respect of material ESG issues.  
 
Embedding disclosure of material ESG risks and opportunities in financial statements would allow 
directors and officers to report how they view ESG as material in the reporting period and how 
they have addressed it to date. It would embed sustainability thinking in core financial reporting. 
It would allow investors to measure progress year over year, as the data will be comparable or 
changes explained as the metrics reporting improves. Requiring ESG to be included in financial 
statements also levels the playing field for corporations, in terms of their ability to attract debt 
and equity investment.  It avoids “greenwashing” of ESG results. It will encourage directors’ and 
officers’ best thinking in respect of material ESG risks and opportunities. Requiring ESG disclosure 
in financial statements would require corporate officers to explain changes in methodology of 
measuring material ESG risks and opportunities, and would provide transparency and 
comparability in the market across corporations. Changes in metrics because of developing 
information on ESG factors, such as climate-related financial risk, would be explained in the notes 
to the financial statement, leading to increasingly better transparency.   
 
The TCFD recommends that organizations should provide information specific to the potential 
impact of climate-related risks and opportunities in their financial statements and future cash 
flows.250 The TCFD recommends that climate-related financial disclosures should be included in 
annual financial filings.251 The TCFD observed that:  
the Task Force’s disclosure recommendations should result in more quantitative 
financial disclosures, particularly disclosure of metrics, about the financial impact 
that climate-related risks have or could have on an organization. Specifically, 
asset impairments may result from assets adversely impacted by the effects of 
                                                 
have 120 days. Deadlines for filing interim financial reports are 45 days for non-venture issuers and 60 days for 
venture issuers after the end of the interim period or the date of filing, in a foreign jurisdiction, interim 
financial reports: NI 51-102, ss 4.2, 4.4. 
248 Mary Condon, Anita Anand, Janis Sarra and Sarah Bradley, Securities Law in Canada: Cases and 
Commentary, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2017) at 401 [Condon, Anand, Sarra and Bradley, 
Securities Law in Canada]. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), “Final Report: Recommendations of the Task 
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures – Appendix 3” (June 2017) at 50, online (pdf): FSB 
<https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf> [TCFD, 
“Final Report”]. 
251 Ibid at 18. 
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climate change and/or additional liabilities may need to be recorded to account 
for regulatory fines and penalties resulting from enhanced regulatory standards. 
Additionally, cash flows from operations, net income, and access to capital could 
all be impacted by the effects of climate-related risks (and opportunities).252 
 
Arguably, the same case can be made for ESG factors more generally, as recognized by the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), in a 2019 Statement on Disclosure 
of ESG Matters by Issuers.253  The IOSCO Statement is premised on the view that: 
 
IOSCO Principle 16 states that issuers should provide “full, accurate, and timely 
disclosure of financial results, risk, and other information which is material to 
investors’ decisions.” With regard to this Principle, IOSCO emphasizes that ESG 
matters, though sometimes characterized as non-financial, may have a material 
short-term and long-term impact on the business operations of the issuers as 
well as on risks and returns for investors and their investment and voting 
decisions.254 
 
As a result, the IOSCO Statement counsels that “IOSCO encourages issuers to consider the 
materiality of ESG matters to their business and to assess risks and opportunities in light of their 
business strategy and risk assessment methodology. When ESG matters are considered to be 
material, issuers should disclose the impact or potential impact on their financial performance 
and value creation.  In doing so, issuers also are encouraged to give insight into the governance 
and oversight of ESG-related material risks.”255 
 
The CCGG has observed that financial reporting should convey key considerations related to 
governance, strategy, and risk management with the right level of detail, context, supporting 
information, and metrics, so that investors can make better informed decisions; and boards 
should have the necessary controls in place, whether internal or external, to provide reasonable 
verification and assurance of the disclosure.256 One survey of asset and portfolio managers using 
ESG in their investments reported that the biggest challenge to using ESG information for 
investment decision making relates to the lack of comparability of reported information across 
firms.257 Another study examined how CSR disclosure in a stand-alone report, disconnected from 
a firm’s financial disclosure, is problematic, as it may lead to asymmetric anchoring, where 
financial professionals and investors may underreact to CSR information when it is disclosed in a 
                                                 
252 Ibid at 37-38. 
253 International Organization of Securities Commissions, “Statement on Disclosure of ESG Matters by Issuers” 
(18 January 2019), online (pdf): IOSCO <https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD619.pdf>. This 
Statement was not voted on by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
254 Ibid at 1 (emphasis in original). 
255 Ibid at 3. 
256 CCGG Guidebook, supra note 42 at 4. 
257 Amir Amel-Zadeh and George Serafeim, “Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence from a Global 
Survey”, (2018) 74:3 Financial Analysts Journal 87 at 88. 
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stand-alone report compared to when CSR information is provided in an integrated financial 
report.258 
 
As noted above, ESG factors are currently frequently reported as part of a CSR report, which the 
CCGG observes can result in metrics that do not link to strategy or are not relevant to a 
corporation’s operations or risk.259 It observes that CSR reports usually are not subject to board 
oversight or approval and do not give investors or other corporate stakeholders the assurance 
processes that support financial reporting.260 As a result, boards of directors are often not paying 
attention to ESG factors. Incorporating either climate-related financial disclosures or ESG 
disclosures into financial statements would address this deficiency in current reporting. 
 
Integrating ESG matters in corporate financial statements would allow greater transparency and 
accountability. Where accounting methods are developing, the notes to the financial statements 
can make clear the basis on which any metrics are being reported or which metrics have changed 
year over year.  It would also allow for reporting of currently known ESG risks and opportunities 
as well as forward-looking ESG information. The scope of a potential safe harbour that recognizes 
that understanding of and information on these risks and opportunities are still evolving is 
discussed in response to the Expert Panel’s Question 3.3(6) below.  
 
The goal of financial reporting is to allow corporate stakeholders, including equity investors, debt 
investors, regulators and other corporate stakeholders, to understand the financial performance 
of the corporation. Accounting for ESG factors (including climate-related financial risk and return) 
in financial reporting must allow corporate stakeholders to understand the corporation’s 
economic performance in respect of these issues. Metrics need to be clear and measurable. 
Financial reporting metrics continue to be refined by a number of organizations in Canada and 
internationally. The reporting framework a company chooses to follow, and its rationale, should 
be described in the company’s MD&A, allowing investors and others to assess how the financials 
have been measured and verified. 
 
i. Canada can look to international standards 
 
The work of incorporating climate-related and ESG factors into financial reporting is already well 
underway. The US-based independent Sustainability Accounting Standards Board was created to 
develop standards for disclosure of material ESG matters.261 The recommendations are not 
                                                 
258 Markus Arnold, Alexander Bassen and Ralf Frank, “Timing effects of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure: an experimental study with investment professionals” (2018) 8:1 Journal of Sustainable Finance & 
Investment 45-71, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2017.1368229>. See also George Apostolakis, Gert 
Van Dijk, Robert Blomme, Frido Kraanen & Athanasios Papadopoulos  “Predicting pension beneficiaries’ 
behaviour when offered a socially responsible and impact investment portfolio” (2018) 8:3 Journal of 
Sustainable Finance & Investment 213-241, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2018.1429148>. 
259 CCGG Guidebook, supra note 42 at 18. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), “Home Page” (2018), online: SASB 
<https://www.sasb.org/>, originally aimed at what SEC registrants should provide in 10K filings, but now 
developing global standards. 
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mandatory, but they serve as guidance on determining what is material. “SASB’s mission is to 
help businesses around the world identify, manage and report on the sustainability topics that 
matter most to their investors.”262 The SASB has a Materiality Map that offers companies a risk 
management framework that contains a risk identification and prioritization process.263  
 
In November 2018, SASB published a complete set of 77 globally applicable industry-specific 
codified standards that identify the minimal set of financially material sustainability topics and 
their associated metrics for the typical company in an industry.264  It sets out a minimum set of 
industry-specific disclosure topics reasonably likely to constitute material information, and a brief 
description of how management or mismanagement of each topic may affect value creation. It 
also recommends, for each sector, a set of quantitative and/or qualitative accounting metrics 
intended to measure performance on each topic.  Each accounting metric is accompanied by a 
technical protocol that provides guidance on definitions, scope, implementation, compilation, 
and presentation, all of which are intended to constitute suitable criteria for third-party 
assurance.  It also sets out a  set of metrics that quantify the scale of a company’s business and 
are intended for use in conjunction with accounting metrics to normalize data and facilitate 
comparison.265 The accounting metrics for each industry and sector include how to financially 
report GHG emissions, biodiversity impacts, human rights and rights of Indigenous peoples, 
community relations, business ethics and transparency and a host of other metrics.266 Each 
standard has an accompanying document explaining the reasons for recommending the 
accounting standards proposed.267 
 
Thus the federal government need not devise its own accounting standards regarding 
sustainability financing where there are increasingly widely accepted standards internationally. 
The federal government should deem companies to have complied with their reporting 
requirements if their financial statements incorporate the SASB sustainability metrics in their 
current accounting standards.  The federal government should ask the Canadian Accounting 
Standards Board to assess the SASB standards and discern if any changes should be required to 
account for unique issues in Canada.  However, with the move internationally to International 
                                                 
262 Ibid. 
263 SASB, “Materiality Map” (2018), online: SASB <https://materiality.sasb.org/>. 
264 SASB, “Standards Overview” (November 2018), online: SASB <https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/>. 
“SASB standards enable businesses around the world to identify, manage and communicate financially-material 
sustainability information to their investors.” SASB has also developed “an Engagement Guide for investors to 
consider questions to discuss with companies regarding financially material issues as well as an Implementation 
Guide . . . for companies which explains issues and approaches to consider when implementing SASB 
standards.”  
265 See for example, SASB, “Oil & Gas – Exploration & Production: Sustainability Accounting Standard” 
(November 2018), online (pdf): SASB <https://www.sasb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Oil_Gas_Exploration_Production_Standard_2018.pdf>. 
266 Ibid. 
267 See for example, SASB, “Oil & Gas – Exploration & Production: Basis for Conclusions” (October 2018), online 
(pdf): SASB <https://www.sasb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Oil_Gas_Exploration_Production_BFC_2018.pdf>. 
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Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”),268 there has been an international move towards 
transparency, accountability and comparability in financial reporting, a shift that has been 
endorsed by Canadian governments and accounting standards-setting authorities.  Discussions 
regarding how to integrate the SASB standards in IFRS are occurring and Canada should be part 
of that public policy discussion.  
 
CPA Canada has issued a publication that outlines 20 questions for boards of directors to ask in 
overseeing organizational risk management, business strategy and performance in the context of 
climate change.269  In respect of financial statements, CPA Canada suggests that boards ask: How 
has the current and potential future impact of climate change issues, including carbon pricing, on 
revenues, expenditures and cash flows been determined?270 How has the impact that climate 
change issues have and could have on the company’s financial condition, liquidity and long-term 
value creation been determined?271 How is materiality of climate change issues assessed, and are 
disclosures made in the financial statements, the MD&A and, if applicable, the Annual 
Information Form (“AIF”) consistent with this assessment?272   
 
CPA Canada outlines a number of potential impacts on revenues and costs that could be reported, 
including sales or licenses of innovative low-carbon technologies, sales of emissions allowances 
or credits and proceeds from issuing green bonds, the possibility that assets such as oil and gas 
reserves may no longer generate revenue, the need to retrofit property, plant and equipment to 
reduce GHG emissions, and investments in productive capacity that embody new energy-efficient 
technologies.273 The CPA Canada report offers guidance to directors in their consideration of 
which procedures and controls to adopt to gather and record reliable and timely climate change-
related financial information for management analysis and internal decision-making, disclosure 
filings with regulatory authorities, and external disclosure to investors, governments and other 
stakeholders.274   
 
CPA Canada also published Building a Better MD&A: Climate Change Disclosures,275 which 
discusses how companies can account for and disclose carbon taxes, regulatory emissions 
reduction targets/caps, and emissions trading transactions and obligations.  It notes that: “Under 
the second type of mandatory reporting, certain Canadian businesses must file GHG emissions 
information with Canadian provincial and/or federal governments”; and directors should assess 
                                                 
268 International Financial Reporting Standards, “Home Page” (January 2019), online: IFRS 
<https://www.ifrs.org/>.  
269 Alan Willis and Sarah Keyes, “Climate change briefing: Questions directors should ask”, 2nd ed (Toronto: 
CPA Canada, 2017), online: CPA Canada <https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-
resources/strategy-risk-and-governance/corporate-governance/publications/climate-change-questions-
directors-should-ask>. 
270 Question 13, ibid.  
271 Question 14, ibid. 
272 Question 17, ibid. 
273 Ibid at 29. 
274 Ibid at 31. 
275 Legacy Body, “Building a Better MD&A: Climate Change Disclosures” (2008), online: CPA Canada 
<www.cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-resources/financial-and-non-financial-reporting/ 
Mdanda-and-other-financial-reporting/publications/climate-change-disclosures-in-the-mda>.  
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whether adequate systems, processes and controls are in place to deliver timely and reliable 
information for these filings.276 In these situations, boards or audit committees may need to ask 
about legal and regulatory requirements related to climate change reporting to determine the 
appropriate degree of oversight. 
 
While the CSA has been less active than one would have hoped, in 2010 the CSA did publish 
guidance for reporting issuers on the environmental disclosure requirements for financial 
statements, MD&A and AIF.277  The CSA’s environmental guidance explains the roles and 
responsibilities of audit committees for oversight of continuous disclosure filings, including 
climate-related disclosures, and underlying controls and procedures. 
 
The TCFD reports that to be sufficiently comprehensive, financial disclosures should contain 
historical and future-oriented information in order to allow users to evaluate their previous 
expectations relative to actual performance and assess possible future financial implications.278 
Future-oriented data should include clarification of the key assumptions used and forward-
looking quantitative disclosure should align with data used by the organization for investment 
decision making and risk management.279 It recommends that disclosures should be written with 
the objective of communicating financial information that serves the needs of a range of financial 
sector users and should be sufficiently granular to inform sophisticated users, but should also 
provide concise information for less specialized readers.280 The TCFD further recommends that 
disclosures should show an appropriate balance between qualitative and quantitative 
information and use text, numbers, and graphical presentations as appropriate; and that “fair and 
balanced narrative explanations should provide insight into the meaning of quantitative 
disclosures, including the changes or developments they portray over time.”281 Financial 
disclosures should be timely and consistent over time. The TCFD recommendations on financial 
statements should be adopted. 
 
                                                 
276 Ibid, noting also that companies with subsidiaries or operations in the UK may be subject to mandatory GHG 
emissions or other climate change disclosure requirements. 
277 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, Environmental Reporting Guidance (27 October 2010) [CSA Staff Notice 51-333]. 
Staff Notice 51-333 cites several securities law requirements under which companies may need to make 
disclosure: Form 51-102F2, Annual Information Form (30 June 2015) [Form 51-102F2]; NI 51-102, supra note 
247; Form 51-102F1, Management’s Discussion & Analysis (“MD&A”) (30 June 2015) [Form 51-102F1]; NI 58-
101, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices (31 March 2017); NI 52-110, Audit Committees (17 
November 2015).  
278 TCFD, “Annex: Implementing the Recommendations of the TCFD” (June 2017) at 68, online (pdf): FSB 
<https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FINAL-TCFD-Annex-Amended-121517.pdf> [TCFD, 
“Annex”].   
279 Ibid. “Any scenario analyses should be based on data or other information used by the organization for 
investment decision making and risk management. Where appropriate, the organization should also 
demonstrate the effect on selected risk metrics or exposures to changes in the key underlying methodologies 
and assumptions, both in qualitative and quantitative terms.” 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
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The European Commission has launched a broad Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth, 
which will require sustainability disclosure in accounting rule-making and create measurable 
standards for green financial products.282 
 
Recommendation 16: 
 
i. Require material ESG factors, including climate-related financial disclosures, to 
be reported in annual financial filings.  
 
ii. Ask the Canadian Accounting Standards Board to review the industry specific 
standards promulgated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board for 
purposes of adoption in Canada. 
 
iii. The federal government should work with Canadian accounting standards 
authorities and securities regulators to provide tools to assist companies to 
embed ESG disclosure in publicly-listed corporations’ financial statements and 
notes to financial statements. 
 
 
2. Require disclosure of management’s approach to material ESG risks and opportunities in 
management’s proxy circular in conjunction with the annual meeting 
 
The Annual Meeting for every company incorporated pursuant to the CBCA, both privately-held 
and publicly-issuing, includes, as important matters of business, the election of directors, 
consideration of the financial statements, consideration of the auditor’s report, and re-
appointment of the incumbent auditor.283  With respect to the election of directors, for 
companies required to distribute a proxy circular, biographical information is required to be 
disclosed concerning every proposed director, including those directors being re-elected, to 
permit an evaluation of that director’s professional experience, likely competence, and 
integrity.284  In conjunction with review of the required financial statements,285 the proxy circular 
information allows shareholders to evaluate how the company has been managed, generally 
speaking, and whether it is prudent to continue the directors in office. 
 
Publicly-listed companies that are reporting issuers under provincial and territorial securities 
legislation must distribute more extensive proxy information in the proxy circular to all 
shareholders entitled to vote in conjunction with the annual meeting and any special meetings 
                                                 
282 EC, “Commission Action Plan”, supra note 245: creating a road map of ten main actions that will be required 
on member states.  
283 CBCA, supra note 41, s 135(5). 
284 NI 51-102F5, Information Circular (30 June 2015), parts 7.1 and 7.2 [NI 51-102F5]. Regarding integrity, the 
proxy circular must state the facts concerning any judicial order within the prior 10 years, including a cease 
trade order, levied against any company where a proposed director was a director, CEO, or CFO: part 7.2. 
285 CBCA, supra note 41, s 155(1). 
75 
 
that management calls.286  These requirements to distribute a proxy circular are pursuant to the 
CBCA and implementing Regulations, with the specific information to be disclosed primarily being 
defined by National Instruments pursuant to provincial and territorial securities law.287  Thus, this 
requirement is an area of law where federal and provincial powers interact regarding the scope 
of required disclosure.  The purpose of the proxy circular is to provide the information that 
regulators have deemed necessary for shareholders or their representatives to be able to 
exercise their voting rights in an informed manner.  Thus the information required depends on 
the specific issue on which shareholders are being asked to vote. 
 
While most of the specific disclosure requirements for publicly-listed companies are promulgated  
based on National Instruments, the federal government does have the power to add to those 
disclosure requirements for corporations incorporated pursuant to the CBCA, and has done so in 
at least a few occasions.288  Thus, we recommend that the CBCA be amended to not only require 
incorporating material ESG risks disclosure into the financial statements and notes thereto, as 
above, but also amend the CBCA to require the board to discuss how it is evaluating and 
incorporating material ESG risks and opportunities into its strategy, governance, and risk 
management.  
 
Proxy circular disclosure of how the board as a whole is analyzing material ESG risks and 
opportunities would give shareholders valuable qualitative information about how proactive 
management is, and how the board and management are positioning the company for future 
success.  There are a number of approaches the federal government could take in amending the 
CBCA to require such annual proxy disclosure.  As discussed immediately above, guidance for how 
directors should evaluate climate change and ESG risks and opportunities, including how to 
connect those topics to strategy and risk management generally, has been developed by a 
number of private initiatives, such as the SASB, the TCFD, and CPA Canada.  The CBCA should be 
amended to ask companies to discuss governance, risk management, and strategy of ESG risks 
and opportunities using the parameters, or questions boards should ask, identified in one of those 
three frameworks.   
 
Another approach is that recently suggested by Professor Jill Fisch, who proposed that the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) require an annual Sustainability Discussion and 
Analysis (“SD&A”) modelled on MD&A (Management Discussion and Analysis).289  In MD&A, in 
both the United States and Canada, companies are required to discuss known trends, events, or 
uncertainties that may have a significant effect on the company’s financial results going forward.  
Fisch suggests that reporting companies should be required to “identify and explain the three 
sustainability issues most significant to their operations,” and include “a discussion of the 
potential impacts of the issues and the basis for the company’s determination” that these issues 
                                                 
286 CBCA, ibid, s 149 (2016) and Canada Business Corporations Regulations, 2001 (SOR/2001-512), part 7, 
Proxies and Proxy Solicitation [Can Reg 2001-512]. 
287 Ibid, and NI 51-102F5, supra note 284. 
288 See, eg, Can Reg 2001-512, supra note 286, ss 2, 55(2), setting out disclosure requirements additional to 
those defined in Form 51-102F5, supra note 284.  
289 Jill E Fisch, “Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable” (2018) Georgetown L J (forthcoming), online: SSRN 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3233053>. 
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are the three most significant for the company’s sustainability.290  Like MD&A, this requirement 
would give investors insight into management’s views of known or reasonably knowable 
sustainability issues that are likely to have a material effect on the company’s operations. Also 
like MD&A, this requirement would serve to focus board attention on sustainability issues, but 
with the flexibility for the board to determine what is significant among the panoply of potential 
sustainability issues.  Professor Fisch emphasizes the importance of board responsibility for the 
proposed SD&A if the proposal is to have the intended effect of providing investors with insights 
into boards’ deliberations and understanding of sustainability risks and opportunities.291   
 
Any of these approaches would give shareholders and their advisors deeper insight into how the 
board is positioning the company for long-term success, and thus would add appreciably to the 
information available as shareholders exercise their voting rights regarding the composition of 
the board. 
 
Recommendation 17: 
 
i. Require disclosure of management’s approach to material ESG risks and 
opportunities in management’s proxy circular in conjunction with the annual 
meeting. 
 
ii. Create a consultation process to evaluate using a “sustainability disclosure and 
analysis” (“SD&A”) reporting tool for the proxy circular ESG disclosure.   
 
  
3. The Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation 
offers another avenue for dealing with systemic risk 
 
Approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in November 2018 of the constitutionality of the draft 
federal “Capital Markets Stability Act” 292 presents an important and timely opportunity to embed 
systemic risk factors in financial statements and other disclosures. However, it is important to 
realize that it will take time for federal and provincial governments to sort out the transition 
towards the infrastructure and policies underpinning the new capital markets stability structure. 
Nonetheless, it offers yet another avenue to address systemic risk and the need for a shift to a 
sustainable economy. 
 
The federal government and the governments of Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New 
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Yukon have agreed to implement a national Cooperative 
System for the regulation of capital markets in Canada.293  All the reasoning in the SCC judgment 
points to climate-related financial risk falling squarely within the types of systemic risk that the 
SCC found was within the jurisdiction of the new national regulatory Authority. 
                                                 
290 Ibid at 42.  
291 Ibid at 43. 
292 Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48 (9 November 2018) at paras 81, 132 
[Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation]. 
293 Ibid. 
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The SCC held that the Constitution Act of Canada authorizes the implementation of pan-Canadian 
securities regulation under the authority of a single regulator, according to the model established 
by the most recent publication of the “Memorandum of Agreement regarding the Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System”.294 The SCC held that the draft federal Capital Markets 
Stability Act does not exceed the authority of the Parliament of Canada over the general branch 
of the trade and commerce power under ss 91(2) of the Constitution Act.295 The main components 
of the Cooperative System include a model provincial and territorial statute that deals primarily 
with the day-to-day aspects of the securities trade,296 a proposed draft federal act, the Capital 
Markets Stability Act, which is aimed at preventing and managing systemic risk and which 
establishes criminal offences relating to financial markets, and a national securities regulator (the 
“Authority”) charged with administering this coordinated regime.297 The Authority and its board 
of directors are to operate under the supervision of a Council of Ministers, which will comprise 
the ministers responsible for capital markets regulation in each participating province and the 
federal Minister of Finance.298 
 
The Supreme Court held that the pith and substance of the draft Capital Markets Stability Act is 
to control systemic risk having the potential to create material adverse effects on the Canadian 
economy.299  The concept of systemic risk is specifically invoked throughout the draft federal Act 
as a means of limiting the scope of federal regulatory powers. The SCC held at para 90: 
 
[90] The cornerstone of the Draft Federal Act is the prevention and control of 
“systemic risk related to capital markets”, which is defined in s. 3 as follows:   
3. In this Act, systemic risk related to capital markets means a threat to 
the stability of Canada’s financial system that originates in, is transmitted 
through or impairs capital markets and that has the potential to have a 
material adverse effect on the Canadian economy.   
 
                                                 
294 Department of Finance, Memorandum of Agreement regarding the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory 
System (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 26 August 2014), online (pdf): Government of Canada 
<https://www.fin.gc.ca/n14/docs/moa-pda-eng.pdf> [Memorandum of Agreement]. 
295 Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, supra note 292 at paras 81, 132. 
296 The Supreme Court held that the Model Provincial Act is expressly subject to legislative approval, and thus 
lacks the force of law within a province unless and until it is enacted by that province’s legislature. These 
provisions of the Memorandum do not contemplate that the Council of Ministers will have any formal 
involvement in the amendment of securities laws that have already been enacted by provincial legislatures. 
The terms of the Memorandum do not even require that the provisions of the Model Provincial Act themselves 
be enacted into law by the legislatures of the participating provinces. Accordingly, the legislatures remain free 
to reject the proposed statutes, and any amendments made to them, if they so choose. Ibid. 
297 Ibid. The SCC at para 70 observed that “the participating provinces will be required to effectively dissolve 
their existing securities commissions, and to merge the administration of those commissions into the 
Authority’s organizational structure (as contemplated in ss 9.2 and 9.3 of the Memorandum)”. 
298 Ibid at para 25. With respect to the Model Provincial Act, s. 5.5 of the Memorandum provides that any 
proposals to amend the Model Provincial Act are subject to a vote and must be approved by at least 50 percent 
of the members of the Council of Ministers, as well as by the members representing the “Major Capital 
Markets Jurisdictions” — which at present, are Ontario and British Columbia. 
299 Ibid at para 90. 
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For the purposes of this definition, systemic risk can be understood as having 
three constituent elements: (a) it must represent a threat to the stability of the 
country’s financial system as a whole; (b) it must be connected to the capital 
markets; and (c) it must have the potential to have a material adverse effect on 
the Canadian economy.  It is noteworthy that this definition does not encompass 
every economic risk that may relate to capital markets, but is limited to those 
that pose a sufficiently significant threat to the Canadian economy. 
         [emphasis added] 
 
The intention is not that the draft Act will displace provincial and territorial securities legislation, 
rather, it is  designed to complement these statutes by addressing economic objectives that are 
considered to be national in character.300  
 
With respect to the classification, the SCC held that the ultimate question is whether the draft 
Act, viewed in its entirety, addresses a matter of  genuine national importance and scope going 
to trade as a whole, in a way that is distinct and different from provincial concerns. The SCC held 
that the dual purposes of the draft federal Act, set out in section 4: “The purposes of this Act are, 
as part of the Canadian capital markets regulatory framework,  (a) to promote and protect the 
stability of Canada’s financial system through the management of systemic risk related to capital 
markets; and (b) to protect capital markets, investors and others from financial crimes”, when 
read together with the Authority’s statutory mandate (section 6), suggests that the federal 
government’s role in regulating capital markets is limited to  the detection, prevention and 
management of risk to the stability of the Canadian economy, as well as to the protection against 
financial crimes.301 The SCC held that draft federal Act does address a matter of genuine national 
importance and scope relating to trade as a whole, and it therefore falls within Parliament’s 
general trade and commerce power under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act. The preservation 
of the integrity and stability of the Canadian economy quite clearly has a national dimension, and 
one that lies beyond provincial competence.302  The Court further held that “The regulatory 
powers authorized by the Draft Federal Act are engaged solely when such threats may 
foreseeably affect national economic interests.”303    
 
The SCC further held that: “the regulation of systemic risk in capital markets  goes to promoting 
the stability of the economy generally, not the stability of one economic sector in particular”, 304 
and engages trade as a whole under the federal trade and commerce power. “Put simply, the 
management of systemic risk across Canadian capital markets must be regulated federally, if at 
all.” 305  
                                                 
300 Ibid at para 95. The SCC held that the Draft Federal Act does not contain provisions that go to the day-to-day 
regulation of all aspects of securities trading. 
301 Ibid at para 88. 
302 The Court held the fact that the federal government’s foray into securities regulation under the Draft 
Federal Act is limited to achieving these objectives supports the validity of this proposed statute: ibid at para 
116. 
303 Ibid at para 89. 
304 Ibid at paras 111, 112. 
305 Ibid at para 115. 
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The SCC findings that capital market stability comes under national authority is bolstered by the 
recent US federal government report on the systemic risks to the US national economy from 
climate change that was published in late November 2018.306 It reports that: 
the continued warming that is projected to occur without substantial and 
sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions is expected to cause 
substantial net damage to the US economy throughout this century, especially in 
the absence of increased adaptation efforts. With continued growth in emissions 
at historic rates, annual losses in some economic sectors are projected to reach 
hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century—more than the current 
gross domestic product (GDP) of many US states. 
   . . . 
While these adaptation and mitigation measures can help reduce damages in a 
number of sectors, this assessment shows that more immediate and substantial 
global greenhouse gas emissions reductions, as well as regional adaptation 
efforts, would be needed to avoid the most severe consequences in the long 
term. Mitigation and adaptation actions also present opportunities for additional 
benefits that are often more immediate and localized, such as improving local air 
quality and economies through investments in infrastructure.307 
 
The framework of the Cooperative System is set out in the memorandum between the federal 
government and the governments of Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, 
Prince Edward Island and Yukon (“participating jurisdictions”).308  This cooperative system has 
four primary components: uniform provincial and territorial legislation, whereby each 
participating province is to enact a statute that mirrors the “Model Provincial Act” addressing all 
matters respecting capital markets that fall within provincial or territorial jurisdiction;309 
complementary federal legislation that addresses matters relating to systemic risk in Canada’s 
capital markets, national data collection and criminal matters;310 contemplates a national 
regulator;311 and the new national Authority, which is to operate under the supervision of a 
Council of Ministers.312 The duties of the Council of Ministers include proposing amendments to 
the draft federal Act and the Model Provincial Act.313  Both statutes will provide that any 
                                                 
306 NCA, “Fourth National Climate Assessment”, supra note 11 at Volume II: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in 
the United States. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 294. 
309 Ibid.  
310 Ibid, s 3(a)(ii).   
311 The national authority will become the sole entity responsible for administering both the federal and 
provincial cooperative system legislation, and will fulfill all relevant regulatory, enforcement and adjudicative 
functions relating to the trade in securities under these statutes as enacted; ibid, s 3(a)(iii). 
312 The Council of Ministers will comprise the ministers responsible for capital markets regulation in each 
participating province and the federal Minister of Finance; ibid, s 3(a)(iv).   
313 Ibid, s 4.2. The voting rules applicable to approval by the Council of Ministers of a proposal to  
amend the Model Provincial Act are set out in s 5.5. 
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regulations proposed by the Authority must be approved by the Council of Ministers before they 
come into force.314 
 
The draft Capital Markets Stability Act sets out the fundamental provisions of capital markets 
statutory law while leaving detailed requirements, including some requirements that are 
currently contained in provincial and territorial securities legislation, to be addressed in 
regulations.315 Part 7, which deals with disclosure, does not contain any reference to ESG factors, 
although the fact that the requirements of the legislation will be set out in regulations316 means 
that there is considerable scope for requiring ESG factors to be included in disclosure 
requirements. 
 
The draft Capital Markets Stability Act specifies:  
19. The regulations may, in order to address a systemic risk related to capital 
markets, prescribe requirements, prohibitions and restrictions respecting 
systemically important benchmarks, including in relation to  
(a) submissions of information for the purpose of determining those 
benchmarks;  
(b) their design, determination and dissemination;  
(c) plans for continuity, recovery and cessation;  
(d) governance, compliance and accountability; and  
(e) any other aspects of benchmark administration. 
      . . .  
 
23. The regulations may, in order to address a systemic risk related to capital 
markets, prescribe requirements, prohibitions and restrictions respecting 
practices that are prescribed to be systemically risky, including in relation to  
(a) policies and procedures for risk management and internal controls;  
(b) disclosure to the public of information whose disclosure is not otherwise 
required;  
(c) transparency;  
(d) aspects of governance and organizational and ownership structure that are 
related to risk management;  
(e) capital, leverage and financial resources;  
(f) margin, collateral, credit protection and position limits;  
(g) the use of credit ratings, including how investment policies govern that use; 
and  
                                                 
314 Model Provincial Act, s 206; Draft Federal Act, s 76. The SCC noted that it was key that nowhere does the 
Memorandum imply that the legislatures of the participating provinces are required to implement any 
amendments made to the Model Provincial Act that have been approved by the Council of Ministers, or that 
they are precluded from making any other amendments to their securities laws; Reference re Pan-Canadian 
Securities Regulation, supra note 292 at paras 50, 68. 
315 Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, “Capital Markets Stability Act – A Revised Consultation 
Draft” (2016), online: CCMR <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/publications/legislation/> [Draft Capital Markets Stability 
Act]. 
316 Ibid, s 43 provides that the regulations will contain the periodic and material change disclosure obligations. 
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(h) conflicts of interest related to the determination of credit ratings. 
 
It appears that there is ample potential for the new national regulatory Authority to work with 
provincial and territorial governments to develop regulations requiring disclosure of ESG factors 
that pose a systemic risk to Canada’s securities law or capital markets, as we discuss at pages 81-
84. 
 
 
4. Can the federal government relieve some of the regulatory burden of requiring climate-
related or ESG factors to be included in financial statements? 
 
The federal government, pursuant to its new federal capital markets draft legislation, is already 
committed to being nimble in respect of approaches to capital markets and securities regulation, 
moving away from overly codified securities requirements.  As the legislation and regulations are 
being finalized, the new Authority could relieve some of the regulatory burden on publicly-listed 
companies by moving to bi-annual financial statements rather than quarterly financial 
statements. Such a move would need to be with consent of the co-operating parties, which 
includes Ontario, in which case, approximately more than 95% of market disclosure would be 
covered.  For smaller issuers, the requirement should be for only annual financial statements.  
Material changes would still be subject to the continuous disclosure regime, but the cost and 
resources of currently providing quarterly reports should be redirected towards effecting 
financial reporting on ESG risks and benefits.  Moreover, moving away from quarterly financial 
statements assists with focusing time horizons on longer periods, much needed, particularly in 
respect of climate-related financial risk and opportunity.  
 
While there would need to be national instruments agreed to by all regulators, the fact that six 
securities regulators, including Ontario and British Columbia, will be part of the new federal 
regulatory body, creates an opening to incorporate either climate-related or ESG factors in 
financial statements.  There were also many recommendations in previous studies conducted by 
the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation and similar national efforts to conceptualize a 
national system that would relieve the regulatory burden while moving financial statement and 
other disclosure towards modern and responsive disclosure, including use of financial technology 
to allow full access to financial statements and material information.317 These recommendations 
and many others made over the years should be considered in terms of how they might relieve 
the regulatory burden with the approval, finally, of a national capital markets stability framework.  
 
Recommendation 18: 
 
The Expert Panel should consider recommending a move to bi-annual and annual 
financial statements for larger issuers and only annual financial statements for venture 
                                                 
317 See for example, Janis Sarra, “Modernizing Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law: An Assessment of Recent 
Developments in Canada and Selected Jurisdictions” (October 2006) Research Report for the National Task Force 
to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Vol 2, 1-180. In 2006, more than 90% of TSX listed companies 
already maintained web-based disclosures, it is most likely much higher now. 
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and smaller issuers (by market cap) as one means to focus on longer-term sustainability 
and relieve some of the resource pressures in shifting to an ESG governance framework. 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(1):  
What would accelerate adoption of the TCFD disclosure framework? Are there any critical 
enablers or barriers to adoption that have not been discussed?  
 
The most effective way for the Government to accelerate adoption of the TCFD disclosure 
framework is to require publicly-listed companies to disclose information pursuant to the TCFD 
recommendations.318    In this section, we discuss the rationale for requiring TCFD disclosure; the 
mechanisms the federal government should use to require that disclosure, given Canada’s 
cooperative federalism; and the rationale for taking a tiered approach.  We then discuss a number 
of barriers to adoption of TCFD disclosure. 
 
  
1.  The rationale for requiring disclosure pursuant to the TCFD framework 
 
As recognized by the Expert Panel’s Interim Report, the recommendations of the TCFD merit 
careful consideration within the Canadian context for a number of reasons.  These reasons 
include that the TCFD’s recommendations (a) are specific to climate-change risk, which is 
understood to be a systemic risk; (b) have been developed by extremely influential, international 
participants in business and government; (c) have been endorsed by Canada’s five largest banks 
and six of its eight largest pension funds,319 indicating that core Canadian financial  actors 
understand the importance of the information TCFD suggests needs to be disclosed; and (d) have 
been endorsed by hundreds of businesses and investors around the world, including 457 
companies with over $5.7 trillion US of market capitalization and financial firms with close to $100 
trillion US of assets under management.320  As Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney 
stated in November of 2018: “TCFD is now supported by three-quarters of the world’s globally 
systemic banks, eight of the top ten asset managers, the world’s leading pension funds and 
insurers, major credit rating agencies, the Big Four accounting firms, the two dominant 
shareholder advisory firms, and the two dominant shareholder advisory services,” all together 
representing a fifth of global GDP.321 
 
i.  Overview of recommendations 
                                                 
318 TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 250. 
319 See Expert Panel, supra note 16 at 6. 
320 See TCFD, “2018 Status Report” (September 2018), online: FSB <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/tcfd-
2018-status-report>. See also Emily Farnworth, “Global CEOs call for greater disclosure of climate risks and 
opportunities” (Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 21 April 2017), online: WEF 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/global-ceos-call-for-greater-disclosure-of-climate-risks-and-
opportunities/>: CEOs representing companies with $4.9 trillion in assets and $700 billion in revenue form 
Alliance of CEO Climate Leaders to advocate for adoption of TCFD Framework. 
321 Terry Slavin, “‘Tragedy of the horizon’ still holding back action on climate change, Carney says” Ethical 
Corporation (26 November 2018), online: <http://ethicalcorp.com/tragedy-horizon-still-holding-back-action-
climate-change-carney-says> [Ethical Corporation, “Tragedy of the Horizon”]. In the same speech Governor 
Carney argued against requiring TCFD disclosure, which view will be discussed in Section IV, below.  
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The TCFD identified four features of its recommendations that it considers “key features”: (1) that 
they could be adopted by all organizations, including financial institutions and investors as well 
as operating companies; (2) that climate-related financial disclosures should be included in 
required financial filings; (3) that the disclosure be decision-relevant, forward-looking 
information; and (4) that there should be a strong focus on risks and opportunities from the 
transition to a lower-carbon economy.322 It also emphasized, as a key recommendation, the 
importance of using and disclosing the results of scenario analysis to determine the resilience of 
an organization and its strategies under different climate change and adaptation scenarios,323 
issuing a Technical Supplement to guide issuers and financial institutions in preparing scenario 
disclosure.324 
 
The Final Report identifies four areas for climate-related disclosure that represent the core 
elements of how organizations operate: Governance, Strategy, Risk Management, and Metrics & 
Targets.325  It conceptualized these recommendations as follows:  
 
 
 
TCFD Final Report326 
 
In discussing these categories of information, the Task Force stated: 
                                                 
322 See TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 250 at iii.   
323 See ibid at v. 
324 See TCFD, “Technical Supplement: The Use of Scenario Analysis in Disclosure of Climate-Related Risks and 
Opportunities” (June 2017), online (pdf): FSB <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-
TCFD-Technical-Supplement-062917.pdf> [Technical Supplement]. 
325 TCFD, “Annex”, supra note 278 at 11. 
326 Ibid. 
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The Task Force recommends that organizations provide climate-related financial 
disclosures in their mainstream (i.e., public) annual financial filings and 
recognizes that most information included in financial filings is subject to a 
materiality assessment.  However, because climate-related risk is a non-
diversifiable risk that affects nearly all industries, many investors believe it 
requires special attention. . . .327 
 
The Task Force concluded that information about a company’s governance and risk management 
should be included in financial filings irrespective of materiality, while disclosures related to 
company strategy, metrics and targets should be provided in annual financial filings only when 
material.328 Even there, the TCFD recommended that non-financial firms in energy, transportation 
materials, and agriculture, food and forest products with $ 1 billion US equivalent or more of 
annual revenue should provide disclosures on strategy and metrics and targets in “other reports,” 
such as sustainability or CSR reports.329   
 
What is notable about the TCFD’s disclosure categories is that they do not call on issuers to make 
speculative determinations about how large-scale, systemic disruptions such as climate change 
might affect their business at a far future date.  Rather, they call upon individual companies to 
discuss how that company is approaching the identification, quantification, and management of 
climate change risks and opportunities today, and what strategic risks and opportunities the 
company perceives in the transition to a low-carbon economy.  In other words, what are 
companies’ managements doing now to respond to the challenges of the Paris Agreement and 
their country’s Nationally Determined Contributions to meet the goals of that agreement?  Far 
from requiring speculative or boiler-plate disclosure, then, the TCFD has focused on specific 
information that managers can provide (how are they evaluating and managing these risks to 
their company in their industry and geographic regions), and specific information that investors 
and lenders can use to direct their capital to companies with smart, proactive management.  
Presumably it is because the information is perceived by investors to be decision-useful that 
financial institutions with close to $100 trillion US have endorsed TCFD, including Canada’s largest 
banks and pension funds. 
 
ii.  Implementing the TCFD’s disclosure framework 
 
The TCFD’s recommendations are widely viewed as the foundation for improved reporting of 
climate-related issues in mainstream financial filings. The TFCD believes that the reporting of 
climate-related risks and opportunities will evolve over time as companies, investors and others 
contribute to the quality and consistency of the information disclosed.  Thus, eventually, TCFD 
disclosure is expected to allow investors, lenders, insurers, and credit ratings agencies’ access to 
better information about specific companies’ climate-related risks and opportunities, and how 
managers and boards are thinking about those issues.  As such, the information disclosed should 
                                                 
327 Ibid. Some of the challenges associated with the concept of materiality, both generally, in mainstream 
financial filings, and with respect to climate-related risk, are discussed below at 83-88. 
328 Ibid.   
329 Ibid. 
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provide an important impetus to sustainable finance in Canada, allowing the capital markets to 
more effectively play a role in allocating capital to those companies with the most proactive 
insights into the transition to a low-carbon economy and how to position their company in light 
of that transition.  The key question for the Expert Panel, then, is how to suggest that the federal 
government implement required TCFD disclosure consistent with the Constitution Act, if the 
Panel is persuaded that is the best policy recommendation to make to the federal government in 
order to accelerate TCFD disclosure. 
 
As indicated above, a key consideration for the SCC in upholding the constitutional validity of the 
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory Scheme was that the federal government’s role in 
regulating capital markets independent of the cooperating provinces and territory is limited to 
the detection, prevention and management of systemic risks to the stability of the Canadian 
economy.330  Systemic risk is defined in the draft Capital Markets Stability Act as “a threat to the 
stability of Canada’s financial system that originates in, is transmitted through or impairs capital 
markets and that has the potential to have a material adverse effect on the Canadian 
economy.”331 
 
Both climate change itself and the transition risks inherent in Canada meeting its obligations 
pursuant to the Paris Agreement to limit the warming of the Earth to “well under” 2° C, compared 
to the pre-industrial era, and “pursuing efforts” to limit to 1.5° C332 are systemic risks with the 
potential to have a material adverse effect on the Canadian economy.  As such, the federal 
government would likely have jurisdiction to act independently of the cooperating provinces in 
enacting new regulations to require disclosure consistent with TCFD.  As the new framework 
negotiated between the federal government and the cooperating provinces specifies,333 the 
federal government’s new Authority would work with the cooperating provinces and territory—
Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and the Yukon—
                                                 
330 See text accompanying notes 292-300, supra. 
331 See Draft Capital Markets Stability Act, supra note 315, s 3.  
332 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC), “Paris Agreement” (12 December 2015), article 
2(1)(a), online (pdf): UN FCCC  
<http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf> 
(“Article 2 (a): Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing 
that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”.) The Paris Agreement entered 
into force as of 4 November 2016, when countries representing 55% of global GHG emissions had ratified the 
Agreement. By August 2017, 160 countries have ratified the Agreement. UN FCCC, “Paris Agreement – Status 
of Ratification” (2019), online: UN FCCC <http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php>. 
333 Draft Capital Markets Stability Act, supra note 315 at s 4: “The purposes of this Act are, as part of the 
Canadian capital markets regulatory framework,  
(a) to promote and protect the stability of Canada’s financial system through the management of systemic risk 
related to capital markets; and  
(b) to protect capital markets, investors and others from financial crimes. The Act is to be administered by the 
Capital Markets Regulatory Authority (b) detect, identify and mitigate systemic risk related to capital markets;  
(c) contribute, as part of the Canadian financial regulatory framework, to the stability of the financial system;  
(d) provide leadership and coordination in enforcing criminal law related to capital markets; and  
(e) coordinate Canada’s international involvement in regulating capital markets, including developing policy 
and representing Canada in international forums related to that regulation.” 
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to develop new climate-specific disclosure based on TCFD.334  Each of these approaches will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
 
2.  Federal jurisdiction under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act:  Climate change as a 
systemic risk 
 
The underlying premise of TCFD is that climate change poses systemic risks to the global financial 
system.  The impetus for the TCFD was discussed in a September 2015 speech to Lloyd’s of 
London delivered by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the FSB at the 
time of the speech, and former Governor of the Bank of Canada.  The speech, entitled Breaking 
the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability, identified climate change as 
one of the greatest extant threats to the resilience and prosperity of global financial markets.335 
 
Governor Carney identified three broad channels through which climate change can affect 
financial stability: 
 
First, physical risks: the impacts today on insurance liabilities and the value of financial 
assets that arise from climate- and weather-related events, such as floods and storms 
that damage property or disrupt trade;  
 
Second, liability risks: the impacts that could arise tomorrow if parties who have suffered 
loss or damage from the effects of climate change seek compensation from those they 
hold responsible. Such claims could come decades in the future, but have the potential 
to hit carbon extractors and emitters –and, if they have liability cover, their insurers–the 
hardest; 
 
Finally, transition risks: the financial risks that could result from the process of adjustment 
towards a lower-carbon economy.  Changes in policy, technology and physical risks could 
prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of assets as costs and opportunities 
become apparent. The speed at which such re-pricing occurs is uncertain and could be 
decisive for financial stability.336   
 
Each of these potential risks can be observed in Canada today, given such events as the Fort 
McMurray fire in 2016, with approximately $8.9 billion Cdn of direct and indirect costs, or the 
recently-filed claim for liability against the federal government for failing to address climate 
change.337  The clearest risks to the Canadian economy are transition risks, however.   
                                                 
334 Ibid, s 6 specifies: (2) In fulfilling that mandate, the Authority must coordinate, to the extent practicable, its 
regulatory activities with those of other federal, provincial and foreign financial authorities so as to promote 
efficient capital markets, to achieve effective regulation and to avoid imposing an undue regulatory burden. 
335 Mark Carney, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability” (Speech 
delivered at the Lloyd’s of London, 29 September 2015) [Carney]. 
336 Ibid at 5-6. 
337 Staff, The Canadian Press, “Fort McMurray Wildfire: Study pegs cost of last buildings, income and 
environmental damage at $8.9 billion” Global News (17 January 2017), online: 
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In December 2016, the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change was 
agreed to by the federal government and all of the provinces and territories, with the exception 
of Saskatchewan, to meet Canada’s commitment to the Paris Agreement.338  That commitment 
is to reduce Canada’s GHG emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.339  While the Ontario 
government has recently pulled out of the Pan-Canadian Framework’s core policy instrument of 
a tax on carbon,340 it maintains it will still meet the commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 
30%.341  The federal government has indicated it will impose a back-stop tax on carbon in any 
province that has not implemented one by 2019, which now includes Ontario and 
Saskatchewan.342   
 
The Pan-Canadian Framework estimates that 80% of Canada’s GHG emissions are caused by the 
production and use of energy: to power homes, offices, and industrial facilities; to fuel the 
transportation of people and goods; to build and heat homes and other types of facilities; to grow 
food and transport that food; to fish, manage forests, cut trees, and generally to fuel the 
economy.343  But Canada faces a number of particularized challenges in its transition to a low-
carbon economy.  It is a large, cold country, with people primarily clustered along its southern 
border, but also living at great distances to the North.344  These geographic aspects require 
extensive systems of transportation, and intensive amounts of energy for heating, including the 
use of carbon-intensive and polluting diesel generators in the North.  Moreover, 14.4% of the 
                                                 
<https://globalnews.ca/news/3187254/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-study-pegs-cost-of-lost-buildings-income-and-
environmental-damage-at-9-5b> (revised from nearly $10 billion). Of this, $3.7 billion were insurable losses, 
making it the most expensive disaster for insurers in Canadian history. Statistics Canada, Infographic: Fort 
McMurray 2016 Wildfire – Economic Impact (16 March 2017), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017007-eng.htm>. Regarding liability risk, see 
“Young Quebecers sue Canada for climate negligence” Montreal Gazette (26 November 2018), online: 
<https://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/young-quebecers-sue-canada-for-climate-negligence>. 
338 Canada, Environment and natural resources, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate 
Change (Gatineau, QC: Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2016), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework.html> 
[Pan-Canadian Framework].  
339 Ibid.  
340 Mike Godfrey, “Ontario Withdraws Support for Canadian Carbon Taxes” Tax-news.com (16 July 2018), 
online: <https://www.tax-
news.com/news/Ontario_Withdraws_Support_For_Canadian_Carbon_Taxes____86868.html>. 
341 Fatima Syed, “Ontario unveils climate plan with scant details” Canada’s National Observer (29 November 
2018), online: <https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/11/29/news/ontario-unveils-climate-plan-scant-
details>. 
342 Prime Minister, Price on Pollution, supra note 5. 
343 See Pan-Canadian Framework, supra note 338, Forward. Canada’s GHG emissions are coming from the 
following sources: 37% industry, the majority of which is coming from oil and gas production; 23% 
transportation; 12% buildings; 11% electricity production; 10% agriculture; and 7% waste and other. Pan-
Canadian Framework at 8; oil and gas emissions constitute the majority of industrial emissions: Pan-Canadian 
Framework at 16. Electricity production is a small part of Canada’s overall GHG emissions because 80% of its 
electricity comes from low-emitting sources, presumably hydro and nuclear power. Pan-Canadian Framework 
at 9.   
344 Natural Resources Canada, Infographic: Ten Key Facts on Canada’s Natural Resources (14 August 2018), 
online: Government of Canada <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/publications/key-facts/16013>.  
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Canadian economy is tied to the extraction, refining, transport and sale of oil, gas, coal, and 
minerals.345  Transitioning away from these GHG-intensive sources of energy and economic inputs 
to the Canadian economy over the next decades will have effects on both producers and 
consumers; and could disproportionately affect particular provinces in Canada, notably Alberta, 
and particular people, such as those individuals who work in the oil, gas, and coal industries.   
 
Given the systemic nature of climate change as a non-diversifiable economic challenge, and the 
particularized transition risks in Canada, we submit that the federal government has clear 
authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act to implement TCFD disclosure.   
 
 
3.  The federal government should also work with provincial securities regulators to 
encourage provincial securities law to require TCFD disclosure 
 
Notwithstanding its likely jurisdiction under the new Capital Markets Stability Act, the federal 
government should also work cooperatively with the provinces, territories and exchanges now to 
encourage implementation of TCFD disclosure on a provincial and territorial level, since it is likely 
to be some time before the new cooperative Authority is fully operational, and its priorities 
established. 
 
The CSA, an umbrella organization of provincial and territorial securities regulators, whose 
mission is to “improve, coordinate, and harmonize” securities regulation across Canada, would 
be the logical place to begin to develop a collaborative approach to this issue.  CSA has already 
studied the potential for requiring TCFD disclosure, and has put the matter on a watching brief.  
The CSA was engaged in consultations with investors, regulators, and issuers throughout much 
of 2017, and on 5 April 2018, the CSA published Staff Notice 51-354 Report on Climate Change-
related Disclosure Project.346  In the report, regulators stated that they intend to “consider new 
disclosure requirements regarding non-venture issuers’ corporate governance practices in 
relation to material business risks including emerging or evolving risks and opportunities arising 
from climate change.”347  Thus, there would seem to be some receptivity to policy consideration 
of at least part of TCFD-type disclosure, perhaps an approach like the SD&A discussed above.348  
 
 
4.  Concerns and barriers to requiring TCFD disclosure 
 
                                                 
345 Ibid. 
346 CSA Staff Notice 51-354, Report on Climate change-related Disclosure Project (5 April 2018), online (pdf): 
OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20180405_climate-change-related-
disclosure-project.pdf> [CSA Staff Notice 51-354].  In the report CSA Staff noted widespread dissatisfaction by 
investors in the quality of climate change disclosure by reporting issuers.  It found that just over half of issuers 
examined provide specific climate change-related disclosure in their MD&A and/or Annual Information Form, 
but the other half used boilerplate disclosure, or no disclosure at all. Ibid at 13.  Almost none of the issuers 
reviewed disclosed their governance and risk management practices respecting climate change. Ibid. 
347 Ibid. 
348 See text accompanying notes 289-291, supra.  
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Mark Carney has expressed the view recently that it is too early to require TCFD disclosure, that 
the framework needs further iteration based on the experiences of early adopters.349  This point 
of view needs to be taken seriously, particularly because it is the expression of the person who 
initiated the TCFD process.  Moreover, the academic literature supports the view that one of the 
advantages of voluntary, private self-regulation is that the “regulatory” framework can adapt 
more readily to changing circumstances, can evolve relatively quickly over time, and can more 
obviously incorporate the experiences of companies using it, versus traditional public laws, which 
can become ossified and are difficult to amend.350  Another advantage of voluntary self-regulation 
may be that participants become more engaged in meeting the spirit as well as the letter, of its 
requirements, and so there may be lower levels of psychological resistance to the 
requirements.351  
 
 Given the broad support for TCFD disclosure by Canadian banks and investors, it could be that 
proceeding along the lines of (a) encouraging strong federal endorsement of TCFD; (b) energizing 
banks and investors to pressure their clients to disclose climate-change risks and opportunities 
using the TCFD framework; and (c) industry peer-pressure will lead to significant voluntary uptake 
of the disclosure framework while the federal Capital Markets Stability Act is being implemented, 
and while the CSA continues to study the issue of climate-related financial disclosure.  
 
When the federal government is in a position to require this disclosure, it should take the 
approach indicated in our Recommendation 19, to require disclosure according to the “at-the-
time current” version of TCFD.   This approach would allow the framework for disclosure to evolve 
with the experience of companies using it, allowing some of the advantages of self-regulation, 
while still employing a mandatory approach.  Sweden and Denmark have taken a similar approach 
to their sustainability reporting requirements, basing the structure of required sustainability 
reporting on voluntary reporting frameworks.  Since 2008 public reporting companies in Sweden 
must issue an annual sustainability report using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
framework.352  Since January 2009, approximately 1,100 large companies in Denmark, as well as 
institutional investors and loan providers, have been required to publish an annual corporate 
responsibility report, following a 2008 government Action Plan on Corporate Responsibility.353   
Companies may use their annual reporting to the UN Global Compact as the framework for their 
                                                 
349 Carney, quoted in Ethical Corporation, “Tragedy of the Horizon”, supra note 321. 
350 See, eg, John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (January 2011) 44 UBC L Rev 475 
(summary of the literature) [Braithwaite]. 
351 See, eg, Deborah E Rupp and Cynthia A Williams, “The Efficacy of Regulation as a Function of Psychological 
Fit” (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 581. 
352 See Jan Bertil Anderson and Frida Segenmark, “Sustainable Companies: Barriers and Possibilities in Swedish 
Company Law” (11 April 2013), Univ of Oslo Res Paper No 2013-09, online: SSRN 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2248584>. For further information on the Global Reporting Initiative, see GRI, 
“Home Page” (2019), online: GRI <http://www.globalreporting.org>. 
353 See Karin Buhmann, “Company Law as an Agent for Migration of CR-Related International Law into 
Company Self-Regulation? The Case of the CR Reporting Requirement” (2011) 8:2-3 European Company Law 65 
at 68. 
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public disclosure, and institutional investors may report on their incorporation of the Principles 
of Responsible Investment (PRI) developed by the UN Environment Program.354  
 
The safe harbour, discussed in response to Expert Panel Question 3.3(6): below, would protect 
corporations as the standards develop.     
 
Recommendation 19:   
 
i. The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should 
require companies to disclose and address material climate-related financial risk 
in its initial regulations, and should peg requirements to international standards 
as they develop. 
 
ii. The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should 
assess whether there is a need to address material environmental, social and 
governance systemic risk more generally, in terms of risk to the stability of the 
country’s financial system as a whole and the  potential to have a material 
adverse effect on the Canadian economy.   
 
iii. The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should 
negotiate with securities administrators across Canada to embed a staged 
approach to TCFD disclosure within provincial securities regulation, where 
applicable and as standards develop. 
 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(2):  
Should the Government of Canada become an official supporter of the TCFD?  
 
 
1. The extensive process underpinning the TCFD framework is one that the Government of 
Canada should recognize 
 
In considering this question, we submit that members of the Expert Panel should consider the 
broad, global indications of support from companies and investors, set out above, but also the 
derivation of the idea for the TCFD, and the careful way the TCFD recommendations were 
developed.  TCFD is a project of the FSB, under the leadership of Canada’s former Governor of 
the Bank of Canada Mark Carney.  Founded in 2009 in reaction to the global financial crisis, the 
FSB is an international organization of central bank governors and financial regulators established 
by the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty (G-20) as a successor to the 
                                                 
354 See ibid. For more information on the PRI, see UN PRI, “About” (2019), online: UN PRI 
<http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/>. 
91 
 
Financial Stability Forum.355 Its remit is to enhance the stability of global financial markets by 
monitoring and making recommendations regarding financial regulations and policies.356  
 
As discussed above, the impetus for the TCFD  was Governor Carney, who, in a 2015 speech 
entitled Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability, 357 identified 
climate change as one of the greatest threats to the resilience and prosperity of global financial 
markets. Carney promoted the establishment of a climate disclosure task force to assess the 
effectiveness of various environmental disclosure regimes and develop an authoritative, 
voluntary disclosure framework so that markets could allocate capital properly to promote the 
necessary transition to a low-carbon economy.358 In December 2015, the TCFD was established 
by the FSB, with Michael Bloomberg as its Chair, and with 32 global industry participants as 
members, including people from operating companies, banks, insurance companies, asset 
managers, and credit rating agencies.359 Canadians Jane Ambachtsheer (then at Mercer, now 
based in Paris) and Stephanie Leaist, CPPIB, were part of the Task Force. 
 
The TCFD was created to develop voluntary climate-related disclosures that “could promote more 
informed investment, credit [or lending], and insurance underwriting decisions” that would, in 
turn, “enable stakeholders to understand better the concentrations of carbon-related assets in 
the financial sector and the financial system’s exposures to climate-related risks.”360 In keeping 
with its mandate, the TCFD released a scoping project in which it invited comments in April 2016; 
a consultation draft of recommended climate-related financial disclosures in December 2016; 
and then a Final Report setting out the TCFD’s recommendations on 29 June 2017.361 
Accompanying the Final Report, the TCFD published an Annex providing further specific guidance 
on how to report pursuant to its framework;362 and a Technical Supplement providing further 
detail on how to develop climate-related scenario analyses.363 
 
The extensive process to develop the TCFD recommendations and disclosure framework is a 
reason why so many governments, corporations, financial institutions and investors have 
endorsed it as a framework.  The federal government’s endorsement of the framework would 
provide an important signal to Canada’s capital markets participants that Canada intends to 
closely align its capital markets disclosure framework with developments internationally.  Then 
the new Authority can carefully work through the specifics with other securities regulators. 
 
 
 
                                                 
355 See FSB, “About” (2019), online: FSB <http://www.fsb.org/about/>. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Carney, supra note 335 at 16.  
358 Ibid at 13-15. 
359 See TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 250.   
360 FSB, Proposal for a Disclosure Task Force on Climate-Related Risks (9 November 2015), online: FSB 
<www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Disclosure-task-force-on-climate-related-risks.pdf>. 
361 See TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 250 at iv. 
362 See TCFD, “Annex”, supra note 278. 
363 See TCFD, “Technical Supplement”, supra note 324.    
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Recommendation 20: 
 
The federal government should endorse the TCFD disclosure framework, recognizing that 
it is continuing to develop. 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(4):  
Should larger firms be looked upon to demonstrate leadership to small- and medium sized 
enterprises with respect to TCFD disclosure?  
 
1. Cultivate leadership by size of enterprise  
 
Rather than looking to larger firms to demonstrate leadership to small-and medium-sized 
enterprises, we suggest that leaders be identified in each category--small, medium, large, and 
national enterprise champions.  The challenges facing companies of different sizes are distinct, 
and the resources available to meet those challenges vary widely according to size.  Thus the 
approaches taken by a larger firm to various TCFD disclosure issues—identifying, quantifying 
where possible, and analyzing risks and opportunities; developing targets for GHG emissions 
reductions and metrics; engaging in scenario analyses—may not be relevant to a small firm with 
few employees and informal governance systems at best.   
 
The federal government may be able to encourage companies to pursue sustainability disclosure 
goals by rewarding leading companies in each size category.  Leading companies could be asked 
by the federal government to constitute a Council of Sustainability Leaders.  Companies could be 
permitted to advertise their membership in the Council by a certification mark, which would 
permit concerned consumers to direct their purchases to sustainability leaders.  Empirical 
evidence is starting to show that consumers are willing to pay up to 20% more for fair trade goods 
and other goods with known sustainability certifications, and that demand for these goods is 
higher than for comparably priced, or even lower priced, non-fair trade goods.364  At least where 
companies are consumer-facing, being a recognized sustainability leader would presumably have 
economic value.   
 
Moreover, by recognizing leaders and celebrating innovation, the government challenges 
laggards to improve performance.  Japan has used techniques of celebrating leaders and 
supporting sector dialogues to improve technological performance.  One study suggests that the 
greater success of Japanese car companies in reducing emissions versus US companies was based 
on the government’s praise of technological innovations and clear expectations that other 
Japanese automakers “would have to innovate to reach or exceed a new ceiling as soon as 
another Japanese manufacturer took environmental engineering of motor vehicles up through 
an old ceiling.”365  A similar technique could be used with respect to sustainability disclosure: 
celebrating leaders and implicitly expecting laggards to improve. 
                                                 
364 R Dragusanu, D Giovannucci, and N Nunn, “The Economics of Fair Trade” (2014) 28:3 J of Econ Perspectives 
217-236. 
365 John Mikler, Greening the Car Industry: Varieties of Capitalism and Climate Change (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2009), cited in Braithwaite, supra note 350 at 501. 
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Still, it must be recognized that many small and medium enterprises will not have the resources 
to invest in new disclosure regimes of unproven benefit to them.  Even larger companies express 
concerns about how sustainability disclosure may—or may not—be valued by investors.  Natural 
Resources Canada recently gave support to CPA Canada to do an in-depth study of investors’ 
expectations of disclosure generally and sustainability disclosure specifically, and how the 
information is being  used in investment, insurance and underwriting decisions.   This avenue of 
study is promising. The government should be asked to support in-depth dialogues between 
investors and companies in key sectors to develop support for further engagement with TCFD 
across sectors and sizes of companies. 
 
Finally, TCFD or other sustainability disclosure should not be understood only as a mechanism to 
better inform investors, insurers and underwriters, although it is important in that regard.  
Focusing on the underlying facts to be disclosed about governance of climate change risks and 
opportunities, risk management, strategy, targets, and metrics is understood to focus attention 
on those matters and lead to improvements in processes, cost savings, new products, 
innovations, and so forth.  As Carney has observed, “you manage what you measure.”366  So if the 
government were to establish a Council of Sustainability Leaders recognizing excellent disclosure, 
and were to bring participants together annually, or semi-annually, it might help to establish 
networks of peers for sharing learning and innovation, much as innovation hubs such as the 
Centres for Social Innovation or Green Economy Canada do.       
 
Recommendation 21: 
 
i. The government should establish criteria to recognize leaders in 
sustainability disclosure in each size category (small, medium, large, 
national champions) and constitute a Council of Sustainability Leaders. 
 
ii. The government should facilitate dialogues between investors and 
companies to develop mutual understandings of what types of 
sustainability disclosure is most valuable to investors.    
 
     
Expert Panel Question 3.3(5):  
Is there a need for further guidance on the relationship between climate-related risks and 
materiality? How can the understanding of what is material be improved? 
 
World business leaders, members of civil society, and governments recognize that climate change 
presents material economic risks.  In the World Economic Forum’s  Global Risks Report 2019, 
published on 15 January 2019, climate change and climate change–related risks dominate the 
list, accounting for six of the top ten global risks, identified by both likelihood of occurrence and 
                                                 
366 Carney, supra note 335 at 11. 
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magnitude of impact.367  “Extreme weather events” was identified as the number one likely risk, 
and the failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation was number two, both in terms of 
likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of negative impact.368  Biodiversity loss, water crises, 
food insecurity and large-scale involuntary migration also ranked within the top ten risks facing 
the world, each of which is related to climate change.369   
 
The Canadian government has similarly understood that climate change represents material, 
economic risks. As just one example, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada Mark Lane has 
stated that the Bank recognizes that “climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing 
Canada and the world in the 21st Century.  Climate change itself and actions to address it will have 
material and pervasive effects on Canada’s economy and financial system.”370   One difficulty has 
been translating these macro-economic and systemic environmental and social risks posed by 
climate change into specific, material information individual companies need to discuss and 
disclose.  It is there that the TCFD process has advanced policy in a fundamental way. 
 
The premise of the TCFD recommendations is that much of the climate-related financial 
disclosures they recommend, particularly regarding risk management and governance of climate 
change, are already required to be disclosed by existing securities law requirements in the G20 
countries, where material.371  As discussed above, however, the quality of both required 
(material) and voluntary climate change and ESG disclosure now in Canada is poor.372  This poor 
quality of information suggests that there is a need for further guidance on the relationship 
between climate-related risks and materiality.  In this section we summarize the guidance that 
has been provided by Canadian securities regulators to date on the materiality of environmental 
information generally, and then discuss recommendations on how to improve that guidance.  
 
It is important to note in this context that what is “material” under securities law is a narrower 
concept than under corporate law. Under corporate law, materiality is one lens through which 
directors and officers assess risk and opportunity and act with a view to the best interests of the 
company. Under securities law, it is aimed at protecting investors, as discussed in this part. 
 
 
                                                 
367 World Economic Forum, Global Risks Report 2019 (2019) at 5, online (pdf): WEF 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf>. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid.    
370 Lane, “Thermometer Rising”, supra note 211. 
371 See TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 250, stating that “The Task force also reviewed financial filing 
requirements applicable to public companies across G20 countries and found that in most G20 countries, 
issuers have a legal obligation to disclose material information in their financial reports—which includes 
material, climate-related information.” 
372 See footnote 346. It should be noted that both the CPA Canada and the CSA have recently evaluated 
climate-related disclosures, primarily focussed on disclosure required under provincial securities laws and 
regulations, and found the quality of such disclosures to be poor. CSA Staff Notice 51-354, supra note 346; CPA 
Canada, “State of Play: Study of Climate-Related Disclosures by Canadian Public Companies” (2017), online: 
CPA <https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-resources/financial-and-non-financial-
reporting/sustainability-environmental-and-social-reporting/publications/climate-related-disclosure-study>. 
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1.  Guidance on the materiality of environmental information to date 
 
As discussed above, the requirements set out in provincial and territorial securities legislation are 
the primary source of disclosure obligations for publicly-listed corporations in Canada, but they 
are based on nationally harmonized standards agreed to by regulators.373 General disclosure 
obligations are primarily provided by National Instrument  41-101 General Prospectus Standards 
(“NI 41-101”) for primary market transactions, and National Instrument 51-102 Continuous 
Disclosure Obligations (“NI 51-102”) for secondary market transactions and continuing 
disclosure.374  According to those instruments, issuers’ disclosures must generally provide “full, 
true, and plain disclosure of all material facts”; issuers must also notify security holders of any 
material changes to their business and operations.375 
 
Three changes in the market motivated the CSA in 2010 to issue specific guidance on 
environmental reporting in CSA Staff Notice 51-533: “increasing impacts on issuers of 
environmental matters; the changing environmental regulatory landscape; and increasing 
investor interest in environmental matters.”376  A staff notice is a less formal communication from 
the CSA than a National Instrument, often, as here, to provide guidance on “emerging regulatory 
problems that have not yet become the subject of a policy or a rule.”377  Staff Notice 51-533 was 
published in an effort to “assist issuers in assessing which information must be disclosed on 
material environmental matters, such as risks related to weather patterns or environmental 
legislation”.378 In specific, CSA Notice 51-333 was drafted to provide guidance on definitions and 
principles concerning the following areas of disclosure:379 
 Material Information (that is, the materiality of environmental information) 
 Environmental risks and related matters 
 Environmental risk oversight and management 
 Forward-looking information requirements as they relate to environmental goals 
and targets   
 Impact of adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards on disclosure 
of environmental liabilities.380 
 
It is important to point out that Canadian environmental disclosure requirements are part of 
disclosure obligations generally, as established in NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations.  In 
other words, environmental disclosure obligations are not housed in a distinct instrument or 
                                                 
373 See, for instance, Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S5 [OSA]; Alberta Securities Act, SA 2000, c S4 [ASA]; 
British Columbia Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418 [BCSA]; Nova Scotia Securities Act, RSNS 1989, c 418 [NSSA]. 
374 NI 41-101, General Prospectus Standards and NI 51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations, both agreed 
within the auspices of the Canadian Securities Administrators and then promulgated in each province and 
territory. 
375 See, eg, Kerr v Danier Leather Inc, [2007] 3 SCR 331, 2007 SCC 44; OSA, supra note 373, §57(1) definition of 
material change. 
376 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 277.  
377 Condon, Anand, Sarra and Bradley, Securities Law in Canada, supra note 248 at 29. 
378 News Release: Canadian Securities Regulators Publish Additional Guidance on Environmental Disclosure (27 
October 2010), online: CSA <http://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=928>.  
379 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 277 at 6. 
380 Ibid. 
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piece of legislation, but rather, are an application of the general disclosure obligations of NI 51-
102.   Staff Notice 51-333 states that environmental matters comprise a “broad range of issues, 
including air, land, water and waste”, which can affect issuers in several ways, “including 
interrupting operations, resulting in material unplanned costs, providing new business 
opportunities, and potentially affecting reputation, capital expenditures, and a license to 
operate”.381  Bearing in mind the source and scope of environmental disclosure in Canada, what 
follows is an overview of the purpose of Staff Notice 51-333 and the guidance it sets out for 
issuers on the topic of materiality.   
 
i. Purpose of Staff Notice 51-333 
 
 The purpose of CSA Notice 51-333 “is to provide guidance to reporting issuers (other than 
investment funds) on existing continuous disclosure requirements relating to environmental 
matters under securities legislation”.382 The Notice is intended to assist issuers with: (1) 
determining what information about environmental matters needs to be disclosed, and (2) 
enhancing or supplementing their disclosure regarding environmental matters, as necessary.383  
 
ii. Materiality of environmental information 
 
The determining factor in considering whether information should be disclosed under securities 
disclosure laws generally is materiality. The test for materiality is objective: “information . . . is 
likely material if a reasonable investor’s decision whether or not to buy, sell or hold securities of 
the issuer would likely be influenced or changed if the information was omitted or misstated”.384 
Where the information is deemed to be material, it must be disclosed. In order to assist issuers 
with determinations of the materiality of environmental information, the Notice sets out several 
guiding principles for determining the materiality of information generally. 
 
One caveat to note here is that CSA Staff Notice 51-333 states that it reviewed many “discussions 
of materiality in the environmental context” in arriving at its guiding principles for determining 
the materiality of environmental information, including reviewing five specific documents on 
climate change disclosure.385  There is nothing specific to climate change disclosure in its 
discussion of material information, nor in its Staff Notice generally, although there are a number 
of examples of climate-related disclosures set out in the Appendix.  Certainly there is no guidance 
                                                 
381 Ibid at 3.     
382 Ibid.   
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid at 5. See also Part 1(f) of Form 51-102F1 and Part 1(e) of Form 51-102F2, supra note 277. 
385 CSA stated that it reviewed: “ • the CICA publication, Executive Briefing – Climate Change and Related 
Disclosures (March 2008) • the CICA publication, Building A Better MD&A: Climate Change Disclosures 
(November 2008) • the CICA publication, Climate Change Briefing (July 2009) • the CICA publication, 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Issues in Institutional Investor Decision Making (August 2010) • 
the May 2009 exposure draft of the Climate Disclosure Standards Board Reporting Framework, and • the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s guidance, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to 
Climate Change (effective 2 February 2010).” (CICA is the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, which 
became CPA Canada in 2014.) CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 277 at 6.  
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on climate-related financial disclosure of the kind now provided by the TCFD Final Report and 
supplemental materials. 
 
The first guiding principle stated by the CSA is that there is no-bright line test for materiality.386  In 
order to make it clear that there is no quantitate threshold for materiality, the CSA states that 
issuers should consider both qualitative and quantitative environmental factors when deciding 
whether environmental matters are material and require disclosure.387 As such, materiality is a 
flexible concept that varies between issuers and industries according to the circumstance.388 In 
other words, an event that may warrant disclosure by one issuer, such as perhaps a small issuer, 
may not be material to another, larger issuer. 
 
The second guiding principle is that determinations of materiality depend on the context.389 
Though certain facts and events may not be material on their own, they may be material if 
considered “in light of all the facts available”.390 Conversely, some facts and events are material 
on their own. In any case, issuers should not assess the materiality of individual facts, but rather 
holistically consider the total mix of facts.391  
 
The next two guiding principles are closely related with an issuer’s projected lifecycle.  The third 
guiding principle, being the timing of disclosures, is driven by the circumstances of the issuer.392 
For instance, an issuer that is expected to have a long investment cycle, or develop and 
implement new technologies throughout its projected investment cycle, may be more 
susceptible to the impacts of gradual environmental change.393 As such, an issuer should consider 
whether the impact of an environmental matter “might reasonably be expected to grow over 
time, in which case the matter may be considered material and warrant early disclosure on the 
basis that it might be important to reasonable investors”.394 Similarly, issuers should also 
understand how their business will intersect with known trends, demands, commitments, events 
and uncertainties.  Accordingly, the next principle states that, when an issuer’s affairs are (or will 
be) affected by a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, such information should be 
disclosed.395  Issuers should consider their operational time horizon and assess the probability 
and the magnitude of the effects imposed by a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty 
                                                 
386 See CSA Staff Notice 51-333, ibid at 7. 
387 Ibid. See also NI 51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations [NI 51-102]; OSC NP 51-102, (2002) 25 OSCB 
4492, (12 July 2002), s 4.2 [NP 51-201]; OSC Notice 51-716, Environmental Reporting, (29 February 2008) 31 
OSCB 2223 [OSC Notice 51-716]; Form 41-101F1 Information Required in a Prospectus, General Instruction 3.  
388  See CSA Staff Notice 51-333, ibid at 7. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid. See also Re YBM Magnex International Inc (2003), 26 OSCB 5285 at paras 94 and 101. 
392 See CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 277 at 7. 
393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid. The CSA recognized that this guiding principle was “derived from sources such as the CICA publication, 
Building A Better MD&A: Climate Change Disclosures (November 2008) and the May 2009 exposure draft of the 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board Reporting Framework. 
395 Ibid. 
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– such that environmental matters that are likely to come to fruition within the projected 
investment cycle of an issuer and materially affect its business and operations are disclosed.396  
 
The last principle articulates the CSA’s general pro-disclosure approach.  As it states, “if there is 
any doubt about whether particular information is material”, the CSA “encourages issuers to err 
on the side of materiality and disclose the information”.397 
 
 
2. Improving the understanding of what is material 
 
The CSA’s discussion of materiality in Staff Notice 51-333 shows that well-meaning and well-
counseled issuers have good, general, principles-based guidance on the disclosure of 
environmental issues in securities documents and financial statements.  Yet this guidance does 
not provide specific, clear, and comprehensive guidance on the disclosure of specific climate-
related information, since “materiality” as the screen for what is to be disclosed is a principles-
based concept.  In our view, therefore, using the TCFD Framework to structure companies’ 
disclosure would give investors a clearer, more consistent, and more easily comparable picture 
of how companies are thinking about, and managing, their current and future challenges from 
the changing climate and regulatory efforts to mitigate and adapt to those climatic changes. 
 
In the Annex accompanying its recommendations, the TCFD provided further details on its 
recommended disclosures, using a structure comparable to other voluntary disclosure initiatives 
(eg, GRI, the Carbon Disclosure Project’s (CDP) climate surveys, SASB): disclosure guidance for all 
sectors, including financial institutions; and then sector-specific disclosures.  For all sectors, 
specific disclosures are identified relating to each of the four thematic areas: governance, 
strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.398  For all sectors, there is no materiality 
screen for disclosures related to governance and risk management, since these are matters 
assumed to be of importance to investors across the board; but for strategy, metrics and targets 
materiality judgments are still relevant.399 Thus, some of the difficulties that the concept of 
materiality presents will still need to be addressed, particularly how company by company 
materiality determinations should be evaluated in light of systemic risks where each company’s 
contribution to the problem matters, but may not be independently “material” in the total 
economic output of that individual company.  For asset managers, the “Task Force recommends 
including carbon foot-printing information in reports to clients and beneficiaries independent of 
a materiality assessment.”400 
 
Sector-specific disclosures are identified for financial institutions, including banks, insurance 
companies, asset managers and asset owners (investors); and then for sectors particularly 
vulnerable to material financial implications from the physical effects of climate change and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.  The Task Force identifies those vulnerable sectors as energy; 
                                                 
396 Ibid.  
397 Ibid at 8. See also NI 51-102, supra note 387. 
398 See TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 50 and TCFD, “Annex”, supra note 278 at 14-20.  
399 See TCFD, “Annex”, ibid at 3. 
400 Ibid. 
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transportation; materials and buildings; and agriculture, food and forestry.401  Again, sector-
specific, detailed guidance is provided for disclosure across the four thematic areas of 
governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.   
 
It is clear from the TCFD analysis that few significant sectors are understood not to be particularly 
vulnerable to climate change effects and transition efforts.  That analysis is consistent with the 
conclusion of the US-based SASB that 72 of 79 industries, representing 93% of capital market 
valuations, are vulnerable to material financial implications from climate change, although the 
implications are obviously different for different sectors.402   
  
The TCFD guidance would encourage corporations to disclose more climate-related information, 
and give investors insight into the company’s process of considering ESG factors and asking 
questions regarding materiality. This guidance thus clarifies reporting responsibilities for issuers 
in a quite useful way.  In every case, what is material is a fact-specific evaluation, based on the 
company; its industry and physical locations; its financial assets, liabilities, and exposure to 
climate risk and transition risk; its preparations for climate-related challenges, and so forth.  In 
other words, further materiality guidance of a general nature is unlikely to be possible.  Rather, 
the specific, sector-specific guidance of TCFD will be beneficial.  
 
Recommendation 22: 
 
The federal government should encourage securities regulators and the CSA to direct 
companies to use the TCFD sector guidance and SASB guidance when determining the 
materiality of climate-related disclosures and when disclosing information about 
governance, risk management, company strategy, and targets and metrics within the 
construct of their continuous disclosure. 
 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(6):  
Are there mechanisms that would help overcome the hesitation to make appropriate 
disclosures with uncertain information in good faith, such as some form of regulatory safe 
harbour?  
 
 
1. A safe harbour for ESG disclosure 
 
In addition to the protections from liability discussed above for the codified fiduciary duties of all 
directors and officers, it makes sense to also consider a regulatory “safe harbour” for disclosure 
by publicly-listed companies of either climate-related financial risk or ESG risk.  While the 
corporate law provisions specify the obligation to consider ESG factors and to address them if 
they are material, securities law disclosure requirements are aimed at providing information to 
                                                 
401 See ibid at 46. 
402 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Climate Risk—Technical Bulletin (SASB Library 2017), 
<https://library.sasb.org/climate-risk-technical-bulletin/>.   
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the capital markets so that investors can make informed decisions as to buy, hold or sell their 
securities.  Thus securities disclosure engages a narrower set of stakeholders than corporate law.   
 
 NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure403 already provides a safe harbour for a reporting issuer 
regarding material forward-looking information, as well as “forward looking financial 
information” (“FOFI”).404  The disclosure cautions users that actual results may vary from the 
forward-looking information and identifies material risk factors that could cause material 
variation.405  NI-51-102 defines FOFI as forward-looking information about prospective financial 
performance, financial position or cash flows, based on assumptions about future economic 
conditions and courses of action, and presented in the format of a historical statement of financial 
position, statement of comprehensive income or statement of cash flows.406 “Forward-looking 
information” means disclosure regarding possible events, conditions or financial performance 
that is based on assumptions about future economic conditions and courses of action and 
includes future-oriented financial information with respect to prospective financial performance, 
financial position or cash flows that is presented as a forecast or a projection.”407 NI 51-102 
contains provisions to avoid duplication with existing mineral and oil and gas disclosure 
requirements.408 
 
Pursuant to NI 51-102, a reporting issuer must disclose the material factors or assumptions used 
to develop material forward-looking information.409 The factors or assumptions should be 
relevant to the forward-looking information.  The CSA has stated that disclosure of material 
factors or assumptions does not require an exhaustive statement of every factor or assumption 
applied – a materiality standard applies.410 
                                                 
403 NI 51-102, supra note 387.  
404 NI 51-102, (New FLI Requirements), effective 21 December 2007.  See also CSA Staff Notice 51-330 
Guidance Regarding the Application of Forward-looking Information Requirements under National Instrument 
51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations [CSA Staff Notice], online: BCSC 
<https://www.bcsc.bc.ca/Securities_Law/Policies/Policy5/51-
330_Guidance_Regarding_the_Application_of_Forward-
looking_Information_Requirements_under_National_Instrument_51-
102_Continuous_Disclosure_Obligations__CSA_Staff_Notice_/>. 
405 NI 51-102, ibid at para 4A.3(b). See also CSA, Companion Policy 51-102CP, Continuous Disclosure 
Obligations, as amended 2018, online: BCSC <https://www.bcsc.bc.ca/Securities_Law/Policies/Policy5/PDF/51-
102CP__CP___June_30__2015/> [51-102CP].  
406 Section 1.1, NI 51-102, ibid. It specifies that “financial outlook” means forward-looking information about 
prospective financial performance, financial position or cash flows that is based on assumptions about future 
economic conditions and courses of action and that is not presented in the format of a historical statement of 
financial position, statement of comprehensive income or statement of cash flows. 
407 Section 1.1, NI 51-102, ibid. 
408 Part 4B.1 (2), NI 51-102 states: “This Part does not apply to disclosure that is  (a) subject to requirements in 
National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities or National Instrument 43-101 
Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects; (b) made to comply with the conditions of any exemption from 
the requirements referred to in paragraph (a) that a reporting issuer received from a regulator or securities 
regulatory authority unless the regulator or securities regulatory authority orders that this Part applies to 
disclosure made under the exemption; or (c) contained in an oral statement.” Ibid. 
409 Para 4A.6, Disclosure of Material Factors or Assumptions, 51-102CP, supra note 405.  
410 51-102CP, ibid, continued at 4A.3. 
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Conceptually and practically, in the initial period requiring disclosure of ESG in financial 
statements, it makes sense to create a safe harbour in respect of disclosure of risks that may 
appear material now but later are determined not to be material or that turn out to be even more 
material than originally disclosed.  While the metrics and accounting standards are being 
developed and implemented, there is likely to be a period over the next several years in which 
the standards will be refined.  Thus, safe harbour language for disclosure of ESG information and 
ESG financial information makes sense. The FOFI provisions offer a good starting point as a model. 
 
The reality is that amendments to NI-51-102 will have to be negotiated by the CSA,  and in this 
respect, the federal government will not be able to unilaterally act as it is not responsible for day 
to day securities regulation over continuing disclosure.  There are some aspects of ESG disclosure, 
such as climate-related financial risk, which may be so systematically important that the 
government should require disclosure in a regulation under the new Capital Markets Stability Act, 
as discussed above.  Otherwise, the implementation of a safe harbour will be subject to provincial 
and territorial regulatory oversight, for some provinces, now under the umbrella of the new 
national Authority. 
 
Clearly securities regulators are best equipped with the skill and knowledge to draft ESG 
disclosure safe harbour language, but the point of the draft text below is to show that ESG 
disclosure under securities law can be limited to material information, and it can provide a safe 
harbour by cautioning readers of the disclosures that results may vary as new information 
develops.  
 
Importantly, the ESG disclosure safe harbour would not be confined only to forward looking 
information, but all ESG reporting. The point is to have directors and officers determine which 
ESG factors are material, what the risks and opportunities are, and how they are acting on these 
risks and opportunities.  The safe harbour recognizes that as ESG disclosure evolves, readers of 
the information should understand that it is evolving and that the disclosure may change as 
understandings of risks, opportunities and how to measure them improve.  Here again, such a 
safe harbour will encourage longer-term sustainability planning and  provide protection against 
short-termism pressure by “impatient capital”.  The safe harbour is a method under securities 
law to protect directors and officers in their duly diligent efforts to disclose material ESG factors 
to investors, regulators and the broader public. 
 
Recommendation 23: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend an ESG disclosure “safe harbour” to protect duly 
diligent directors and officers (possible draft language in red italics): 
 
DISCLOSURE OF ENVIROMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE INFORMATION   
 
1. Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) Information 
(1) This Part applies to ESG information that is disclosed by a reporting issuer 
other than ESG information contained in oral statements. 
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2.  Disclosure  
(1) A reporting issuer that discloses material ESG information must include 
disclosure that  
(a) cautions users of the ESG information that actual results may vary in 
the future due to refinements in metrics to measure risks and 
opportunities and identifies material risk factors that could cause results 
to differ materially from the reported ESG information;  
(c) states the material factors or assumptions used to develop the ESG 
information; and   
(d) describes the reporting issuer’s policy for updating ESG information. 
 
(2) ESG outlook information that is based on assumptions that are reasonable 
in the circumstances must, without limitation,  
(a) be limited to a period for which the information in the ESG outlook 
can be reasonably reported or be estimated; and  
(b) use the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to 
prepare its historical financial statements for the period covered.  
 
(3) This Part does not apply to disclosure that is (a) subject to requirements 
in National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas 
Activities or National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral 
Projects; made to comply with the conditions of any exemption from the 
requirements that a reporting issuer received from a regulator or securities 
regulatory authority unless the regulator or securities regulatory authority 
orders that this Part applies to disclosure made under the exemption; or  
contained in an oral statement.  
 
3. Reasonable Basis  
A reporting issuer is not required to disclose ESG information unless the issuer has 
a reasonable basis for considering the information to be material. 
 
4. A reporting issuer that discloses ESG information must include disclosure that 
states the date management approved the ESG information. 
 
5. ESG Financial Information 
(1) A reporting issuer must not disclose ESG financial information unless it is 
reasonable in the circumstances,  
(a) is limited to a period for which the information in the ESG financial 
information or financial outlook can be reasonably measured or 
estimated; and   
(b) uses the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to 
prepare its historical financial statements for the period covered by 
the ESG information or the financial outlook.  
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(2) The issuer must explain the ESG financial information in the financial 
statements and the notes to the financial statements.  
(3) The issuer must disclose the date management approved the ESG financial 
information and explain the purpose of the ESG financial information and 
caution readers that the information may not be appropriate for other 
purposes. 
(4) The issuer must disclose any year to year change in reporting ESG metrics 
used. 
 
The idea is that an issuer must have a reasonable basis on which to consider material ESG 
information and ESG financial information disclosed in financial statements.  As with FOFI 
disclosure, the ESG disclosure should not be “boilerplate in nature”.411  If a reasonable investor’s 
decision whether to buy, sell or hold securities of the reporting issuer would be influenced or 
changed if the information were omitted or misstated, then the information is material.412 
Disclosure of material ESG information should be presented in a manner that allows an investor 
who reads the document or other material containing the ESG information to be able to readily 
understand the information and inform him/her or itself of the material assumptions underlying 
the ESG information and/or ESG financial information and the material risk factors associated 
with the information.413  
 
Of note is that developing appropriate disclosures, including ESG information, is an ongoing 
process. The record of existing disclosures under current securities regulation attests to this 
ongoing process. In fiscal 2018, of 840 securities reviews the CSA conducted, 51% of issuers 
reviewed were required to take action to improve and/or amend their financial statement 
disclosures or resulted in issuers being sanctioned for failing to meet disclosure requirements in 
their financial statements.414 There are continuing issues relating to financial disclosures in 
compliance with the requirements of the IFRS, which include mining technical reports, climate 
change disclosure, incorrectly classifying cash flows as investing or financing activities on the 
statement of cash flows, and a number of other deficiencies.415 The CSA notes that many issuers 
across a wide range of industries could be materially impacted by climate change and yet many 
of these issuers either provide boilerplate disclosure or fail to provide disclosures of climate 
                                                 
411 51-102CP, supra note 405. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Ibid re forward looking information. 
414 CSA Staff Notice 51-355 Continuous Disclosure Review Program Activities for the fiscal years ended March 
31, 2018 and March 31, 2017 (19 July 2018), online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20180719_51-355_continuous-disclosure-review-
program.htm>. 
415 Ibid. 
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change-related financial risks and opportunities.416 To date, most disclosure of climate risks has 
failed to be sufficiently specific to the issuer and its finances and operations.417  
 
It will therefore be no surprise that fully embedding ESG factors in financial statements will take 
some time, effort and resources. The safe harbour provision would protect the good faith efforts 
of directors and officers of publicly-listed companies with respect to their securities law disclosure 
requirements. 
 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(7):  
What is the role of a board - and specifically the audit committee - in overseeing climate-
related financial disclosures?  
 
 
1. Both the board and the audit committee are vitally important to effective oversight of ESG 
financial disclosures, including climate-related financial disclosures 
 
The role of both the board and the audit committee is vitally important to the successful 
transition of Canadian corporations to a sustainable future, particularly important with respect 
to climate-related financial disclosures because the risks are rapidly becoming a reality and the 
capacity to move swiftly and effectively to address climate-related risk has become an imperative. 
 
The TCFD recommends that financial reporting of climate-related financial risk should be subject 
to the same requirements as other corporate reporting and thus involve review by the chief 
financial officer and audit committee, as appropriate.”418 As a core function, the board has a role 
in overseeing climate-related financial disclosures and risk management, as it has oversight of all 
significant risk factors, including ESG factors. Depending on the size of the company, it may be 
the board itself, an enterprise risk management committee or the audit committee.  Whatever 
the designated structure in which ESG risks are being identified, reporting must be made directly 
to the full board; directors should be made aware of the risks and whether they are material, and 
how the risks are being managed, so that they can engage in proactive oversight.   
 
If, as recommended above, ESG factors are required to be reported in financial statements, the 
national instrument on audit committees will be helpful. National Instrument 52-110 Audit 
Committees419 (“NI 52-110”) establishes requirements for the responsibilities, composition, and 
                                                 
416 Ibid, observing that the AIF must include disclosure of risk factors relating to the issuer and its business that 
would be likely to influence an investor's decision to purchase the issuer's securities. When assessing the 
materiality of climate change-related risks and impacts, issuers should consider a wide range of risks including 
physical (acute/chronic), regulatory, reputational and business model risks. 
417 Ibid, stating “In order to provide useful information to investors, material climate change-related risks 
should provide specificity and additional quantitative discussion (e.g. the financial impact). Reference: Item 5.2 
of Form 51-102F2, Item 1.4(g) of Form 51-102F1, and CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 277. 
418 TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 250 at 18. 
419 NI 52-110, Audit Committees (effective 17 November 2015), online: BCSC <https://www.bcsc.bc.ca/52-
110_[NI]_11172015/> [NI 52-110].  
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authority of audit committees.  An audit committee of the board of directors has responsibility 
for oversight of the financial reporting process, which includes helping directors meet their 
responsibilities, providing better communication between the directors and the external 
auditors, enhancing the independence of the external auditor, increasing the credibility and 
objectivity of financial reports, and strengthening the role of the directors by facilitating in-depth 
discussions among directors, management, and the external auditor.420  NI 52-110 also sets 
financial literacy requirements for audit committee members.421  It means that ESG factors, if 
included in financial reporting, will be subject to the standards of review of the audit committee, 
providing greater assurance of the accuracy and reasonableness of the disclosures. 
 
Also relevant to this question is National Instrument 52-109 Certification Disclosure in Issuer’s 
Annual and Interim Filings422 (“NI 52-109”), which was promulgated to improve the quality, 
reliability and transparency of annual filings, interim filings and other materials that issuers 
submit under securities legislation. NI 52-109 requires an issuer’s chief executive officer (“CEO”) 
and chief financial officer (“CFO”), or persons performing similar functions to a CEO or CFO 
(referred to as certifying officers), to personally certify: that the issuer’s annual filings and interim 
filings do not contain any misrepresentations; that the financial statements and other financial 
information in the annual and interim filings fairly present in all material respects the financial 
condition, results of operations, and cash flows of the issuer; that they have designed or 
supervised design of disclosure controls and procedures (“DC&P”) and internal control over 
financial reporting (“ICFR”); that they have caused the issuer to disclose in its MD&A any change 
in the issuer’s ICFR that has materially affected the issuer’s ICFR; and, on an annual basis, that 
they have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s DC&P and caused the issuer to disclose their 
conclusions about the effectiveness of DC&P in the issuer’s MD&A.423  
 
This certification requirement means that if federal corporate law or Canadian securities law is 
amended to require disclosure of ESG material information in financial statements, the certifying 
officers of publicly-issuing corporations will have to personally certify the accuracy and quality of 
the disclosures. They are required to certify that the financial statements fairly present the 
                                                 
420 Condon, Anand, Sarra and Bradley, Securities Law in Canada, supra note 248 at 539. Section 2.3(3), ibid 
specifies that an audit committee must be directly responsible for overseeing the work of the external auditor 
engaged for the purpose of preparing or issuing an auditor’s report or performing other audit, review or attest 
services for the issuer, including the resolution of disagreements between management and the external 
auditor regarding financial reporting. 
421 An individual is financially literate if he or she has the ability to read and understand a set of financial 
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are generally comparable to 
the breadth and complexity of the issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the issuer’s financial 
statements; NI 52-110, ibid, s 1.6. 
422 NI 52-109, Certification of Disclosure in Issuer’s Annual and Interim Filings (15 December 2008, as amended 
effective 17 November 2015), online: BCSC 
<https://www.bcsc.bc.ca/Securities_Law/Policies/Policy5/Group/?group=52%20109>.  
423 Condon, Anand, Sarra, and Bradley, supra note 248 at 527. NI 52-109, ibid, does not define “financial 
condition,” but its companion policy notes that the term “financial condition” in the annual certificates and 
interim certificates is to reflect the overall financial health of the issuer and includes the issuer’s financial 
position, as shown on the balance sheet, and other factors that may affect the issuer’s liquidity, capital 
resources, and solvency; see 52-109CP (1 January 2011), s 4.2. 
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financial condition of the issuer, that there are internal controls to ensure that material 
information is conveyed to decision-makers, and that they have disclosed to the auditor and audit 
committee any significant deficiencies in internal control and any fraud, material or not, that 
involved managers or other employees who have a significant role in the company’s internal 
controls.424 This degree of scrutiny will play a pivotal role in the disclosure of ESG financial 
information, including climate-related financial risk. 
 
 
Expert Panel Question 3.3(8):  
Are there any other standards that could be combined with the TCFD to reduce reporting 
burden? 
 
 
1. Canada can benefit from international reporting standards already developed  
 
The TCFD sector-specific disclosure guidance referenced above (see discussion of Expert Panel 
Question 3.3(5)) has been prepared with a view to aligning TCFD’s disclosure recommendations 
for energy; transportation; materials and buildings; and agriculture, food and forestry with the 
other leading disclosure standards: the GRI framework; the Carbon Disclosure Project Standards 
Board; and the SASB standards.  As a result, requiring disclosure according with TCFD’s proposals, 
as recommended above, obviates the need to canvass other reporting standards for synergies, 
as that alignment is already occurring.  
 
Along with an expansion of materiality standards, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) 
has a framework for identifying material environmental information that should assist 
organizations in disclosing material climate risks.425 The framework involves an organization's 
activities that will likely give rise to environmental impacts and affect the organization’s operation 
of its business model and its strategy. The CDSB includes activities such as changes in resource 
availability, supply, pricing, degradation, and policy constraints that could impact resources and 
relationships the organization is dependent on.426  For instance, an organization’s activity may 
                                                 
424 Condon, Anand, Sarra, and Bradley, ibid at 528.  
425 Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB), “Position paper: Materiality and Climate-Related Financial 
Disclosures” (UK: CDSB, 2018) at 6-7, online (pdf): CDSB 
<https://www.cdsb.net/sites/default/files/materiality_and_tcfd_paper.pdf> [CDSB]. Australia, Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), “Regulatory Guide 228 – Prospectuses: Effective Disclosure for 
Retail Investors” (November 2016) at 32-34, online (pdf): Government of Australia 
<https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4062323/rg228-published-3-november-2016.pdf>. Nancy Meyer, “Best 
Practices and Challenges: Using Scenarios to Assess and Report Climate-Related Financial Risk” (August 2018) 
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions at 2, online (pdf): 
<https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2018/08/using-scenarios-assess-climate-risk-08-18.pdf>.  Alexia 
Staker, Alice Garton & Sarah Barker, “Concerns misplaced: Will compliance with the TCFD recommendations 
really expose companies and directors to liability risk?” (2017) Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative at 8-9 
[Staker et al].   
426 CDSB, ibid. 
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cause stakeholders to act against the company in order to protect environmental resources they 
are negatively impacting.427 
 
 
V. AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR LENDERS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE 
TRANSITION TO A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY 
 
Both debt and equity investors have an important role in promoting Canada’s transition to a low 
carbon economy. As noted above, many institutional investors in Canada have already recognized 
the importance of this role. Internationally, there is considerable leadership whereby  
institutional investors are committed to identifying and managing portfolio risks in order to 
facilitate the transition to low emissions, and to accelerate the integration of climate change 
analysis into the management of large, long-term and diversified asset pools.428 415 investors 
with more than $30 trillion US in assets under management have called on the G7 countries to 
act now to address climate-related financial risk, including accelerating private sector investment 
into the low carbon transition and committing to improve climate-related financial reporting.429   
 
In Canada, financial institutions are extremely well-positioned to help shift the trajectory of 
climate-related financial risk in both their debt and equity investment decisions.  Currently, 16 
financial institutions and their 51 subsidiaries have an aggregate qualifying market value of 
$597.6 billion and comprise 71.2% of all financial services trading on the TSX.430  In addition, there 
are 71 privately-owned financial institutions, 27 domestic subsidiaries of foreign companies, 
publicly traded on foreign markets and 175 foreign-owned institutions operating in Canada.431  
The investment power of these institutions could be effectively deployed in the shift to a 
sustainable economy.  More importantly, absent their active support of the transition, Canada is 
unlikely to be able to effectively address the impending transition risks to its economy or meet 
its international commitments under the Paris Agreement.  
 
Yet despite the leadership of some institutional investors,432 there are counter-pressures to 
moving towards sustainable finance.  On the debt side, our significant financial institutions are 
well resourced to foster the move towards sustainable finance. However, amending fiduciary 
                                                 
427 CDSB, ibid at 21. The framework also includes activities that impact the organization’s capacity to innovate, 
its ability to influence natural capital, and brand and reputational consequences. The CDSB additionally 
emphasizes that GHG emissions should be treated as material and reported in all cases. 
428 Sovereign Wealth Funds, “The One Planet Sovereign Wealth Fund Framework” (2018), online (pdf): 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
<http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/One_Planet_Sovereign_Wealth_Fund_Framework.pdf>.  
429 The Investor Agenda, “Investors call on world leaders to address climate change ‘ambition gap” (10 
December 2018), online (pdf): The Investor Agenda <http://theinvestoragenda.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Investor-Agenda-COP24-press-release-final-06.12.18-1.pdf>. 
430 TSX, supra note 47, on file with authors. 
431 Ibid. 
432 An example would be Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, “CDPQ announces investment strategy to 
address climate change” (18 October 2017), online: CDPQ 
<https://www.cdpq.com/en/news/pressreleases/cdpq-announces-investment-strategy-to-address-climate-
change> [Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec].  
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obligation alone will not shift the trajectory. Capital markets have changed significantly in the past 
two decades in nature and size, in the maturing of Canadian securities regulation that has allowed 
access to international capital pools, and in the shift from bank lending to public and private 
market non-bank lending.433  The ease of capital movement and the accompanying exponential 
increase in pressure for short-term investor returns has led many companies to pay out dividends 
in preference to investing in the longer-term sustainability of firms.434 Intercompany credit 
arrangements have become common, where assets of Canadian companies are encumbered to 
finance operations of related entities in foreign jurisdictions.435  New products and strategies in 
the structure of finance, including syndication, securitization and collateralization, have 
profoundly altered the nature of debt.436 The result has been a fundamental shift in credit 
relationships from the many years of relational lending to a situation where both domestic and 
foreign creditors have little interest or direct connection with Canadian domestic corporations 
and their stakeholders, other than an interest in short-term returns on their investment.  
 
The result of these developments is that directors and officers of financial institutions can fully 
act in the best interests of their institution and continue their lending practices of financing 
carbon-intensive sectors. If the risk is fully hedged through securitization of the loan, or the risk 
substantially reduced through syndicated lending, they will meet the best interests threshold test 
as currently construed.  What is needed, therefore, is more: some action that will ensure lenders 
shift credit patterns to actually address climate-related financial risk.  A first step is disclosure: 
how are they taking steps in their portfolio construction, oversight of debt compliance and 
engagement activities to ensure Canada is moving towards a lower carbon economy? Combined 
with pricing ESG in financial statements, as recommended above, it will encourage financial 
institutions to move towards more sustainable finance. 
 
The same obligations should be placed on debt and equity institutional investors and asset 
managers, given the increased market share of private equity funds, mutual funds and pension 
plan investment firms. It will shift the minds, and hopefully the capital, of institutional investors 
and asset managers towards potential investments in green infrastructure and technologies. 
 
The federal government should adopt legislation similar to that enacted in France to require 
institutional investors, including mutual funds and pension funds, to disclose annually the 
financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the company’s measures to reduce 
them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in every component of their 
activities, and how their corporate and investment decision-making is contributing to the energy 
and ecological transition to limit global warming. Relevant for this report are the requirements 
                                                 
433 Janis Sarra, “The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency 
Law” in J Sarra and BE Romaine, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2016 (Toronto: Carswell, 2017). 
434 Ibid at 9. The structure of corporate groups has resulted in the uploading of cash on a frequent basis to the 
parent company to finance non-domestic related entities, leaving fewer assets in the Canadian debtor to 
satisfy claims on insolvency, a trend occurring globally. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid at 10; with the globalization of business, many cross-border enterprises have grown, both originating in 
Canada and as subsidiaries of large multinational enterprises. 
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that institutional investors publish commitments on responsible investment regarding climate 
change risk, including explanations of how these commitments align with their fiduciary duties. 
 
In 2015, the French National Assembly enacted La Loi de transition énergetique pour la croissance 
verte (the Law for Energy Transition and Green Growth), aimed at reducing GHG  emissions, 
capping fossil fuel production and increasing renewable energy usage.437 Article 173 of the Law 
introduces the first mandatory requirements for institutional investors, including mutual funds 
and pension funds.438 Institutional investors must disclose how their investment decision-making 
takes ESG criteria into consideration, and disclose how they are contributing to the energy and 
ecological transition to limit global warming.439  The law is an important step forward in 
addressing climate financial risk, both in the transparent and accountable reporting required and 
the obligation to disclose the specific manner in which climate change issues are being addressed. 
 
The European Commission has proposed that institutional investors and money managers 
demonstrate how their investments align with ESG factors under proposed regulations pursuant 
to its action plan for financing sustainable growth.440 Among the proposals are regulations to 
introduce consistency and clarity on how institutional investors, including pension funds and 
insurance companies, should integrate ESG in investment decision-making processes. In 
November 2018, the European Commission adopted a strategic long-term vision for a 
prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy by 2050, “A Clean Planet for 
                                                 
437 French National Assembly, Law for Energy Transition and Green Growth (22 July 2015). On 18 November 
2015, modifications were made to the Code de l’environnement – L222-1 in response to Article 173 of the Law 
for Energy Transition and Green Growth (“Transition énergétique”). The amendments address carbon budgets 
and national low-carbon strategy, regulating the quantity of greenhouse gases of certain types of large-scale 
operation, converting energy consumed or waste processed into corresponding emission factors. Emissions are 
recorded annually, excluding international air and sea links, under France’s carbon budgets as set out by the 
European Commission and the UN Convention on Climate Change, UN FCCC, supra note 332. On 19 August 
2016, modifications were made to the Code de commerce – Art R225-105-1(M) in response to Articles 70 and 
173 of the Transition énergétique. The Commercial Code now includes a section on Environment information:  
A. General policy on the environment, including that environmental assessment must be made where 
appropriate, employees trained to protect the environment, and steps be taken to prevent environmental risks 
and pollution;  
B. Pollution, including measures to reduce or repair damage;  
C. Economical waste management, including recycling, reuse, use of sustainable resources, and the 
minimization of energy consumption;  
D. Climate change, particularly significant emissions from the use or development of the company’s product;  
E. Protection of biodiversity.  
The amendment also added societal commitments to sustainable development, including a commitment to use 
resources sustainably and to adapt to the consequences of climate change, ibid. 
438 As well as investment companies with variable share capital, ibid. 
439 As well as how they exert the voting rights attached to the financial instruments resulting from those 
choices. “Environmental” includes the exposure to climate-related risks, including GHG emissions associated 
with assets owned, ibid. 
440 European Commission, A Clean Planet for all – A European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, 
competitive and climate neutral economy, COM(2018) 773 final (28 November 2018), online (pdf): Europa 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_en.pdf>. 
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All”.441 The strategy focuses on investing in realistic technological solutions, empowering citizens, 
and aligning action in key areas such as industrial policy, finance and research, while ensuring 
social fairness for a just transition.442 The Action Plan on Sustainable Finance is aimed at 
connecting finance with the EU's agenda for sustainable development, while the European 
Commission's proposal for a unified classification system or taxonomy on sustainable economic 
activities and proposed rules for low-carbon benchmarks and improved disclosure requirements 
for investment products is aimed at enhancing transparency and helping investors with targeting 
the right investments.443 
 
We have an excellent role model within Canada.  The Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 
(CDPQ) has an impressive investment strategy to address climate change, which is built on four 
pillars: 
1. CDPQ is factoring in climate change in every investment decision. 
 
2. CDPQ is committed to increasing its low carbon investments by 50%, $8 billion, by 
2020. 
 
3. CDPQ is committed to reducing its carbon footprint by 25% per dollar invested by 
2025, setting a carbon target covering all its asset classes. 
 
4. CDPQ is committed to exercising strong leadership in accounting for climate risk and 
will publish audited information on its portfolio’s GHG emissions annually.444 
 
CDPQ’s strategy offers a frame of reference for what the federal government could mandate. 
Recommendation 24 on disclosure would be an important first step.  While this report discusses 
ESG disclosure at length, the role of institutional debt and equity investors in addressing climate-
related financial risk and opportunity is of such importance, it is deserving of its own targeted 
recommendation.  
 
Recommendation 24: 
 
The federal government should adopt requirements to require debt and equity 
institutional investors and asset managers, including mutual funds and pension funds, to 
disclose annually the financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the 
company’s measures to reduce them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon 
strategy in each component of their activities, and how their corporate and investment 
decision-making is contributing to the energy and ecological transition to limit global 
warming. 
 
 
                                                 
441 Ibid. See also European Commission – Press release, “The Commission calls for a climate neutral Europe by 
2050” (28 November 2018), online (pdf): Europa <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6543_en.htm>.  
442 Ibid. 
443 Ibid at 18. 
444 Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, supra note 432 at 3. 
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VI. INITIATING THE REFORM PROCESS 
 
The recommendations that we have made are extensive, and both the Expert Panel and the 
federal government are likely  to have priorities in what legislative reform is addressed first.  We 
note that of the 72 questions posed by the Expert Panel, the majority will not require legislative 
change.  However, our recommendations focus on areas of law that are already codified and 
require amendment to reflect developments in the common law and in international standards. 
The executive summary sets out our top four priorities. 
 
If addressed on an individual statute basis, the process is clear: a bill proposing a new law or 
amendments to existing law is introduced in either the Senate or the House of Commons, often 
after a public consultation process on possible amendments to existing statues or a new draft bill. 
The bill is tabled, then debated in the chamber of Parliament, and if approved for further 
consideration, it is sent to a parliamentary committee for study and amendments if needed. The 
bill is then brought for final reading and a vote; if it passes, it goes to the other chamber and the 
process is repeated. Once the bill has been passed by both Chambers in identical form, it goes to 
the Governor General for Royal Assent and is in force in Canadian law on a named date.  
 
On a statute by statute basis, easiest to amend is the CBCA because it has a well-established 
consultation and legislative process, as evidenced by recent amendments on board diversity.  One 
option would be to start with the CBCA and then work to amend the other federal incorporation 
statutes to align.  If the approach is to be statute by statute, we recommend that the Bank Act 
and the Insurance Companies Act would also be the highest priorities, in terms of impact.  We 
note, however, that the recent amendments to the corporate board diversity provisions 
simultaneously amended the CBCA, the Canada Cooperatives Act, The Canada Not-for-profit 
Corporations Act and the Competition Act;445 so there is recent precedent for amending a number 
of statutes on the same issue in one parliamentary bill.   
 
The federal government should also implement a more overarching strategy on sustainable 
finance by having a “framework strategy”, which it has used recently in its process regarding a 
federal financial sector framework.  In this framework strategy, the federal government 
examined, on a broader basis, how to advance a financial sector legislative and regulatory 
framework that supports stability, in terms of safety, soundness and resilience; efficiency, in 
terms of encouraging competitively priced products and services, including efficiency gains to 
customers, accommodating innovation, and effectively contributing to economic growth; and 
utility, in terms of meeting the needs of an array of consumers, including businesses, individuals 
and families.446  It commenced with a 2016 consultation paper and process, publishing responses 
and submissions.447 It then conducted a second consultation stage in 2017 that proposed specific 
                                                 
445 An Act to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act, the Canada Not-for-
profit Corporations Act and the Competition Act, SC 2018, c 8. 
446 Government of Canada, “Department of Finance Canada Launches Consultations to Review the Federal 
Financial Sector Framework” [Archived] (26 August 2016), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.fin.gc.ca/n16/16-105-eng.asp>. 
447 Ibid. 
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policy measures.448  That process is in the final stages, the Department of Finance Canada now 
working on legislative reforms for consideration by Parliament prior to the statutory sunset date 
of 29 March 2019, as well as having the suggestions and recommendations inform the 
Department's longer-term approaches to the financial sector.449 
 
In terms of the Expert Panel’s recommendations, the recommendations for federally-regulated 
financial institutions, recommendations 7 to 13 of our report, should be included in the legislative 
proposals coming forward in early 2019.  They meet the express goals of the financial framework 
process: stability, efficiency and utility; and are aimed at the protection of consumers, businesses 
and other stakeholders.  It would result in treating the federally-regulated financial institutions 
on a level playing field in terms of ESG requirements being embedded in law. 
 
The Expert Panel should also recommend a framework approach to the fiduciary obligations of 
all federally-regulated entities and ESG considerations such as we have proposed here. It should 
propose a series of legislative changes related to ESG across a variety of statutes as a framework 
approach to effective governance and risk management, seeking community responses to the 
express proposals and initiating the parliamentary process.  That would assist in developing a 
broad-based policy approach to ESG, and assist in creating a level playing field, as all federally-
registered companies would be subject to the new provisions at the same time.   
 
Most of the recommendations in our report fall directly under federal jurisdiction and thus could 
be implemented using one of these strategies. A few call on federal-provincial cooperation, 
which, as noted in this report, will take more time and energy, but are nonetheless possible.  
 
On climate-related financial risk more specifically, the Expert Panel should consider whether 
some of its recommendations fall within the current federal government process of climate 
action incentives, the public consultation process of which just closed.450  This process follows on 
enactment of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act,451 but looks more systemically on creating 
pricing incentives to shift Canada to a lower carbon economy. Some of its recommendations may 
align with the federal government’s efforts to address these issues in a timely manner. 
 
 
VII.   A MECHANISM FOR ONGOING DIALOGUE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Expert Panel should also consider making a recommendation to the federal government to 
establish a longer-term mechanism for ongoing dialogue and actions on aligning financial policies 
and regulations with low carbon sustainable economy transition, so that there is a mechanism in 
                                                 
448 Government of Canada, “Department of Finance Canada Launches Second Stage of Consultations on 
Federal Financial Sector Framework” (11 August 2017), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.fin.gc.ca/n17/17-074-eng.asp>. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Government of Canada, “Department of Finance Announcing Climate Action Incentive Payments and Launch 
of Fuel Charge Consultations” (23 October 2018), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.fin.gc.ca/n18/18-097-eng.asp>. 
451 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12, s 186. 
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place for evolution of fiduciary obligation, disclosure and transition strategies, and a coordinated 
source for information on developments internationally as they occur.  It is critically important 
that the government stay engaged with the financial sector regarding the shift to a low carbon 
economy, and that this engagement also includes other sectors of the economy, as well as 
Indigenous peoples, and both urban and rural communities across Canada. The transition is both 
challenging and exciting, and what is needed is a range of financial and other expert 
conversations, including how best to leverage Canada’s natural and financial assets in this 
transition.   
 
One possible option is an institute on sustainable finance.  There are different models. The UK 
Government and the City of London have co-created and co-funded, in 2019 a new Green Finance 
Institute that will act as the focal point for future UK green finance activity, a “one-stop-shop for 
world-leading climate science, and for capital”.452 The Green Finance Institute is aimed at  
accelerating green finance across a range of thematic areas, including green fintech solutions, 
advancing international partnerships, supporting green finance policy and enhancing 
communications and branding.453 It is to advance an innovative, coordinated agenda to ensure 
London’s green finance approach continues to represent the cutting edge; work with other Green 
Finance centres to shape international dialogues on green and sustainable finance; partner with 
the private sector to deliver recommendations and support the UK Government’s Green Finance 
Strategy; collaborate with universities to promote innovation and data analytics; and work closely 
with the UK Government and regulators to ensure policy that supports the growth of green and 
sustainable finance.454  
 
The UK Green Finance Institute has been created at the same time as a new venture capital fund, 
the Clean Growth Fund, in which the UK will invest £20 million, alongside at least £20 million from 
private investors, in an investment fund to support new clean technology at early stages, making 
direct investments in companies seeking to commercialize promising innovative green 
solutions.455 It has sought proposals from prospective fund managers that will be responsible for 
raising the private sector portion of fund investment of 50% or more.456 
 
Other models include university-based models. The Smith School of Business Oxford Sustainable 
Finance Programme at Oxford University and its Global Sustainable Finance Advisory Council is 
researching environment-related risks, impacts, and opportunities across different sectors and 
                                                 
452 UK Green Finance Initiative, “Green Finance Institute” (announced by the UK Chancellor on 21 June 2018), 
online: City of London <http://greenfinanceinitiative.org/green-finance-institute/>. 
UK Government, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, “Clean Growth Fund: Request for 
Proposals” (2018), online (pdf): City of London 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748943/
CGF_RFP.pdf>. 
453 UK Green Finance Initiative, “CEO Job Description” (2018), online (pdf): City of London 
<http://greenfinanceinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Job-Information-Pack-GFInstitute-CEO.pdf>. 
454 Ibid. 
455 UK Government, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, “Driving ambition in green finance” 
(17 October 2018), online (pdf): City of London <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/driving-ambition-in-
green-finance>. 
456 Ibid. 
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asset classes; how such factors are emerging and how they positively or negatively affect asset 
values; how they might be interrelated or correlated; their materiality (in terms of scale, impact, 
timing, and likelihood); who will be affected; and what affected groups can do to pre-emptively 
manage risk.457 Also in the UK, the Cambridge Centre for Sustainable Finance at Cambridge 
University is aimed at building a sustainable financial system through strong partnerships that 
bridge traditional academic and industry boundaries. It is developing research on the efficacy of 
regulatory standards and practices in promoting the movement of capital into sustainable 
business; the governance of the financial system with respect to the Sustainable Development 
Goals; the potential gains and losses in financial markets as a consequence of climate change, 
inequality and ecosystem degradation; whether responsible investment practices create more 
stable and profitable institutions; and the impact of active ownership and engagement on 
corporate sustainability performance.458  
 
Similarly, Canada needs an independent research and policy body that can assist both public and 
private sectors to build capacity.   
 
Recommendation 25:  
 
The Expert Panel should recommend that the federal government create a Sustainable 
Finance Institute aimed at accelerating green finance and a sustainable Canadian 
economy, including working with the private sector, regulators, universities, non-
governmental organizations, and green finance institutes internationally to further 
develop green finance policy, innovative strategies, data and metrics.  
 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION  
 
The interim report of the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance was an important first step in the 
public policy discussion regarding how to ensure Canada is sustainable financially in the long 
term. All of the questions posed in the report need careful consideration and specific proposals 
need to be developed, but the policy recommendations generated must be timely and should be 
implemented expeditiously.  For climate-related financial risk, there is an urgent time imperative 
that affects all Canadians in their daily economic and social lives. There is also the requirement to 
act in order to meet Canada’s international commitments.  For ESG more generally, it merits 
serious consideration of expanding the need to address climate-related risks and opportunities 
to these other important factors.  It is hoped that our response to 12 of the 72 questions posed 
by the Expert Panel contributes to moving the federal government forward to take action now. 
                                                 
457 Smith School of Business Oxford, “Sustainable Finance Programme” (2019), online: University of Oxford 
<https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/sustainable-finance/>. See also The Global Research Alliance for 
Sustainable Finance and Investment (the “Alliance”), which was founded in 2017 to promote multi-disciplinary 
academic research on sustainable finance and investment across more than 20 universities globally: Global 
Research Alliance, “Welcome” (2019), online: Sustainable Finance Alliance 
<https://www.sustainablefinancealliance.org/>. 
458 Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, “About the Centre for Sustainable Finance” (2019), online: 
University of Cambridge <https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/research/centre-for-sustainable-finance/about>.  
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APPENDIX 1  Summary of Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: 
 
The current fiduciary obligation under the CBCA should be amended to incorporate ESG 
factors as follows (in red italics): 
 
Duty of care of directors and officers  
122 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
122(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees, 
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 2: 
 
Amend section 148 of the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act459  to read (in red italics): 
 
Duties of directors and officers  
148 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
                                                 
459 NFP Corporations Act, supra note 81. 
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148(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, members, shareholders, employees, 
retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 3: 
 
The fiduciary obligation of the directors and officers pursuant to the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board Act is virtually the same as many other federal statutes and the Act 
should be amended to incorporate ESG as follows (in red italics) 
 
Duty of care  
14 (1) Every director and officer of the Board in exercising any of the powers of 
a director or an officer and in discharging any of the duties of a director or an 
officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Board;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of 
the corporation; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
Special knowledge or skill 
14(2) A director or officer of the Board who in fact possesses, or by reason of 
profession or business ought to possess, a particular level of knowledge or skill 
relevant to the director’s or officer’s powers or duties shall employ that 
particular level of knowledge or skill in the exercise of those powers or the 
discharge of those duties. 
 
14(3) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees, 
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 4: 
 
Amend sections 8(4.1) and 8(4.2) of the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act by adding 
the follow language (in red italics): 
 
Manner of investing assets  
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8(4.1) The administrator shall invest the assets of a pension fund in accordance 
with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person 
would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments of a pension fund, and in 
exercising this authority, will consider environmental, social and governance 
factors.  
 
Investment choices  
8(4.2) A pension plan may permit a member, former member, survivor or former 
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make 
investment choices with respect to their account maintained in respect of a 
defined contribution provision or with respect to their account maintained for 
additional voluntary contributions, and to inform that choice, the pension 
administrator should provide information on environmental, social and 
governance factors to the member, former member, survivor or former spouse or 
former common law partner of a member or former member for their 
consideration on each fund offered. 
 
 
Recommendation 5: 
 
The Pension Benefits Standards Regulations should be amended to specify that ESG 
factors must be considered and incorporated in the SIP&P. The federal government 
should amend section 7.1 of the Pension Benefit Standards Regulation to require: 
 
The Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures required under section 7.1 
shall contain information as to how environmental, social and governance 
factors have been considered and have been incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures. 
 
 
Recommendation 6: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend to the federal government to require federal Crown 
corporations to consider whether there are material ESG risks and opportunities, and 
where they exist, to take all reasonable care to address the material ESG factors. 
 
 
Recommendation 7:  
 
For greater certainty, the Bank Act sections 158 and 748 on fiduciary obligations of banks 
and bank holding companies should be amended to read (in red italics): 
 
158 (1) Every director and officer of a bank in exercising any of the powers of a 
director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer 
shall 
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(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank; 
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
158(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment to inform their decisions. 
    . . . 
 
Duty of care  
748 (1) Every director and officer of a bank holding company in exercising any of 
the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a 
director or an officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank 
holding company;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
748(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment to inform their decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 8: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers under the Canada Cooperatives 
Act as follows (in red italics): 
 
Duties  
80 (1) Every director and officer must, in exercising the powers and performing 
the duties of office, 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
cooperative;  
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(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
80(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment to inform their decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 9: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligation of directors and officers under section 168(1) of the 
Cooperative Credit Associations Act as follows:  
 
Duty of care  
168 (1) Every director and officer of an association in exercising any of the powers of 
a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer 
shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the association;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to environmental, 
social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of the corporation; 
and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
168(2)  In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may 
consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection funds, 
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment to inform their decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 10: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligations under the federal Trust and Loan Companies Act as 
follows (in red italics):  
 
Duty of care  
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162 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers 
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an 
officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
company;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the bank; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
162(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection 
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment to inform their decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 11: 
 
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers of insurance companies and insurance 
holding companies in the Insurance Companies Act as follows (in red italics): 
 
166 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers 
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an 
officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
company;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation; and 
(d)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
166(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds, 
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment to inform their decisions. 
    . . . 
   
Duty of care  
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795 (1) Every director and officer of an insurance holding company in exercising 
any of the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of 
a director or an officer shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
insurance holding company;  
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation;  
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns 
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation and 
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in comparable circumstances. 
 
795(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers 
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds, 
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment to inform their decisions. 
 
 
Recommendation 12: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions include in its supervisory oversight of federally-regulated financial institutions 
material ESG factors that pose a risk to capital adequacy and liquidity of these 
institutions.  This requirement would provide greater certainty and transparency of 
management of ESG risks and opportunities. 
 
 
Recommendation 13: 
 
Amend the Bank of Canada Act to add the following language (in red italics): 
 
1. The directors and officers, in carrying out their duties under this Act, shall in 
good faith consider any material environmental, social and governance 
factors that may affect the Bank fulfilling its statutory mandate. 
 
2. In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may 
consider the interests of, inter alia, members of the public, shareholders, 
employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment 
to inform their decisions. 
 
The provision limiting liability should be amended to account for ESG factors in the 
following way (in red italics): 
 
No liability if in good faith 
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 30.1 No action lies against Her Majesty, the Minister, any officer, employee or 
director of the Bank or any person acting under the direction of the Governor for 
anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or 
discharge of any powers or duties that under this Act are intended or authorized 
to be executed or performed, including their consideration of environmental, 
social and governance factors in carrying out their duties under this Act. 
 
 
Recommendation 14: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend that financial advisers be required to include 
information on material ESG factors in giving financial  advice to consumer or retail 
investors. 
 
 
Recommendation 15: 
  
The federal government should work with  IIROC, MFDA and investment firms to develop 
new requirements that investment advisers and distributors ask about their clients' 
preferences regarding ESG factors and take them into account when assessing the range 
of financial instruments and insurance products being recommended. 
 
 
Recommendation 16: 
 
i. Require material ESG factors, including climate-related financial disclosures, to 
be reported in annual financial filings.  
 
ii. Ask the Canadian Accounting Standards Board to review the industry specific 
standards promulgated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board for 
purposes of adoption in Canada. 
 
iii. The federal government should work with Canadian accounting standards 
authorities and securities regulators to provide tools to assist companies to 
embed ESG disclosure in publicly-listed corporations’ financial statements and 
notes to financial statements. 
 
 
Recommendation 17: 
 
i. Require disclosure of management’s approach to material ESG risks and 
opportunities in management’s proxy circular in conjunction with the annual 
meeting. 
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ii. Create a consultation process to evaluate using a “sustainability disclosure and 
analysis” (“SD&A”) reporting tool for the proxy circular ESG disclosure.   
 
 
Recommendation 18: 
 
The Expert Panel should consider recommending a move to bi-annual and annual 
financial statements for larger issuers and only annual financial statements for venture 
and smaller issuers (by market cap) as one means to focus on longer-term sustainability 
and relieve some of the resource pressures in shifting to an ESG governance framework. 
 
 
Recommendation 19:   
 
i. The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should 
require companies to disclose and address material climate-related financial risk 
in its initial regulations, and should peg requirements to international standards 
as they develop. 
 
ii. The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act and 
should assess whether there is a need to address material environmental, social 
and governance systemic risk more generally, in terms of risk to the stability of 
the country’s financial system as a whole and the  potential to have a material 
adverse effect on the Canadian economy.   
 
iii. The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should 
negotiate with securities administrators across Canada to embed a staged 
approach to TCFD disclosure within provincial securities regulation, where 
applicable and as standards develop. 
 
 
Recommendation 20: 
 
The federal government should endorse the TCFD disclosure framework, recognizing that 
it is continuing to develop. 
 
 
Recommendation 21: 
 
i. The government should establish criteria to recognize leaders in sustainability 
disclosure in each size category (small, medium, large, national champions) and 
constitute a Council of Sustainability Leaders. 
 
124 
 
ii. The government should facilitate dialogues between investors and companies to 
develop mutual understandings of what types of sustainability disclosure is most 
valuable to investors.    
 
 
Recommendation 22: 
 
The federal government should encourage securities regulators and the CSA to direct 
companies to use the TCFD sector guidance and SASB guidance when determining the 
materiality of climate-related disclosures and when disclosing information about 
governance, risk management, company strategy, and targets and metrics within the 
construct of their continuous disclosure. 
 
 
Recommendation 23: 
 
The Expert Panel should recommend an ESG disclosure “safe harbour” to protect duly 
diligent directors and officers (possible draft language in red italics): 
 
DISCLOSURE OF ENVIROMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE INFORMATION   
 
1. Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) Information 
(1) This Part applies to ESG information that is disclosed by a reporting issuer 
other than ESG information contained in oral statements. 
 
2. Disclosure  
(1) A reporting issuer that discloses material ESG information must include 
disclosure that  
(a) cautions users of the ESG information that actual results may vary in 
the future due to refinements in metrics to measure risks and 
opportunities and identifies material risk factors that could cause results 
to differ materially from the reported ESG information;  
(c) states the material factors or assumptions used to develop the ESG 
information; and   
(d) describes the reporting issuer’s policy for updating ESG information. 
 
(2) ESG outlook information that is based on assumptions that are reasonable 
in the circumstances must, without limitation,  
(a) be limited to a period for which the information in the ESG outlook 
can be reasonably reported or be estimated; and  
(b) use the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to 
prepare its historical financial statements for the period covered.  
 
(3) This Part does not apply to disclosure that is (a) subject to requirements 
in National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas 
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Activities or National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral 
Projects; made to comply with the conditions of any exemption from the 
requirements that a reporting issuer received from a regulator or securities 
regulatory authority unless the regulator or securities regulatory authority 
orders that this Part applies to disclosure made under the exemption; or  
contained in an oral statement.  
 
3. Reasonable Basis  
A reporting issuer is not required to disclose ESG information unless the issuer has 
a reasonable basis for considering the information to be material. 
 
4. A reporting issuer that discloses ESG information must include disclosure that 
states the date management approved the ESG information. 
 
5. ESG Financial Information 
(1) A reporting issuer must not disclose ESG financial information unless it is 
reasonable in the circumstances,  
(a) is limited to a period for which the information in the ESG financial 
information or financial outlook can be reasonably measured or 
estimated; and   
(b) use the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to prepare 
its historical financial statements for the period covered by the ESG 
information or the financial outlook.  
(2) The issuer must explain the ESG financial information in the financial 
statements and the notes to the financial statements.  
(3) The issuer must disclose the date management approved the ESG financial 
information and explain the purpose of the ESG financial information and 
caution readers that the information may not be appropriate for other 
purposes. 
(4) The issuer must disclose any year to year change in reporting ESG metrics 
used. 
 
 
Recommendation 24: 
 
The federal government should adopt requirements to require debt and equity 
institutional investors and asset managers, including mutual funds and pension funds, to 
disclose annually the financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the 
company’s measures to reduce them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon 
strategy in each component of their activities, and how their corporate and investment 
decision-making is contributing to the energy and ecological transition to limit global 
warming. 
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Recommendation 25:  
 
The Expert Panel should recommend that the federal government create a Sustainable 
Finance Institute aimed at accelerating green finance and a sustainable Canadian 
economy, including working with the private sector, regulators, universities, non-
governmental organizations, and green finance institutes internationally to further 
develop green finance policy, innovative strategies, data and metrics. 
